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Medellin v. Texas
(06-984)
Ruling Below: (Ex parte Medellin, No. AP-75,207 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert granted, 2006 WL
3302639, April 30, 2007).
Medellin, a Mexican national who spent most of his life in Texas, was convicted of the rape and
murder of two teenage girls. He later appealed on grounds that he was not notified of his right to
access the Mexican consulate for advice and legal counsel. In Mexico v. U.S. (the Avena
judgment), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that 51 Mexican nationals, including
petitioner, were entitled to receive review and reconsideration in the U.S. President Bush then
ordered a review and hearings in each of the 51 cases, which the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals disregarded, holding that the decision of the ICJ was not binding federal law and so did
not abide by its decision.
Questions Presented: (1) Did the President of the United States act within his constitutional and
statutory foreign affairs authority when he determined on Feb. 28, 2005, that the states must
comply with the United States' treaty obligation to give effect to the Avena judgment of the
International Court of Justice in the cases of the 51 Mexican nationals named in that March 2004
judgment? (2) Are state courts bound by the Constitution to honor the undisputed international
obligation of the United States, under treaties duly ratified by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to give effect to the Avena judgment in the cases that the judgment
addressed?
Ex parte MEDELLIN
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Decided November 15, 2006
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
KEASLER, Judge, delivered the opinion of
the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III.A.,
III.C., and IV:
Jose Ernesto Medellin filed this subsequent
application, alleging that the International
Court of Justice Avena decision and the
President's memorandum directing state
courts to give effect to Avena, require this
Court to reconsider his Article 36 Vienna
Convention claim because they (1) constitute
hindina federal law that preempt Section
Article 11.071 and (2) were previously
unavailable factual and legal bases under
Section 5(a)(1). We hold that Avena and the
President's memorandum do not preempt
Section 5 and do not qualify as previously
unavailable factual or legal bases.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF
MEDELLIN'S CASE
Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted
of capital murder and sentenced to death for
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his participation in the gang rape and murder
of two teenage girls in Houston. We affirmed
his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
Medellin v. State, No. AP-71.997. slip op.
(Tex.Crim.App. Mar. 19, 1997).
Medellin filed an initial application for a writ
of habeas corpus, claiming for the first time,
among other things, that his rights under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention had been
violated because he had not been advised of
his right to contact the Mexican consular
official after he was arrested. Ex parte
Medellin, No. 675430-A (339th Dist. Ct. Jan.
22, 2001). The district court found that
Medellin failed to object to the violation of
his Vienna Convention rights at trial and, as a
result, concluded that his claim was
procedurally barred from review. The court
also found, in the alternative, that Medellin.
as a private individual, did not have standing
to bring a claim under the Vienna Convention
because it is a treaty among nations and
therefore does not confer enforceable rights
on individuals; only signatory nations have
standing to raise a claim under the treaty.
Offering an additional alternative. the court
determined that Medellin failed to show harm
because he received effective legal
representation and his constitutional rights
had been safeguarded. Finally, the court
concluded that Medellin did not prove that his
rights under the Fifth. Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments had been violated and that he
failed to show that any non-notification
affected the validity of his conviction and
sentence. We adopted the trial court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law with
written order and denied relief.
Medellin then presented his Vienna
Convention claim in a federal petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. The district court
denied relief, and Medellin filed for a
certificate of appealability While his
application was pending. the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its decision in
Avena. Mexico v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. No. 128.
In that case, Mexico claimed that the United
States had violated the Vienna Convention by
failing to timely advise more than fifty
Mexican nationals awaiting execution in
United States prisons, including Medellin, of
their right to talk to a consular official after
they had been detained. Id. at 13-16, 49. The
ICJ ruled in favor of Mexico, holding that the
Vienna Convention does confer individual
rights and that the United States violated the
Convention. Id. at 90, 106. 140. To remedy
the violation, the ICJ ordered the United
States to provide review and reconsideration
of the convictions and sentences at issue to
determine whether the violation "caused
actual prejudice to the defendant in the
process of administration of criminal justice."
Id. at 121. The ICJ specifically stated that
review is required regardless of procedural
default rules that would otherwise bar review.
Id. at 112-13, 153(9), (11).
The federal district court denied Medellin's
application for a certificate of appealability.
and Medellin appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which
also denied his application. Medellin v.
Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 273. 281 (5th
Cir.2004). The Fifth Circuit noted the ICJ
decision in Avena, but determined that it was
bound by the Supreme Court's decision in
Breard v. Greene. which held that claims
based on a violation of the Vienna
Convention are subject to procedural default
rules. Id. at 280 (citing Breard v. Greene. 523
U.S. 371. 118 S.Ct. 1352. 140 L.Ed.2d 529
(1998)). Continuing. the court found that even
if Medellin's Vienna Convention claim was
not procedurally defaulted, its previous
holding in United States v. Jimenez-Nava-
that the Vienna Convention does not create
individually enforceable rights-would
require it to deny Medellin's application for a
certificate of appealability. Id. (citing United
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States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198
(5th Cir.2001)).
Medellin petitioned for certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States, which
granted review. Medellin v. Dretke, 543 U.S.
1032, 125 S.Ct. 686, 160 L.Ed.2d 518 (2004).
Before oral argument, the President issued a
memorandum directing state courts to give
effect to the Avena decision under the
principles of comity. Then, while his case was
pending before the Supreme Court, Medellin
filed an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in this Court, requesting that we give
full effect to the Avena decision and to the
President's memorandum. Ex parte Medellin,
206 S.W.3d 584 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005),
Application No. AP-75,207. The Supreme
Court subsequently dismissed Medellin's case
as improvidently granted, stating that there is
a possibility that "Texas courts will provide
Medellin with the review he seeks pursuant to
the Avena judgment and the President's
memorandum. . . ." Medellin v. Dretke, 544
U.S. 660, 125 S.Ct. 2088, 2092, 161 L.Ed.2d
982 (2005) (per curiam).
Based on the Supreme Court's dismissal, we
determined that Medellin's subsequent
application is ripe for consideration. We
therefore filed and set this case for
submission.
Under Article 11.071, Section 5(a) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, we may not
consider the merits of any claims raised on a
subsequent application for a writ of habeas
corpus or grant relief unless the applicant
provides sufficient specific facts
demonstrating that:
"the current claims and issues
have not been and could not have
been presented previously in a
timely initial application or in a
previously considered application
. . . because the factual or legal
basis for the claim was
unavailable on the date the
applicant filed the previous
application."
We ordered Medellin and the State to brief
the following issue: whether Medellin "meets
the requirements for consideration of a
subsequent application for writ of habeas
corpus under the provisions of Article 11.071,
section 5, of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure." Ex parte Medellin. We also
invited the Attorney General of the United
States to "present the views of the United
States." Id.; see 28 C.F.R. § 0.5 (2005). On
September 14, 2005, we heard oral argument
from the parties and the Solicitor General,
who argued on behalf of the Attorney General
of the United States. ...
Medellin argues that the Avena decision and
the President's memorandum are binding
federal law that preempt Section 5 under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. Alternatively, contending that
he meets the requirements of Section 5(a)(1),
Medellin claims that the Avena decision and
the President's memorandum are previously
unavailable factual and legal bases because
neither was available when he filed his first
application. Countering Medellin's
arguments, the State contends that the Avena
decision and the President's memorandum do
not meet the requirements of Section 5 and do
not override it. Finally, the United States as
amicus curiae asserts that, although Avena is
not enforceable in United States courts.
Medellin is entitled to review and
reconsideration of the merits of his Vienna
Convention claim "to the extent that his claim
relies on the President's determination that
'review and reconsideration' .. by Texas
courts is necessary for compliance with the
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United States' international obligations." The
United States also avers that "Section 5 would
contravene the President's implementation of
treaty obligations, and federal law would
preempt its operation in the circumstances of
this case."
II. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Treaties
Treaties, entered into by the President of the
United States with the consent of a super-
majority of the United States Senate, are
incorporated into the domestic law of our
country pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution, which
commands: "all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Treaties are "placed on the
same footing" as legislation enacted by the
United States Congress, and while neither is
superior to the other, both are subject to the
United States Constitution. Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 17, 77 S.Ct. 1222. 1 L.Ed.2d 1148
(1957). . ..
When a self-executing treaty and an act of
Congress concern the same subject matter,
courts should give effect to both unless the
language of one would be violated. Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S.Ct. 456, 31
L.Ed. 386 (1888). But when "the two are
inconsistent, the one last in date will control
the other." Id.
Addressing the relationship between state law
and treaties, the Supreme Court has stated:
"[T]reaties with foreign nations will be
carefully construed so as not to derogate from
the authority and jurisdiction of the States of
this nation unless clearly necessary to
effectuate the national policy." United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230, 62 S.Ct. 552
(1942). Accordingly, "state law must yield
when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the
policy or provisions of, a treaty or of an
international compact or agreement." Id. at
230-31, 62 S.Ct. 552.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a
treaty may contain certain provisions that
grant judicially enforceable rights to a foreign
national residing in another country. Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598, 5 S.Ct. 247. In
such cases, under the Supremacy Clause, the
provisions of the treaty are placed in the
"same category as other laws of Congress"
and therefore, are "subject to such acts as
Congress may pass for its enforcement,
modification, or repeal." Id. at 599, 5 S.Ct.
247. When a treaty confers rights that are
judicially enforceable, a court will look "to
the treaty for a rule of decision for the case
before it as it would to a statute." Id.
However, as we recently noted. there is a
presumption that "'international agreements,
even those directly benefiting private persons,
generally do not create private rights or
provide for a private cause of action in
domestic courts."' Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d
469, 478 (Tex.Crim.App.2005)....
B. The United Nations Charter and the Statute
of the International Court of Justice
. . . Article 92 establishes the ICJ as "the
principal judicial organ of the United
Nations." The ICJ operates "in accordance
with the annexed Statute [of the ICJ]. . .
Under Article 93, "All Members of the United
Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of
the International Court of Justice." . . . Article
34 of the Statute provides that "[o]nly states
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may be parties in cases before the [ICJ]" and,
under Article 36(1), the court has jurisdiction
over "cases which the parties refer to it and all
matters specifically provided for . . . in
treaties and conventions in force." Under
Article 59, an ICJ decision binds only the
parties to that particular case....
C. The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations and the Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes
... The Vienna Convention is a seventy-nine
article multilateral treaty that "promotes the
effective delivery of consular services in
foreign countries, including access to consular
assistance when a citizen of one country is
arrested, committed to prison or custody
pending trial, or detained in any other manner
in another country" ...
Article 36 "ensure[s] that no signatory nation
denies consular access and assistance to
another country's citizens traveling or
residing in a foreign country... " Sorto. 173
S.W.3d at 477. Article 36 reads as follows:
1. With a view to facilitating the
exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending
State:
(a) consular officers shall be
free to communicate with
nationals of the sending State
and to have access to them.
Nationals of the sendinu State
shall have the same freedom
with respect to
communication with and
access to consular officers of
the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the
competent authorities of the
receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular
post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a
national of that State is
arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending
trial or is detained in any
other manner....
In addition to becoming signatories to the
Vienna Convention, Mexico and the United
States became parties to the Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes. Article I of the Optional Protocol
states: "Disputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of the
Convention shall lie within the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice and may accordingly be brought
before the Court by an application made by
any party to the dispute being a Party to the
present Protocol." Although the United States
recently withdrew from the Optional Protocol,
the United States has agreed to "discharge its
inter-national obligations under the decision
. . . by having State courts give effect to the
[Avena] decision. . . ."
D. International Court of Justice Rulings on
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
Involving the United States
The ICJ has encountered a series of cases
filed against the United States by other
nations alleging violations of Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention.
... Two suits were filed. Federal Republic of
Germany v. United States of America
(LaGrand) and Mexico v. United States of
America (Avena). . . . Although both the
LaGrands were executed before the ICJ
issued its judgment, the ICJ still found.
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among other things, that: (1) Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention confers individual rights
on detained foreign nationals; (2) the United
States failed to comply with Article 36; and
(3) as applied to the LaGrands, the procedural
default rules of the United States prevented
the rights intended under Article 36 from
being given full effect. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J.
104, TT 1, 10, 14. The court further stated that
the United States, "by means of its own
choosing, shall allow the review and
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence
by taking account of the violation of the rights
set forth in that Convention."
Almost three years after LaGrand, the ICJ
handed down its decision in Avena. With
regard to Medellin and fifty other Mexican
nationals, the ICJ concluded that the United
States breached its obligations under Article
36, paragraph 1(b) by failing to inform them,
after their arrests and without delay, of their
right to contact the Mexican consular post.
Avena, 106(1), 153(4). And in forty-nine
cases, including Medellin's case, the court
found that the United States violated Article
36, paragraphs 1(a) through (c) by failing to:
(1) notify the consular post of their detention;
(2) enable consular officials to communicate
with and have access to them; and (3) enable
consular officials to visit with them. The court
also found that in Medellin's case, in addition
to thirty-three others, the United States
violated Article 36, paragraph (c) by
preventing consular officials from being able
to timely arrange for their citizens' legal
representation.
After addressing the United States' and
Mexico's arguments concerning the
appropriate remedy for the Article 36
violations, the court concluded "that the
,review and reconsideration' prescribed by it
in the LaGrand case should be effective."
Directing the United States to provide review
and reconsideration of the convictions and
sentences of the Mexican nationals whose
individual rights under the Vienna
Convention had been violated, the ICJ stated:
... [W]hat is crucial in the review
and reconsideration process is the
existence of a procedure which
guarantees that full weight is given
to the violation of the rights set
forth in the Vienna Convention,
whatever may be the actual
outcome of such review and
reconsideration.
E. The Presidential Memorandum
After the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in this case, the President
weighed in on the controversy surrounding
Avena by issuing a memorandum to the
United States Attorney General, which states,
in pertinent part, as follows:
I have determined, pursuant to the
authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and the laws of
the United States of America, that
the United States will discharge its
inter-national obligations under the
decision of the International Court
of Justice in . . . [Avena], by having
State courts give effect to the
decision in accordance with general
principles of comity in cases filed
by the 51 Mexican nationals
addressed in that decision.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Avena and The Supremacy Clause
Medellin claims that the ICJ decision in
Avena is binding federal law that preempts
Section 5 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. The State and the United States as
amicus curiae disagree.
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As an initial matter, while we recognize the
competing arguments before us concerning
whether Article 36 confers privately
enforceable rights, a resolution to that issue is
not required for our determination of whether
Avena is enforceable in this Court. Our
decision is controlled by the Supreme Court's
recent opinion in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
and accordingly, we hold that Avena is not
binding federal law and therefore does not
preempt Section 5.
In this case, we are bound by the Supreme
Court's determination that ICJ decisions are
not binding on United States courts. As a
result, Medellin, even as one of the named
individuals in the decision, cannot show that
Avena requires us to set aside Section 5 and
review and reconsider his Vienna Convention
claim.
B. The Presidential Memorandum and the
Supremacy Clause
Aligned on the effect of the Presidentfs
memorandum, both Medellin and the United
States as amicus curiae contend that the
President's February 28, 2005, memorandum
preempts Section 5 and, as a result, requires
us to review and reconsider Medellin's
conviction and sentence as prescribed by
Avena. In opposition, the State challenges,
among other things, the effect of the
memorandum's substantive language.
. . . [W]e conclude that Medellin has not
shown that the President's memorandum
entitles him to review and reconsideration, we
will assume, without deciding, that the
memorandum constitutes an executive order.
. . . With regard to external affairs. the federal
government possesses exclusive power; it is
"vested with all the powers of government
necessary to maintain an effective control of
international relations." Curtiss- Wright, 299
U.S. at 318, 57 S.Ct. 216. When acting in
external affairs, the President has "plenary
and exclusive power . .. as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of
international relations." And while the
President's power "must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of
the Constitution," such power is not
necessarily dependent on specific
congressional authorization. Id. The
President, for example, can enter into
executive agreements with foreign nations
without the advice and consent of the Senate.
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,
415, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 156 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003).
Valid agreements are accorded the same
status as treaties and, consequently, may
preempt state law if they "'impair the
effective exercise of the Nation's foreign
policy."' Executive orders issued by the
President must be authorized by an act of
Congress or by the Constitution.
Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v.
Sawyer, sought to define the scope of the
President's power. Recognizing that he was
offering "a somewhat over-simplified
grouping" because "[p]residential powers are
not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress," Justice Jackson related the
following:
* The President's "authority is at its
maximum" "[w]hen the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress." In such
circumstances, the President's power
"includes all that he possesses in his own
right plus all that Congress can delegate."
* The President's power is in "a zone of
twilight" "[w]hen the President acts in
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absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority."
The President's memorandum cites his
authority under the Constitution and laws of
the United States. With this in mind, we must
decide whether the President has exceeded his
power by directing us to give effect to the
Avena decision under the principles of
comity. The President's directive, which is
dependent on his power to act in both foreign
and domestic affairs, is unprecedented. What
Justice Jackson proclaimed in his concurrence
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company fifty-
four years ago-that the judiciary "may be
surprised at the poverty of really useful and
unambiguous authority applicable to concrete
problems of executive power as they actually
present themselves" resonates with us today.
We hold that the President has exceeded his
constitutional authority by intruding into the
independent powers of the judiciary. By
stating "that the United States will discharge
its inter-national obligations under the
decision of the International Court of Justice
in . . . [ Avena ], by having State courts give
effect to the decision . . . [J" the President's
determination is effectively analogous to that
decision. In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme
Court made clear that its judicial "power
includes the duty 'to say what the law is."'
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2684. And that
power, according to the Court, includes the
authority to determine the meaning of a treaty
as a "matter of federal law." The clear import
of this is that the President cannot dictate to
the judiciary what law to apply or how to
interpret the applicable law.
Medellin and the United States argue that the
President's authority is at its maximum. In
doing so, both rely on the President's inherent
foreign affairs power to enter into executive
agreements to settle claims with foreign
nations....
Turning to the case before us, we conclude
that the reliance on the President's power to
enter into executive agreements to settle
disputes with other nations, and even
corporations under the limited circumstances
described in Garamendi, by Medellin and the
United States is misplaced. The President has
not entered into any such agreement with
Mexico relating to the Mexican nationals
named in the Avena decision. There has been
no settlement. Rather, the presidential
memorandum is a unilateral act executed in
an effort to achieve a settlement with Mexico.
The President's independent foreign affairs
power to enter into an executive agreement to
settle a dispute with a foreign nation under
Article II of the Constitution "has received
congressional acquiescence throughout its
history. . . ." Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415, 123
S.Ct. 2374. But there is no similar history of
congressional acquiescence relating to the
President's authority to unilaterally settle a
dispute with another nation by executive
order, memorandum, or directive. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at
610-11, 72 S.Ct. 863. . . . In this context, it is
evident that the President's independent
power to settle a dispute with a foreign nation,
recognized throughout the nation's history,
depends on the existence of an executive
agreement. Given the extraordinary conduct
of the President, unsupported by a history of
congressional acquiescence, we find that the
President's chosen method for resolving this
country's dispute with Mexico is
"incompatible with the . . . implied will of
Congress[.]" Accordingly, in this instance, we
find that the exercise of the President's
foreign affairs power "is at its lowest ebb[.]"
Having acted contrary to the implied will of
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Congress, we conclude that the President has
exceeded his inherent constitutional foreign
affairs authority by directing state courts to
comply with Avena.
Contrary to the United States' contentions,
requiring a formal bilateral agreement does
not limit or constrain the President's ability to
settle international controversies or comply
with treaty obligations. The President's ability
to negotiate and enter into an executive
agreement to settle a dispute with a foreign
nation remains. In this case, however, the
President failed to avail himself of that
mechanism to settle this nation's dispute with
Mexico. And although it may be time-
consuming to obtain an executive agreement,
the need for "swift action" does not override
what the Constitution requires-an
international compact or agreement.
... A Presidential resolution that is based on
an evaluation of the means necessary to
resolve a dispute and then implemented in
anticipation of future acquiescence by a
foreign government is not a settlement. The
mere possibility of later acquiescence by a
foreign government is speculation.
Representatives of foreign governments
change. and with them, international relations
are subject to modification. When it comes to
foreign relations, history has proven that a
nation deemed an ally on one day, may on the
next, be declared an enemy. Finally, the view
that an executive agreement allows "a foreign
government veto power over the President's
exercise of his foreign affairs powers"
undermines the purpose of the negotiation
process-the accomplishment of an actual
settlement.
The absence of an executive agreement
between the United States and Mexico is
central to our determination that the President
has exceeded his inherent foreign affairs
power by ordering us to comply with Avena.
We must make clear, however, that our
decision is limited to the issue before us-the
effect of the President's February 28, 2005,
memorandum. Therefore, we express no
opinion about whether an executive
agreement between the United States and
Mexico providing for state court compliance
with Avena would preempt state law.
Medellin also relies on the President's duty to
faithfully execute the laws as provided in
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
According to Medellin, the President "has
both the authority and the duty to enforce the
United States's treaty obligations within the
domestic legal system" because, under the
Supremacy Clause, treaties are supreme.
Related to this argument is Medellin's
contention that the President has done nothing
more than confirm that the United States will
do what it has already promised to do-abide
by the decision of the ICJ in a dispute
concerning the interpretation and application
of the Vienna Convention. That promise was
made by [a] constitutionally prescribed
process when the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, entered into the
Vienna Convention, the Optional Protocol,
the U.N. Charter. and the ICJ Statute.
The Supreme Court's determination about the
domestic effect of ICJ decisions-that they
are entitled only to "'respectful
consideration'" Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at
2685 (quoting Breard, 523 U.S. at 375, 118
S.Ct. 1352)., based on its interpretation of the
Statute of the ICJ and the United Nations
Charter in Sanchez-Llamas forecloses any
argument that the President is acting within
his authority to faithfully execute the laws of
the United States. By directing state courts to
give effect to Avena, the President has acted
as a lawmaker. But, as Justice Black
explained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, "[i1n
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the framework of our Constitution, the
President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is
to be a lawmaker." The President's February
28, 2005, determination cannot be sustained
under the power of the Executive to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed.
Relying again on the enumerated powers of
the President, Medellin also contends that
"[t]he Constitution explicitly vests the
President with authority over diplomatic and
consular relations." He argues: "No power is
more clearly Presidential than the authority to
protect U.S. citizens and their interests
abroad." He contends that the ability of the
United States to protect its citizens may be
compromised if the United States does not
comply with Avena. Looking to statutory
authority, Medellin maintains that by virtue of
Title 22 United States Code, Sections 1732
and 402(a)(1)(D), "Congress has specifically
referenced the President's duty in the context
of protecting U.S. citizens who have been
detained or arrested in foreign lands, . . . and
in requiring the President to protect foreign
nationals in the United States[.]"
We have no doubt that the President and other
executive branch officials play a vital role in
protecting the interests of American citizens
abroad when necessary. However, we do not
construe the constitutional provisions as
expressly or implicitly granting the President
the authority to mandate state court
compliance with the ICJ Avena decision, and
Medellin cites no precedent that would lead
us to conclude otherwise.
Nor can the statutes be read to authorize the
President's independent action in this case.
First, there is no indication that the Hostage
Act specifically grants the President unlimited
power to act when the President's objective is
to protect the interests of American citizens
traveling or residing abroad....
. . . We cannot accept Medellin's argument
that the Hostage Act grants the President
unfettered authority to act to protect the
interest of United States citizens abroad. It
strains logic to conclude that the power
delegated to the President under the Hostage
Act permits the President to engage in any
conduct that will ensure the maintenance of
that power. Nevertheless, we need not decide
the scope of any implied power conferred to
the President under the Hostage Act, because,
as we have already concluded in this case,
"there is [not] a history of congressional
acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged
in by the President." When concluding that
the President had the authority to suspend
pending court claims in Dames & Moore, the
Court relied on not only the President's power
under the Hostage Act, but on the President's
power under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act and the President's
power to settle claims with foreign nations by
executive agreement. In doing so, the Court
specifically noted: "Crucial to our decision
today is the conclusion that Congress has
implicitly approved the practice of claim
settlement by executive agreement." We
decline to find that the Hostage Act authorizes
the President to order this Court to comply
with Avena.
Although Section 4802(a)(1)(D), Title 22,
United States Code, provides that the
Secretary of State has the duty to protect
"foreign missions, international organizations,
and foreign officials and other foreign persons
in the United States," that duty extends only
to things "'authorized by law." The statute,
therefore. cannot be regarded as an
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independent source of authority for the
President's memorandum ordering state
courts to comply with Avena.
In further support of its position that the
President has the authority to direct state
courts to give effect to the ICJ Avena
decision, the United States directs us to the
United Nations Charter and the United
Nations Participation Act. The United States
maintains that the ratification of the Charter
"implicitly grants the President 'the lead role'
in determining how to respond to an ICJ
decision." And under the United Nations
Participation Act, according to the United
States, the President; through appointed
officials, "represents the United States in the
United Nations, including before the ICJ and
in the Security Council." Moreover, the
United States argues that Congress "expressly
anticipated that these officials would . . .
perform 'other functions in connection with
the participation of the United States in the
United Nations' at the direction of the
President or his representative to the United
Nations."
Starting with the United Nations Charter, we
hold it does not authorize the type of action
that the President has taken here. The
President is still bound by the Constitution
when deciding how the United States will
respond to an ICJ decision, and, as stated
above, the President exceeded his implied
foreign affairs power by directing state courts
to give effect to Avena.
Additionally, the subsections of the United
Nations Participation Act set forth above do
not support the President's determination.
Because the participation of the United States
in proceedings before the ICJ does not bind
the courts of this country to comply with a
decision of the ICJ, it necessarily follows that
the participation of the United States in the
United Nations does not authorize the
President to order state courts to give effect to
any decision rendered by the ICJ.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the
President's memorandum ordering us to give
effect to the ICJ Avena decision cannot be
sustained under the express or implied
constitutional powers of the President relied
on by Medellin and the United States or under
any power granted to the President by an act
of Congress cited by Medellin and the United
States. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343
U.S. at 585, 72 S.Ct. 863. As such, the
President has violated the separation of
powers doctrine by intruding into the domain
of the judiciary, and therefore, Medellin
cannot show that the President's
memorandum preempts Section 5.
C. Section 5(a)(1), Article 11.071 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
We now consider whether Medellin has
satisfied the requirements of Article 11.071.
Section 5(a)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure so as to permit this Court to review
and reconsider his Vienna Convention claim.
Medellin contends that the Avena decision
and the Presidential memorandum serve as
previously unavailable factual and legal bases
because both issued after his first application
was denied. The State maintains that the legal
basis for Medellin's claim, the Vienna
Convention, was available before his trial and
when he filed his first application. Medellin
claims, however, that he is not reasserting the
same claim presented on his first application;
he contends that the Avena decision and the
President's memorandum provide him with
the right to prospective review and
reconsideration. We will address whether the
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Avena decision or the Presidential
memorandum qualify as a new factual or legal
basis under Section 5(a)(1) separately.
1. Factual Basis
Section 5(e) of Article 11.071 states:
For purposes of Subsection (a)(1), a factual
basis of a claim is unavailable on or before a
date described by Subsection (a)(1) if the
factual basis was not ascertainable through
the exercise of reasonable diligence on or
before that date.
What constitutes a "factual basis" under
Section 5(a)(1) is not defined. Therefore, to
determine whether Avena or the President's
memorandum qualify as a previously
unavailable factual basis under Section
5(a)(1), we must perform a statutory-
construction analysis to determine the
meaning of "factual."
Our review of multiple dictionaries reveals
that there are numerous definitions for the
word "fact." For instance, Webster's Third
New International Dictionary alone contains
six definitions. Although there are a variety of
definitions for the word "fact," it must be
considered in the context in which it appears.
We find it instructive that the Legislature
expressly distinguished factual basis (fact)
from legal basis (law) in Section 5(a)(1). This
distinction accounts for the two necessary, but
separate. parts of any subsequent claim: the
factual basis and the legal basis. With this in
mind, we find that the following definition of
"fact" from Black's Law Dictionary
accurately reflects the Legislature's intent:
"[a]n actual or alleged event or circumstance,
as distinguished from its legal effect,
consequence, or interpretation." Giving effect
to the plain meaning of "fact" does not lead to
an absurd result that the Legislature could not
have intended. It is the application of the law
to a fact or set of facts that yields the legal
effect, consequence, or interpretation. And in
some cases, the legal effect, consequence, or
interpretation creates a new rule of law.
The actual event or circumstance involved in
Medellin's case is that law enforcement
authorities did not inform Medellin of his
right to contact the Mexican consulate after
his arrest as required by Article 36(1)(b). This
fact provided the factual basis for Medellin's
challenge to his conviction and sentence
under the Vienna Convention on his first
application for a writ of habeas corpus. We
disposed of this claim on an independent state
ground. Ex parte Medellin, No. WR-50,191-
01 (Tex.Crim.App. Oct. 3, 2001). Agreeing
with the trial court, we found that the legal
effect or consequence of Medellin's Vienna
Convention claim resulted in the application
of our state procedural default rule due to
Medellin's failure to object at trial.
Medellin now argues that Avena is a
previously unavailable factual basis for
purposes of Section 5(a)(1). We disagree. For
purposes of Section 5(a)(1), the Avena
decision is properly categorized as law, even
though it is not binding on us. Sanchez-
Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2682. The ICJ's decision
in Avena is not a fact and, therefore, does not
qualify as a previously unavailable factual
basis under Section 5(a)(1).
As to the President's memorandum, Medellin
asserts that "[a] judgment giving rise to new
claims issued after an applicant's habeas
application renders the factual basis of the
claim 'unavailable' under Section 5(a)." Thus,
he urges, the President's memorandum is a
new "factual basis" entitling him to review.
We also disagree with this argument.
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Medellin broadly claims that "whether
considered as a factual or legal basis . . . the
President's Determination was [not] available
at the time of his initial application for
purposes of Section 5(a)" without further
explanation as to how the memorandum
constitutes a "factual" basis. Medellin's
arguments, however, address the
memorandum exclusively as a legal, not
factual, basis; he argues that the President's
memorandum "constitutes a binding federal
rule of decision." But even if Medellin had
devised a complete argument that the
President's memorandum constitutes a
"factual basis," we would still reach the same
conclusion....
2. Legal Basis
Because neither the Avena decision nor the
President's memorandum constitute a "factual
basis," we now consider whether either
qualifies as a previously unavailable "legal
basis" under Section 5(a)(1). Section 5(d) of
Article 11.071 states:
a legal basis of a claim is
unavailable on or before a date
described by Subsection (a)(1) if
the legal basis was not recognized
by or could not have been
reasonably formulated from a final
decision of the United States
Supreme Court, a court of appeals
of the United States, or a court of
appellate jurisdiction of this state
on or before that date.
Although the Avena decision and the
Presidential memorandum were not available
when Medellin filed his first application,
neither constitutes a new legal basis under the
plain language of Section 5(d). Boykin, 818
S.W.2d at 785. First, neither has been
recognized as providing a right to review and
reconsideration in "a final decision of the
United States Supreme Court, a court of
appeals of the United States, or a court of
appellate jurisdiction of this state. .
Indeed, as we noted earlier, the United States
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its holding
in Breard-that procedural default rules may
bar Vienna Convention claims. In Sanchez-
Llamas, the Supreme Court concluded that
Avena is entitled to only "'respectful
consideration,"' and as such, that decision is
not binding on us. Likewise, because we have
concluded that the President has exceeded his
authority by ordering state courts to give
effect to Avena, the President's determination
is not binding federal law. Because Avena and
the President's memorandum are not binding
law, neither of them can serve as a previously
unavailable legal basis for purposes of
Section 5(a)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
Having found that the ICJ Avena decision and
the Presidential memorandum do not
constitute binding federal law that preempt
Section 5 under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution and that neither
qualify as a previously unavailable factual or
legal basis under Section 5(a)(1). we
DISMISS Medellin's subsequent application
for a writ of habeas corpus under Article
11.071, Section 5.
KELLER, Judge, concurring:
On behalf of the United States as amicus
curiae, the U.S. Attorney General's office has
taken the position that President Bush's
memorandum constitutes an order requiring
this Court to ignore rules of procedural
default (including rules governing
contemporaneous objections at trial and
statutes governing subsequent habeas corpus
applications) and evaluate anew whether
applicant was prejudiced by a failure to
comply with the Vienna Convention on
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Consular Relations. I conclude that the
President of the United States does not have
the power to order a state court to conduct
such a review.
The Supreme Court has suggested that the
proper analysis for determining whether a
president's exercise of his foreign relations
power preempts state law is to determine first
whether the state has acted within an area of
"traditional state responsibility." and if it has,
to assess the degree of conflict with federal
policy and the strength of the state interest
involved. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420, 420 n.
11, 123 S.Ct. 2374. Unlike other federal
preemption cases in which a state has
prevailed, we address here an express, stark
conflict between the President's assertion of
power (at least under the Justice Department's
interpretation) and the state law at issue.
Nevertheless, given the principle that a
weighty state interest lessens the likelihood of
federal preemption, it follows that a president
cannot use his foreign affairs authority to
intrude into the state arena with impunity: at
some point, the national interest is served in
too attenuated a manner by the specific
presidential action, and the state interest
intruded upon is too fundamental, to permit a
president's intervention.
Such a case is now before us. Criminal justice
is an area primarily of state concern. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
the "States possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law." And
states have, to say the least, an overwhelming
interest in the procedures followed in their
own courts. . . . Moreover, the memorandum
ignores "the importance of the procedural
default rules in an adversary system." These
rules, which are neutral-applying to
everyone, not just foreign nationals-"are
designed to encourage parties to raise their
claims promptly and to vindicate the law's
important interest in finality of judgments."
When a habeas petitioner asked the United
States Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas to
exempt Vienna Convention claims from the
rules of procedural default, the Court
responded that the relief requested was "by
any measure, extraordinary." The Court
observed that the exception to procedural
default rules requested in that case (as in this
one) "is accorded to almost no other right,
including many of our most fundamental
constitutional protections." The President's
action here is unprecedented.
The President has made an admirable attempt
to resolve a complicated issue involving the
United States' international obligations. But
this unprecedented, unnecessary, and
intrusive exercise of power over the Texas
court system cannot be supported by the
foreign policy authority conferred on him by
the United States Constitution. As a
consequence,. the presidential memorandum
does not constitute a new legal or factual
basis for relief under Art. 11.071, § 5, nor
does it override § 5's requirements.
With these comments, I concur in the
judgment with regard to the analysis of the
president's memorandum and otherwise join
the Court's opinion.
PRICE. Judge, concurring:
I agree with the majority's analysis and
rationale, and, therefore, join the majority.
Nevertheless, I write separately to advise law
enforcement of this State to honor the
provisions of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention and apprise foreign nationals of
their rights under the treaty.
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A key issue, however, is the question of
whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
even confers individual rights upon detained
foreign nationals. I believe it does. Pertinent
language of the treaty states "if [the detained
foreign national] so requests, the competent
authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post. .
Since a foreign national may request that the
consular official be notified, it is quite logical
to conclude that it is the foreign national's
personal decision to make whether the
consulate is or is not notified. This decision is
not left to public or diplomatic officials;
rather, the detainee is to decide. Furthermore,
the treaty explicitly directs a consular officer
to desist in aiding a detained national if that is
the national's desire. This language provides
additional support for the position that Article
36 creates individual rights for the signatory-
nation's citizenry. It is apparent that the
power of choice is left to the foreign national.
Though the United States Supreme Court has
not directly ruled on this issue, a strong voice
on that Court favors the position that
individual rights are conferred by the Vienna
Convention.
. . . Since I agree with the majority's
application of procedural default to Article
36, I find it all the more imperative for a
foreign national in the custody of law
enforcement in this State to be informed of
his treaty rights. Unless he is informed of
what his rights are under the Vienna
Convention, those rights will be of no use to
him. One must be aware of these rights before
one can properly exercise them. Not only is it
imperative as a practical matter, Article 36
compels it.
HERVEY, Judge, concurring:
This international cause c6lbre centers
around this applicant who makes no claim
that he did not brutally rape and murder two
teenage girls (ages 14 and 16) with fellow
gang members over 13 years ago in the
summer of 1993....
This case has dragged on for an amount of
time equal to almost the entirety of the lives
of these two girls. For many years, in both
state and federal courts, applicant has
received the almost unparalleled due process
protections afforded by our country's laws.
Now, from half-way around the world, the
International Court of Justice in its Avena
decision has ordered our state courts to review
applicant's Article 36 Vienna Convention
claim which applicant did not even raise until
his first state habeas application. The
President of the United States has made a
similar request.
. . . The Court's 60 plus page opinion
disposing of applicant's current successive
habeas corpus application provides applicant
with much more than he deserves and is also
consistent with the President's unprecedented
memorandum expressing the United States'
intent to discharge its international obligations
under Avena "by having State courts give
effect to the [ Avena ] decision in accordance
with general principles of comity." The
Court's opinion in this proceeding affords the
Avena decision all the "respectful
consideration" that it deserves "in accordance
with general principles of comity."
Finally, applicant is by no means a stranger in
a strange land. He has lived in this country
and enjoyed its benefits since he was three-
years old....
. . . Nevertheless, applicant maintains that the
lack of intentional, reckless, or negligent
wrongdoing by the State (other than, perhaps,
the lack of clairvoyance), and despite his non-
assertion of any privilege or immunity, he is
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entitled to an immunity heretofore not
afforded to any citizen or nonresident under
Texas or Federal law-immunity from
procedural default. He argues that he has this
immunity simply because he happened to be
born on foreign soil approximately 28 years
ago and, for whatever reason, has elected not
to apply for United States citizenship.
With these comments, I join the Court's
opinion.
COCHRAN, Judge, joined by JOHNSON,
and HOLCOMB, JJ, concurring:
I join all of the Court's opinion except for
Section IIIB dealing with the Presidential
Memorandum. I am unable to conclude that a
memorandum from the President to his
Attorney General constitutes the enactment of
federal law that is binding on all state courts.
This memorandum, discussing compliance
with the decision of the International Court of
Justice in Avena, looks much more like a
memo than a law....
... It is written in a private memo style. I am
unable to find a copy of this memo published
in the Federal Register. In fact, the only
public publication of this memo that I can
find is on the White House Press Release
Internet website. I cannot accept the
proposition that binding federal law, either
through Congressional enactment or
Executive Order, can be accomplished
through a Presidential press release of a
private memorandum directed to the Attorney
General. Thus, I cannot accept the premise
that the President's memo to his Attorney
General is federal law that could supersede
and obviate a clear and explicit Texas statute.
Thus, I find it unnecessary to undertake a
separation of powers analysis as does the
majority.
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"Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of Mexican
Death Row Inmate"
The New York Times
May 1, 2007
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court on
Monday agreed to hear an appeal from a
Mexican citizen on death row in Texas
whose case has embroiled the World Court,
the Bush administration and the State of
Texas in a conflict that has only deepened in
the two years since the justices last
considered how to resolve it.
The inmate, Jose E. Medellin, is one of 50
Mexicans on death rows in various states
who, the World Court found in 2004, had
been charged and tried without the
assistance from Mexican diplomats to which
an international treaty entitled them.
The United States is a signatory to the
treaty. the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, which requires local authorities to
inform foreign nationals being held on
criminal charges of the right to consult with
their country's diplomats. The requirement
was, until recently, widely ignored.
In the World Court, formally known as the
International Court of Justice, Mexico sued
the United States on behalf of its citizens
who had been sentenced to death without
receiving the required "consular
notification." The court ruled that the United
States was obliged to have the defendants'
cases reopened and reconsidered.
Initially, the Bush administration described
Mexico's suit as "an unjustified, unwise and
ultimately unacceptable intrusion in the
United States criminal justice system. But
in early 2005, with Mr. Medellin's death-
penalty appeal pending before the Supreme
Court, the White House announced that it
would abide by the World Court's decision
by instructing the states to reconsider the
convictions and sentences of the Mexican
nationals on death row. The Supreme Court
then dismissed Mr. Medellin's case to
enable the Texas courts to comply with that
directive.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
refused to relax its procedural rules that
barred any reconsideration. One of the
court's judges, in a concurring opinion,
accused the White House of an
"unprecedented, unnecessary and intrusive
exercise of power over the Texas court
system"-language that echoed the criticism
that the administration had once directed at
Mexico.
Now, however, the administration has
entered the case on Mr. Medellin's behalf
and urged the Supreme Court to overturn the
Texas court's decision. The case, Medellin
)v. Texas, No. 06-984, will be argued next
fall. The government's brief, filed by
Solicitor General Paul D. Clement, told the
justices that the Texas court's decision, if
not reversed. "will place the United States in
breach of its international law obligation" to
comply with the World Court's decision and
would "frustrate the president's judgment
that foreign policy interests are best served
by giving effect to that decision."
Mr. Medellin was a gang member in
Houston when he was convicted in 1993 of
participating in the gang rape and murder of
two teenage girls. In urging the Supreme
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Court not to hear the case, the Texas
solicitor general, R. Ted Cruz, recounted the
crime in vivid detail and said that the Texas
court had applied its usual rules in
concluding that Mr. Medellin was
procedurally barred from reopening his case.
The president had no constitutional authority
to pre-empt the state's procedural rules, Mr.
Cruz said.
Mexico filed a brief on Mr. Medellin's
behalf, noting its desire to provide "critical
resources to aid in the defense of its
nationals facing the death penalty." Mexico
noted that last month, the Texas court had
denied relief to five other Mexican death-
row inmates who are also governed by the
World Court decision. "Bilateral relations
between the United States and Mexico" will
"unquestionably" be affected by these cases.
Mexico's brief said.
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"New Claim of Presidential Power"
SCOTUSBiog
March 27, 2007
Lyle Denniston
The Bush Administration, -continuing its
sturdy defense of presidential powers, has
urged the Supreme Court to rule that
President Bush had the authority to direct
state courts to obey a decision of the World
Court bearing on state criminal prosecutions.
The state of Texas disputed that plea in
urging the Court not to hear again a case that
was before the Justices in 2005, but did not
produce a ruling at that time.
In an amicus filing in the case of Medellin v.
Texas (06-984), the government called for
reversal of a Texas state court ruling that
Bush did not have the power to ensure that
state courts complied with the international
tribunal's decision on the rights of foreign
nationals arrested and prosecuted within the
U.S. for crimes here. The state argued in
response that the case is moot because
Medellin has had access to the courts in
Texas to challenge his conviction, and that is
all that the World Court ruling required.
While Texas challenges the Bush
Administration's assertion of executive
power, it suggests that that question, too, is
moot.
The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations gives such foreign nationals a
right to meet with a diplomatic officer from
his or her home country when arrested in
another country. The World Court (the
International Court of Justice at The Hague)
ruled that the U.S. government must take
steps to assure that 51 Mexican nationals
(including Medellin) who were prosecuted
in the U.S. had that right, despite state court
rules that barred them from relying upon the
Convention in challenging their convictions.
The government's brief was filed last
Thursday but has just now become publicly
available. Similarly, the state's brief in
opposition, filed last week, is now publicly
available.
The government supports the appeal of Jose
Ernesto Medellin, a Mexican national who
was convicted of a double rape and murder
in Houston in 1993. Medellin claims that his
consular access rights were violated, but he
has been denied a chance to press that claim,
both by the Fifth Circuit Court and by
Texas' highest criminal court. In the most
recent decision, last Nov. 15, the Texas state
court found he had failed to raise that issue
properly as his case unfolded in state court.
Medellin's appeal to the Justices was filed
on January 16.
Medellin's appeal is also supported by the
Mexican government and by a group of law
professors who are experts on World Court
matters.
The case has not yet been scheduled for a
Conference of the Justices. It is expected to
go to the Justices sometime in April, after
Medellin's counsel has filed a reply.
While the government brief stressed that
President Bush did not agree with the World
Court's ruling (and noted that he has since
withdrawn the U.S. from the protocol that
gave the World Court authority to apply the
Vienna Convention), the brief argued that
the Texas ruling will undermine the
President's authority to determine "how the
United States will comply with its treaty
obligations."
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The Medellin case had been before the
Supreme Court in 2005, when the Justices
agreed to review and heard argument on the
enforceability of the World Court decision.
But, after argument, the Court dismissed the
case as "improvidently granted," partly
because Medellin's lawyers had then
recently filed a state court challenge to his
conviction based on a violation of the
Convention. That case went forward in
Texas courts, resulting in the ruling at issue
in his new appeal.
In defending presidential powers, the new
brief by Solicitor General Paul D. Clement
argued that the state court decision "decided
fundamental questions of federal law
relating to the authority of the President to
bring the United States into compliance with
its treaty obligations." Moreover, it added,
the ruling "set a course that, if not reversed,
will place the United States in breach of its
international law obligation to comply with
the [World Court] decision, leave
unresolved the dispute between Mexico and
the United States over the treatment of
[Medellin], and frustrate the President's
judgment that foreign policy interests are
best served by giving effect to that
decision."
Citing the famous concurrence opinion of
Justice Robert H. Jackson in the 1952 ruling
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,
Clement argued that the President's powers
were at the maximum when he was acted
under authority recognized by Congress. In
this instance, the Solicitor General said, the
President's authority relies upon two
treaties-the protocol that gave the World
Court the authority to implement the Vienna
Convention, plus the United Nations
Charter. The UN Charter requires signatory
nations like the U.S. to comply with World
Court decisions when the nation is a party in
a case decided by that tribunal, Clement
noted.
"Because the President is uniquely
positioned both to evaluate and resolve
sensitive foreign policy issues and to act
with dispatch," the brief contended, "the
Optional Protocol and the U.N. Charter are
most sensibly read to entrust the President
with the responsibility of deciding how to
respond to an ICJ decision."
In addition, the brief noted that Congress
had "expressly authorized the President to
direct all functions connected with the
United States' participation in the United
Nations."
While some of the Texas judges had argued
that the President's attempt to get the states
to carry out the World Court decision would
be deeply intrusive in state criminal
proceedings, Clement countered that the
intrusion is no greater than necessary to see
that the World Court ruling is obeyed to the
extent it requires consideration of the
Vienna Convention claims, without dictating
how the state court decides the underlying
case. "Where, as here, the President acts
pursuant to his authority under treaties of the
United States, principles of federalism do
not stand as an obstacle. To the contrary,
federal law is supreme, and state law must
give way."
While supporting Medellin on
implementation of the World Court ruling,
the government brief did not support his
separate claim that the Vienna Convention is
open to private enforcement. But Clement
indicated that the government did not
oppose review of that issue, too.
Texas, in opposing Supreme Court review.
contended that President Bush's
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"memorandum" demanding that the states
comply with the World Court ruling is
beyond presidential authority as spelled out
in the Constitution. "The President's Article
II powers are limited to executing, not
creating, the law."
Making its own argument out of the Court's
1952 Youngstown Sheet decision, the state
suggested that the President had attempted
to use unilateral authority.
The claim of Executive power made by
Medellin's lawyers (and seconded by the
government's brief), the state added, is an
argument for "a hypothetically limitless
executive power to create law based on
unilateral decisions concerning the foreign
affairs interests of the United States. But no
enumerated power in Article II allows the
President to order a state to disregard its
own habeas corpus statute and review a
claim based on the decision of a foreign
tribunal that this Court has determined has
no binding effect on domestic courts."
The latter point, Texas argued, was settled in
the Court's decision last Term in Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon. In that ruling, the state
said, "the Court determined that decisions of
the ICJ are not binding on American courts.
Medellin's request that the Court revisit an
issue decided last Term is without merit."
In the state's argument on the mootness
question, it contends that Medellin's first
post-conviction challenge, rejected by state
courts, was a sufficient opportunity under
the World Court decision that the U.S. must
"give effect" to its ruling.
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"CCA Plurality Says Bush Exceeded
His Authority"
Texas Lawyer
November 20, 2006
Mary Alice Robbins
In a first-of-its-kind ruling, the Court of
Criminal Appeals has held that an
International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision
and President George W. Bush's directive that
state courts comply with that decision do not
require the CCA to revisit a death-row
inmate's case.
"We hold that the President has exceeded his
constitutional authority by intruding into the
independent powers of the judiciary," CCA
Judge Mike Keasler wrote for a plurality of
the court in Nov. 15's Ex Parte Medellin.
Three members of the CCA-Judges
Lawrence Meyers, Tom Price and Barbara
Hervey-joined Keasler in the portion of the
opinion that addresses the presidential
memorandum, raising the question of whether
the holding is precedent. But in a concurring
opinion, Presiding Judge Sharon Keller
provided a similar analysis, holding that the
memorandum does not override the state's
procedural rules.
"Technically, it is not precedent if it is only a
plurality opinion," says University of Texas
School of Law professor George Dix, who
teaches criminal law. "If it appears that a
majority of the judges agree with the
plurality, it comes very close to precedent."
The CCA's holding in Medellin is the first
judicial decision on a U.S. president's
authority to issue a directive for state courts to
implement a decision of the ICJ, the judicial
arm of the United Nations.
Mexico had sued the United States before the
ICJ in January 2003, alleging that this country
had violated its obligations under the Vienna
Convention and the treaty's Optional
Protocol. In March 2004, the ICJ held in Case
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals that the United States had denied
the rights to consular notification and
consultation required under Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention to 49 Mexican nationals,
including Jose Ernest Medellin, who are
sentenced to die in Texas and other states.
The ICJ held in Avena that the rights created
under the treaty between nations were also
individual rights that, if violated, the United
States must remedy by providing the 49
Mexican nationals with a forum for the
"review and reconsideration" of their
convictions. Under the ICJ's holding, courts
cannot apply procedural default to deny
judicial review of the Article 36 claims and
must determine if the violations prejudiced
the Mexican nationals.
According to the CCA's plurality opinion in
Medellin, Bush weighed in on the controversy
surrounding Avena in February 2005 by
issuing a memorandum directing state courts
to hold the hearings that the international
tribunal required.
But the CCA held in Medellin that the ICJ's
Avena decision and Bush's memorandum are
not binding federal law that pre-empts Article
11.071, §5(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. Under Article 11.071, §5(a), a
court may not consider the merits or grant
relief if a death-row inmate files a successive
state habeas writ application, unless the
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inmate could not have presented the claim
previously. because the legal basis for the
claim was unavailable. The CCA held that the
ICJ's decision in Avena and the president's
memorandum do not qualify as previously
unavailable factual or legal bases for filing a
successive writ.
The CCA's opinion sets out the following
facts: In 1994, a Harris County jury convicted
Medellin of capital murder and sentenced him
to death for his participation in the 1993 gang
rape and murder of two teenage girls in
Houston. Medellin, who was born in Mexico,
was 18 at the time of the slayings. The CCA
affirmed Medellin's conviction on direct
appeal in 1997.
It wasn't until he filed his initial state habeas
writ application in 1998 that Medellin
claimed that law enforcement authorities had
violated his rights under Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention because they did not
advise him of his right to contact the Mexican
consular official after he was arrested. The
339th District Court in Houston, which
considered Medellin's second state writ
application, concluded that his claim was
procedurally barred, because Medellin had
not objected at trial to the violation of his
right to contact the consulate.
Medellin presented his Vienna Convention
claim in an application for a federal habeas
writ to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas. In June 2003. the
federal district court denied relief, and
Medellin filed for a certificate of
appealability. The ICJ issued its decision in
Avena while Medellin's application was
pending.
-%fter the federal district court denied his
application for a certificate of appealability,.
Medellin appealed to the 5th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals, which denied his
application in May 2004.
Medellin filed a petition for writ of certiorari
with the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted
review in Medellin v. Dretke in December
2004 to review the enforceability of the Avena
decision. [The current case before the Court is
Medellin v Texas.] Bush issued his
memorandum in February 2005 before the
Supreme Court heard arguments in Medellin's
case.
Medellin filed his second application for a
state habeas writ while his case was pending
before the Supreme Court, which
subsequently dismissed his case to allow the
CCA to act.
The CCA held that the Supreme Court's June
decision in Sanchez-Llamas i. Oregon
controls its decision in Medellin. The
Supreme Court consolidated Sanchez-Llamas
with Bustillo v. Johnson to consider, among
other issues, whether a defendant forfeits an
Article 36 claim under state procedural rules
if the defendant fails to raise the claim at trial.
The Supreme Court concluded that ICJ
decisions are entitled only to "respectful
consideration."
According to the CCA opinion in Medellin,
the Supreme Court made it clear in Sanchez-
Llamas that judicial power includes the duty
"to say what the law is."
"The clear import of this is that the President
cannot dictate to the judiciary what law to
apply or how to interpret the applicable law,"
Keasler wrote for the plurality.
Keller wrote in a concurring opinion that
Bush's memorandum "ignores the importance
of the procedural default rules in an adversary
system." According to Keller's concurrence,
the rules are designed to encourage parties to
raise claims promptly and to "vindicate the
131
law's important interest in finality of
judgments."
Bush's action in issuing the memorandum
was unprecedented, and such extraordinary
action is unnecessary, Keller wrote. As noted
in Keller's opinion, a foreign national whose
lawyer fails to raise the Vienna Convention
issue at trial can raise ineffective assistance of
counsel in a state habeas writ application. If
all other measures fail, the foreign national
still can apply to the Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles and the governor for clemency,
Keller noted.
Price, Hervey and CCA Judge Cathy Cochran
also each wrote concurring opinions. Judge
Paul Womack concurred in the judgment of
the court but did not write an opinion.
U.S. Deputy Solicitor General Michael R.
Dreeben, who argued for the United States
before the CCA as an amicus curiae, declines
comment on the CCA's decision. Dreeben
had contended during the arguments that
Bush was at the zenith of the lawful exercise
of executive power when he issued the
memorandum because of his inherent
constitutional authority to conduct foreign
affairs, the United States' international
obligation to comply with Avena under the
U.N. Charter and the nation's obligations
under the Vienna Convention. [See "Medellin
Returns," Texas Lawyer, Sept. 19, 2005,
page 1.]
Sandra Babcock, a Northwestern University
School of Law professor who represents
Medellin. says it was in the interest of
Americans abroad to comply with the ICJ's
decision in Avena, because they depend on
the protections afforded by the Vienna
Convention.
"It continues to be our position that it's well
within the president's power to comply with
international law," Babcock says, adding that
Medellin will petition the U.S. Supreme Court
again for a writ of certiorari. "I believe Mr.
Medellin's rights ultimately will be vindicated
by the Supreme Court," she says.
But Roe Wilson, chief of the post-conviction
writs section in the Harris County District
Attorney's Office, says she thinks the CCA is
correct in its interpretation of Bush's
memorandum.
Wilson, who argued on the state's behalf
before the CCA in Medellin, says state courts
have to go by state law; they don't have to go
by the ICJ decision. "It's not binding on our
courts," she says of the Avena decision.
Lori Fisler Damrosch, a professor of
international law at Columbia Law School,
says the CCA erred in Medellin by applying
the Supreme Court's ruling in Sanchez-
Llamas to more than the high court actually
held. Damrosch says Sanchez-Llamas
involved individuals who were not covered by
the ICJ's Avena decision.
What the president did in his memorandum
responding to Avena was to tell Texas courts
to comply with the United States' treaty
obligations, Damrosch says.
"Even if the president had never put his oar in
these waters, the courts would have an
obligation to comply with these treaty
obligations," she says. Damrosch predicts
that the Supreme Court will take another look
at Medellin's case. The Supreme Court's two
newest members-Chief Justice John Roberts
Jr. and Justice Samuel Alito Jr.-are strong
proponents of executive powers, she says.
Notes Damrosch: "I think we could well
expect Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
to be quite interested in thinking through
questions of presidential powers."
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"Texas Appeals Court Takes Bush to Task for Stepping
in for Foreign-Born Death Row Inmate"
The Associated Press
November 16, 2006
Michael Graczyk
HOUSTON-A state appeals court
chastised President Bush for intervening in
the case of a condemned killer born in
Mexico, one of several dozen cases in which
Bush ordered new hearings amid
international complaints.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on
Wednesday rejected the argument from Jose
Ernesto Medellin that he was denied legal
help he should have received under
international treaties. [The Supreme Court
will consider Medellin's case in Medellin v.
Texas this term.]
Medellin, who spent most of his life in
Texas, was sentenced in 1994 to die for the
rapes and killings of two teenage girls.
"We hold that the President has exceeded
his constitutional authority by intruding into
the independent powers of the judiciary,"
the court said in a 64-page ruling.
Justice Department spokesman Brian
Roehrkasse said the department was
reviewing the ruling and considering its
options.
Medellin was supported in his appeal by
dozens of countries, legal groups and human
rights organizations, as well as former
American diplomats and the European
Union. Much of the international community
is opposed to capital punishment and the
execution of Mexican nationals in Texas, the
nation s most active death penalty state, is a
particularly touchy point.
At issue overall was how much weight U.S.
courts should give to decisions of the
International Court of Justice in The Hague,
which ruled the convictions of Medellin and
50 other Mexican-born prisoners violated
the 1963 Vienna Convention. The pact
requires consular access for Americans
detained abroad and foreigners arrested in
the United States.
In February 2005, Bush unexpectedly
ordered new state court hearings for all 51
prisoners. The Texas court said Wednesday
neither the Constitution nor any act of
Congress gives the president the power to
issue such an order.
The decision means Medellin, 31, is not
entitled to additional review of his
international rights claim.
Last year. the Supreme Court rejected
Medellin's case and those of the 50 other
Mexican nationals on death row in the
United States. citing the presidential order,
and sent them to their respective state courts
for review. That ruling avoided the dispute
over whether international law is binding on
American courts.
In their arguments to the Supreme Court,
Medellin's attorneys said his court-
appointed trial lawyer was suspended from
practicing law for ethics violations during
the case, and he failed to call any witnesses
during the guilt phase of the trial. Lawyers
for Mexico said the country would have
made sure Medellin had a competent lawyer
had it known about the trial.
Medellin, 18 at the time, was one of six
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members of a fledgling Houston street gang
convicted in the slayings of Jennifer Ertman,
14, and Elizabeth Pena, 16. The pair had
been tortured, raped and strangled.
One of Medellin's companions, Derrick
Sean O'Brien, also 18 at the time of the
slayings, was executed earlier this year. In a
confession, O'Brien said Medellin was at
one end of a belt being pulled around
Ertman's neck as he yanked on the other.
Two other gang members had their death
sentences commuted to life in prison when
the Supreme Court last year barred
executions for those who were 17 at the time
of their crimes. The man authorities call the
gang's ringleader remains on death row
without an execution date.
The sixth person convicted was Medellin's
brother, Vernancio, who was 14 at the time
and received a 40-year prison term.
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"Appeals of Mexicans on Death
Row Rejected"
Chicago Sun-Times
May 24, 2005
Hope Yen
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court
turned away an appeal Monday [prior to the
current court's case, Medellin v. Texas] that
contended 51 Mexicans on U.S. Death Row
were improperly denied legal help, avoiding
a dispute over whether international law is
binding on American courts.
The 5-4 decision dismissed the case of Jose
Medellin, who argued he was entitled to a
federal court hearing on whether his rights
were violated when a Texas court tried and
sentenced him to death in 1994 on rape and
murder charges.
It means the case, which has stirred tensions
with foreign countries over convictions of
their citizens in violation of international
law, will be hashed out in state courts.
President Bush in February ordered new
state court hearings for the 51 Mexicans. and
the court cited that order on Monday.
Texas prosecutors vow to challenge Bush's
authority in the matter. "Jose Medellin
voluntarily confessed to the brutal gang-rape
and murder of two teenage girls," Texas
Solicitor General Ted Cruz said.
Sandra Babcock, an attorney representing
the Mexican government, said she remained
hopeful that Medellin's international rights
would ultimately be recognized in state
court.
"All the issues are still open, and Mexico is
confident that if and when Mexican
nationals receive new consideration, thev
will prevail," she said.
In an unsigned opinion, the Supreme Court
dismissed Medellin's case as premature
because of Bush's unexpected order, which
came one month before justices heard
arguments in the case. The court reserved
the right to hear the appeal again once the
case had run its full course in state court.
"This state-court proceeding may provide
Medellin with the very reconsideration of
his Vienna Convention claim that he now
seeks in the present proceeding," stated the
opinion, which was backed by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, as well as Justices
Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia.
At issue is how much weight U.S. courts
should give to decisions of the International
Court of Justice in The Hague, which ruled
last year that the 51 convictions violated the
1963 Vienna Convention.
In 1969, the Senate ratified the Vienna
Convention, which requires consular access
for Americans detained abroad and
foreigners arrested in the United States. The
Constitution states that U.S. treaties "shall
be the supreme law of the land," but does
not make clear who interprets them.
In a dissent, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
said she would have ordered the federal
courts to review whether international law
should be binding on the U.S. courts.
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"Justices Consider Rights of Foreigners"
The Washington Post
March 29, 2005
Charles Lane
WASHINTGON-The Supreme Court
seemed divided over how best to handle a
dispute over the role of international law in
U.S. death penalty cases yesterday, as the
justices heard oral arguments in the case of a
Mexican who says Texas violated his rights
under a U.S.-ratified treaty when it
sentenced him to death more than a decade
ago.
The court took up Medellin v. Dretke, No.
04-5928, which centers on a ruling last year
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in
The Hague. [The court for the coming term
addresses a different issue in Medellin v.
Texas.] The international court ruled that
the United States had violated the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations by failing
to tell 51 Mexicans charged with capital
murder that they had a right under the
convention to meet with diplomats from
their home country.
One of the Mexicans, Jose Ernesto Medellin,
and his supporters had urged the court to
rule that the ICJ ruling is binding in U.S.
courts-an argument that, if endorsed by the
Supreme Court, would have laid an
important precedent in favor of the authority
of international law generally.
But Texas, citing Supreme Court rulings.
countered that the ICJ could not override
state procedural rules under which Medellin
had forfeited his right to invoke the Vienna
Convention by not asserting it until 1998,
rather than at his trial in 1994.
A month ago, however, President Bush
intervened in this looming clash between
global law and Texas law, issuing a
determination that he alone, as the country's
chief diplomat, has the power to decide how
the country should react to the international
court's rulings. Noting that the United States
had agreed to accept ICJ rulings on cases
involving the Vienna Convention, he
instructed the state courts to give Medellin
and the other Mexicans new hearings, as the
ICJ had proposed, and told the Supreme
Court it should bow out.
Then he withdrew the United States from
international court jurisdiction under the
convention, to avoid future cases.
Medellin's lawyer, Donald F. Donovan,
asked the court to suspend its proceedings
until he has a chance to seek a new hearing
in state court, as provided for in the
president's determination.
But Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said "it
would be more likely we would dismiss" the
case. "This is a very unusual request," she
added.
And Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
said that "granting a stay could be seen as
validating the position of the government
without an opinion" from the court....
Texas Solicitor General R. Ted Cruz asked
the court to avoid "the many interesting
international law questions that swirl around
the case" and rule in favor of Texas now.
Even if Medellin's rights under the treaty
had been violated, Cruz argued, that could
not entitle him to a new hearing. That is
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because a federal law enacted in 1996-the
treaty went into effect in 1969-says that
death row inmates can seek a fresh hearing
only on new claims that their constitutional
rights were violated.
But Justice David H. Souter said the court
"wouldn't even have to venture into [that], if
we accept the president's determination."
Cruz replied that Texas sees "significant
constitutional problems with any unilateral
[presidential] decision" that tells state courts
what to do.
But that constitutional issue, he
acknowledged, would inevitably reach the
Supreme Court, after Texas courts have
dealt with Medellin's effort to enforce the
president's determination there.
"Why doesn't the ICJ judgment get the same
recognition as any judgment by any other
court?" Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg asked
Cruz.
Cruz replied that international law
contemplates the Vienna Convention will be
enforced through U.N. Security Council
action.
U.S. Deputy Solicitor General Michael
Dreeben, urging the court to let Bush's
proposal for new state court hearings run its
course, told the court that "if this court treats
the ICJ as a free-standing source of law . ..
it would rob the president of freedorn of
action in international affairs."
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"Bush Orders Hearings for Mexicans
on Death Row"
Los Angeles Times
March 9, 2005
David G. Savage
President Bush, in a bow to international
law, has decided that the 49 Mexican
nationals who are on death row in
California, Texas and other states are
entitled to new hearings to see if they were
harmed by the failure of authorities to tell
them of their right to seek the aid of
Mexican officials.
The presidential order-if it stands-could
eventually lead to the release from death
row of as many as 28 Mexican inmates in
California and 15 in Texas, as well as others
in Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Nevada, Ohio
and Oregon.
It may also affect dozens of other foreign
nationals who have been condemned to
death across the country.
The president's order was issued last week
without fanfare. It puts the former Texas
governor in the unusual spot of challenging
Texas officials on the validity of death
sentences in the Lone Star State.
Texas Atty. Gen. Greg Abbott questioned
Tuesday whether the president had the
authority to tell the state courts to reopen
these old cases.
"We respectfully believe the executive
determination [issued by Bush] exceeds the
constitutional bounds for federal authority,"
Abbott's office said in a statement.
California officials had no comment.
Bush's action was triggered by a recent
ruling by the International Court of Justice.
known as the World Court, that the U.S. had
violated the Vienna Convention by failing to
notify Mexican officials when Mexican
nationals were arrested and charged with
serious crimes.
In the Vienna Convention of 1963, the U.S.
and most other nations agreed to protect
their citizens by requiring that they be
informed whenever one of their nationals
was "arrested or committed to prison."
Local authorities must also tell the arrested
person of his rights.
This treaty protects Americans when they
live or travel abroad.
However, its requirements have been widely
ignored by U.S. police and prosecutors when
foreign nationals are taken into custody.
The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear a
case this month that tests whether Jose
Medellin, a Mexican national who is on
death row in Texas, has a right to a new
hearing in federal court after the World
Court ruling.
Two years ago, Mexico took the issue to the
World Court on behalf of 51 Mexicans who
were held on death rows across the U.S.
The lead plaintiff, Carlos Avena Guillen,
was charged with murder in Los Angeles in
1980 and sentenced to death in 1981.
Mexican officials say they did not learn of
the Avena case until the mid-1990s.
Last year. the international tribunal ruled for
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Mexico and said the U.S. must provide
"review and reconsideration of the
convictions and sentences of the Mexican
nationals." Despite the ruling, it was unclear
how the World Court's order could be
enforced.
Lawyers for Mexico raised the issue in the
federal courts in Texas on behalf of
Medellin, but got nowhere. The U.S. Court
of Appeals said the World Court's decision
did not give him a right to a new hearing
under U.S. law.
However, the Supreme Court agreed to
Medellin's appeal. The justices
scheduled to hear arguments in the
March 28.
hear
are
case
Last week, in a friend-of-the-court brief, the
Bush administration agreed with Texas
lawyers in saying the Mexicans had "no
judicially enforceable right" to seek help in
the federal courts. The brief urged the
Supreme Court to dismiss Medellin's legal
appeal.
But having rejected Medellin's legal claim,
the administration then declared that the
president had the authority to order new
hearings in state courts for Medellin and the
other Mexicans. Lawyers attached an order
signed by Bush on Feb. 28.
"I have determined, pursuant to the authority
vested in me as president . . . that the United
States discharge its international obligations
under the decision of the International Court
of Justice . . . in the case concerning Avena
and other Mexican nationals by having state
courts give effect to the decision," the order
said.
Bush's lawyers said the "foreign policy
interests" of the U.S. outweighed the laws of
the states. Texas, for example. has a law that
forbids its courts from reopening cases that
have been thoroughly litigated.
Paul Clement, acting U.S. solicitor general,
said state courts must "review and
reconsider the conviction and sentence" of
each Mexican to see whether the failure to
warn him of his rights "caused actual
prejudice to the defense at trial or at
sentencing." If so, "a new trial or a new
sentencing would be ordered," Clement said.
To their surprise, defense lawyers and
international law experts found themselves
cheering a move by Bush. The president has
been a critic of international courts and a
strong supporter of the death penalty.
"This is an amazing concession," said Mike
Charlton, a defense lawyer for several Texas
inmates. "The president is saying the Texas
courts have to reopen and relitigate these
cases."
"This is a complete victory for the Mexican
nationals," said Sandra Babcock, a
Minneapolis lawyer who worked for the
Mexican government in the case. "It is not
the way we anticipated winning. but we
won."
Many police and prosecutors are not aware
of the Vienna Convention and its duties,
Babcock said. "I have talked to police
officers in San Diego and in the Central
Valley of California, and they say they never
heard of this. But the old maxim-ignorance
of the law is no excuse-applies here as
well," she said.
It is not clear what the Supreme Court will
do now.
Bush's order "raises more questions than it
answers," Charlton said. He and other
defense lawyers would like the high court to
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say the inmates have a legal right to a new
hearing. Texas state lawyers, by contrast, are
likely to argue that neither Bush nor the
Supreme Court can reopen an old case such
as Medellin's.
"The state of Texas believes no international
court supersedes the laws of Texas and the
laws of the United States," Abbott said.
[The Supreme Court will address Medellin's
case again in the coming term in Medellin v.
Texas. ]
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"Mexicans on Death Row Win Review"
The Washington Post
December 11, 2004
Charles Lane
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court
agreed yesterday to decide whether the
federal courts must give a hearing to a
Mexican inmate on Texas's death row who
says the state violated international law by
trying him on murder charges without first
notifying Mexican diplomats who might
have helped him.
The case, which has attracted worldwide
attention, is seen as a test of the willingness
of the judicial branch of the U.S.
government to accept an international
institution's authority at a time when the
executive branch under President Bush is
taking criticism from many quarters abroad
for operating unilaterally in world affairs.
The context of the death penalty, for which
the United States in general and Texas in
particular are under fire in Europe and Latin
America, adds to its potential international
impact.
The case marks the Supreme Court's first
opportunity to respond to a March 31
decision by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in The Hague, which ruled that the
United States violated the Vienna
Convention on consular relations in the case
of the Texas inmate, Jose Ernesto Medellin,
and 48 other Mexican nationals on death
row.
The application of the Vienna Convention to
criminal cases is no small issue in the United
States. where the population includes
millions of noncitizens. Including the
Mexicans directly involved in the ICJ ruling.
there are 118 foreign nationals on death row
in the United States, from 32 countries.
The court received friend-of-the-court briefs
from the European Union, Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and
Mexico, all urging it to hear the case. Also
supporting Medellin's appeal was a group of
former U.S. diplomats, including former
Iran hostage L. Bruce Laingen, who argued
that U.S. citizens abroad will "suffer in
kind" if their own courts do not enforce
consular access.
In its March ruling, the ICJ did not attempt
to overturn the men's death sentences. It
said only that the treaty-which both the
United States and Mexico have ratified-
gives Medellin and the other Mexicans an
individual right to claim in a federal court
that their cases might have turned out
differently if they had had consular access.
U.S. rules that require them to raise such
claims in state court first do not apply, the
ICJ ruled.
The Bush administration had argued against
this interpretation, but the vote in the ICJ
was 14 to 1. with a U.S. judge joining the
majority.
The ICJ ruling brought to a head a long-
simmering conflict between that court and
the conservative majority on the Supreme
Court, which generally favors limiting the
avenues by which death-row inmates may
challenge their sentences on constitutional
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and other legal grounds.
Six years ago, the Supreme Court said that a
treaty-based right of consular access could
not trump the requirement in U.S. law that
inmates seeking to overturn their sentences
must raise their constitutional and legal
claims in state court first-or forfeit the
right to bring them up later in federal court.
In that case, Breard v. Greene, the court
declined to stay the execution of a
Paraguayan convicted of murder and rape in
Virginia. Its unsigned opinion said that, even
if the Paraguayan, Angel Francisco Breard,
were permitted to raise his claim in federal
court, he could not show that the violation of
his right to see a consul would have made a
difference.
He had insisted on going to trial against the
advice of his American attorneys, who urged
him to plead guilty in return for a life
sentence.
The vote was 6 to 3, with Justices John Paul
Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
G. Breyer dissenting.
The court acted in Breard even though
Paraguay had taken the case to the ICJ, and
the ICJ had called on Virginia not to execute
Breard until it had finished considering the
matter.
But now it faces a direct and clear judgment
by the ICJ.
The case accepted for review yesterday is
Medellin i'. Dretke, No. 04-5928. Oral
argument is scheduled for March, and a
decision is expected by July.
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"Death Term Upheld for 5th in Gang"
The Dallas Morning News
March 20, 1997
The Associated Press
AUSTIN-The last of five young gang
members sent to death row for the rapes and
murders of two teenage girls in Houston 3
1/2 years ago had his death sentence upheld
Wednesday by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals.
Jose Medellin has been on death row since
September 1994 for the slayings of Jennifer
Ertman, 14, and Elizabeth Pena, 16.
The girls were raped, strangled and beaten to
death after they came upon a railroad trestle
in Houston where the members of a gang
known as the "Black and Whites" were
celebrating a new member's initiation. The
girls' bodies were found four days later.
It was a crime so brutal-committed by
people all younger than 20-that it caught
the nation's attention and shocked the city of
Houston.
"It's a relief to have gotten through this
stage," said Bill Delmore, Harris County
assistant district attorney who prosecuted the
case.
The girls' parents have since become leaders
in the victims' rights movement and fought
for the state's new law that allows murder
victims' families to witness the execution of
their loved one's killer.
"The facts in this case were so heinous, that
if there ever was a small error the court
would find it harmless given the evidence,"
said Kim Stelter, who prosecuted three of
the five cases for the Hams County district
attorney's office.
The five gang members charged with capital
murder in the case-Mr. Medellin, Peter
Cantu, Derrick Sean O'Brien, Raul
Villareal, and Efrian Perez-all received the
death penalty. All were 18 at the time of the
slayings.
A sixth participant, tried as a juvenile, was
sentenced to 40 years in prison.
Mr. Medellin did not challenge his being
found guilty. but rather the sufficiency of
evidence to support the jury's decision to
sentence him to death.
When Mr. Medellin's Houston attorney
Randy McDonald was asked if he was
surprised with the decision, he replied: "A
little, his four co-defendants were denied,
but our issues were a little different."
Mr. McDonald had argued in his appeal that
several errors were made by the court in jury
selection and that Mr. Medellin deserved a
new trial.
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United States v. Williams
(06-694)
Ruling Below: (U.S. v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006), cert granted, 127 S.Ct. 1874,
167 L.E.2d 363, 75 USLW 3508, 75 USLW 3286, 75 USLW 3511).
U.S. Secret Service Special Agent Timothy Devine entered a chatroom under an alias screen
name and replied to a post by the defendant which stated that he had pictures of his toddler for
exchange. Defendant then stated he had nude photos and hardcore photos of defendant and his
daughter as well as others engaging in oral sex with the four-year old toddler. Defendant later
posted a hyperlink which led to several pictures of children five to fifteen naked and engaged in
various sexual activities, including sado-masochistic behaviors. Secret Service agents raided
defendant's home and found two hard drives full of photos. Williams was charged with one
count of promoting material in such a manner that was intended to cause another to believe it
was illegal child pornography. The charge carries a 60-month mandatory minimum sentence.
Williams filed a motion that 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. While the motion was pending, Williams reached a plea agreement and plead guilty
but reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
Questions Presented: Whether §2252A(a)(3)(B), which prohibits knowingly advertising,
promoting, presenting, distributing, or soliciting any material in such a way that reflects the
belief or that is intended to cause another to believe the material is illegal child pornography, is
overly broad and impermissibly vague, and thus facially unconstitutional.
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REAVLEY. Circuit Judge: convicted of possession of child pornography
under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), and he
Michael Williams appeals his conviction for appeals his sentence for that offense on the
promotion of child pornography under 18 grounds that the court unconstitutionally
U.S.C. § 2252Aa)(3)(B) on the grounds of enhanced his sentence under a mandatory
facial unconstitutionality. For this reason, we guidelines scheme in violation of United
reverse that conviction. Williams was also States v. Booker. 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738,
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no reversible Booker
Williams's sentence
imprisonment.
Because there was
error, we affirm
of 60-months'
I. THE CHARGES
[The Court recounts the background and
factual history of the case.]
II. WILLIAMS'S FACIAL CHALLENGE
TO 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)
B. The Child Pornography Problem
In this case, we consider the constitutionality
of a law aimed at curbing the promotion, or
"pandering," of child pornography. While
society has benefited greatly from the
technological advances of the last decade, an
unfortunate byproduct of sophisticated
imaging technology and the rise of the
Internet has been the proliferation of
pornography involving children.
[The Court explains the development of
widening child pornography distribution rings
over the internet and the challenges with
regulating child pornography with that
expansion and with the sexual stimulation
pedophiles derive from innocuous images.]
Over the years, Congress has, by large
bipartisan majorities, enacted legislation
designed to punish those who produce,
peddle. or possess child pornography.
Congress has struggled to draft legislation
that captures the truly objectionable child-
exploitative materials while staying within the
boundaries of the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence. In other words.
Congress may not "burn the house to roast the
pig." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380. 383.
77 S.Ct. 524, 526, 1 L.Ed.2d 412 (1957).
Whether that difficult balance has been struck
in the instant legislation is the issue before us.
C. The Law and Child Pornography
[The Court explains the root of child
pornography regulation as growing from the
obscenity doctrine, specifically that in Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37
L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). In the first case dealing
directly with child pornography, the Supreme
Court found it was a new category of speech
and was unprotected by the First Amendment,
finding that it documents an underlying act of
abuse and the circulation of images causes the
child injury. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982).
Congress shaped a law against child
pornography by following the statute upheld
in Ferber. After this law, Congress passed
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 (CPPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, to outlaw
computer-generated images. Since its
passing, the circuits have split and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 122
S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002).]
D. The Supreme Court's Decision in Free
Speech Coalition
[The Court explains the Supreme Court's
decision in Free Speech Coalition and the
Supreme Court's rationale in striking down
two provisions of the CPPA, including
prohibitions of computer-generated images
and pandering. The Court found both
provisions to be overbroad under Miller and
Ferber, further stating that the government
may not prohibit speech on grounds that it
may merely encourage, rather than incite,
pedophiles to engage in illegal activity.]
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E. The PROTECT Act
Almost immediately after the Free Speech
Coalition decision was handed down,
Congress began an effort to craft responsive
legislation. [T]he houses compromised and
passed the PROTECT Act, now codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
The revised pandering provision of the
PROTECT Act at issue in this case, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(3)(B), provides that any person
who knowingly-
(B) advertises, promotes, presents,
distributes, or solicits through the
mails, or in interstate or foreign
commerce by any means, including
by computer, any material or
purported material in a manner that
reflects the belief, or that is
intended to cause another to
believe, that the material or
purported material is, or contains-
(i) an obscene visual
depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; or
(ii) a visual depiction of
an actual minor engaging
in sexually explicit
conduct;
commits a criminal offense. .
Any person who violates, or attempts or
conspires to violate, the pandering prohibition
is subject to a fine and imprisonment for a
minimum of five years and up to twenty
years. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1). It is an
affirmative defense for certain reproducers,
distributors, recipients, and possessors of
child pornography charged under other
subsections of § 2252A that the alleged child
pornography depicts actual adults rather than
minors or that no "actual" minors were
involved in the production. 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(c). However, the affirmative defense
expressly does not apply to the pandering
provision.
F. What Congress Has Done Differently
At the outset of our discussion, we note that
the new pandering provision allays certain
concerns voiced by the Court in Free Speech
Coalition. First, the Court's primary objection
to the CPPA's pandering provision was that
pandered materials were criminalized for all
purposes in the hands of any possessor based
on how they were originally pandered. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 257-58, 122
S.Ct. at 1405-06. By moving the pandering
provision from the definitions section to a
stand-alone status, and using language that
targets only the act of pandering, the new
provision has shifted from regulation of the
underlying material to regulation of the
speech related to the material. This remedies
the problem of penalizing individuals farther
down the distribution chain for possessing
images that, despite how they were marketed,
are not illegal child pornography.
With respect to its legislative findings for the
PROTECT Act, Congress largely abandons
the secondary effects and market deterrence
justifications found wanting by the Court in
Free Speech Coalition.... Congress instead
focuses primarily on beefing up its findings
that technological advancements since Free
Speech Coalition have increased the
prosecutorial difficulties raised by the ready
availability of technology able to disguise
depictions of real children (proscribable under
Ferber) to make them unidentifiable or to
make them appear computer-generated
(defensible under Free Speech Coalition).
[The Court explains the PROTECT Act's new
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definition for child pornography, which
includes computer-generated images and the
pandering of such images. The Court further
explains that Williams's pictures were of real
children and so the computer-generated
definition is not at issue in this case.]
G. Williams's Overbreadth Challenge
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a statute that
prohibits a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected speech is invalid on
its face. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at
255, 122 S.Ct. at 1404. Williams asserts that
the PROTECT Act prohibition of speech that
"reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause
another to believe" that materials contain
illegal child pornography is no different than
the CPPA's prohibition of images that
"appear to be" or "convey the impression" of
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct
that was struck down as overbroad in Free
Speech Coalition.
We begin our analysis with the recognition
that subsections (i) and (ii) of the PROTECT
Act pandering provision capture perfectly
what remains clearly restrictable child
pornography under pre- and post-Free Speech
Coalition Supreme Court jurisprudence:
obscene simulations of minors engaged in
sexually explicit conduct and depictions of
actual minors engaged in same. As reviewed
above, the government may constitutionally
regulate, on interstate commerce grounds, the
transportation and distribution of obscene
material, even if it is legal to hold privately
(i.e. non-real child pornography), U.S. v.
Orito, 413 U.S. at 141, 93 S.Ct. at 2676, and
may outlaw "real" child pornography for all
purposes, including private possession.
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. at 110, 110 S.Ct.
at 1696; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760, 102 S.Ct. at
3359. However, the PROTECT Act
pandering provision criminalizes not the
speech expressed in the underlying materials
described in (i) and (ii), but the speech
promoting and soliciting such materials. The
question before us is whether the restriction
on that speech is too broad.
1. The Government May Wholly Prohibit
Commercial Speech That Is False or Proposes
an Illegal Transaction
We recognize that, if we consider the
pandering provision as purely a restriction of
commercial speech, we do not apply strict
overbreadth analysis. See Bd. of Tr. of the
State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
477-81, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3033-35, 106
L.Ed.2d 388 (1989). Instead, we determine
whether the government has narrowly tailored
any content-based regulation on protected
speech, that is neither misleading nor related
to unlawful activities, to achieve its desired
legitimate objectives. Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65
L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). Under this analysis, the
government may prohibit completely the
advertisement or solicitation of an illegal
product or activity as well as false or
misleading advertisement because neither is
protected speech. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770, 96 S.Ct.
1817, 1829-30, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). If a
person possessing or seeking either obscene
synthetic child pornography or "real" child
pornography, offers to sell or buy it, this is
unlawful commercial activity that the
government may constitutionally proscribe. If
a person does not have obscene or "real" child
pornography but offers such things for sale,
then the offeror is engaged in false or
misleading advertising, which the govermnent
may likewise punish.
If all that the pandering provision stood for
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was that individuals may not commercially
offer or solicit illegal child pornography nor
falsely advertise non-obscene material as
though it were, the Government need not
show that it has narrowly tailored its
restriction because neither of these scenarios
involve protected speech. We observe,
however, that false or misleading commercial
advertising is already addressed under other
state and federal laws, which are aimed at
protecting consumers from fraud. Here, under
legislation aimed at protecting children, the
only person who is harmed by misleading
speech, even if it preys on the basest of
motives, is the would-be buyer of illegal child
pornography, and that individual is scarcely in
a position to complain....
Because the First Amendment allows the
absolute prohibition of both truthful
advertising of an illegal product and false
advertising of any product and because, in the
commercial context, we have before us no
challenge to the severity of punishment meted
out for such behavior, the pandering provision
would likely pass our muster as a prohibition
of unprotected forms of commercial speech, if
that were all it proscribed. However, the law
is not limited to commercial exploitation and
continues to sweep in non-commercial
speech. Accordingly, we must move to the
question of whether the restriction on such
non-commercial speech is constitutionally
overbroad.
2. The PROTECT Act Pandering Provision
Continues to Sweep in Protected Non-
Commercial Speech
Because it is not limited to commercial
speech but extends also to non-commercial
promotion, presentation, distribution, and
solicitation, we must subject the content-
based restriction of the PROTECT Act
pandering provision to strict scrutiny,
determining whether it represents the least
restrictive means to advance the government's
compelling interest or instead sweeps in a
substantial amount of protected speech.
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d
865 (2000). Under this analysis, we find the
language of the provision problematic for
three reasons.
First, that pandered child pornography need
only be "purported" to fall under the
prohibition of § 2252A(a)(3)(B) means that
promotional or speech is criminalized even
when the touted materials are clean or non-
existent. . . . In a non-commercial context,
any promoter-be they a braggart,
exaggerator, or outright liar-who claims to
have illegal child pornography materials is a
criminal punishable by up to twenty years in
prison, even if what he or she actually has is a
video of "Our Gang," a dirty handkerchief, or
an empty pocket.
Further, while the commercial advertisement
of an unlawful product or service is not
constitutionally protected, this feature of the
Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine
does not apply to non-commercial speech.
where the description or advocacy of illegal
acts is fully protected unless under the narrow
circumstances, not applicable here, of
immediate incitement. The First Amendment
plainly protects speech advocating or
encouraging or approving of otherwise illegal
activity, so long as it does not rise to "fighting
word" status. See Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. at 253, 122 S.Ct. at 1403 (citing
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89
S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (holding
advocacy of racist violence protected
speech)). ... Thus, the non-commercial. non-
inciteful promotion of illegal child
pornography, even if repugnant, is protected
speech under the First Amendment.
Finally, we find particularly objectionable the
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criminalization of speech that "reflects the
belief' that materials constitute obscene
synthetic or "real" child pornography.
Because no regard is given to the actual
nature or even the existence of the underlying
material, liability can be established based
purely on promotional speech reflecting the
deluded belief that real children are depicted
in legal child erotica, or on promotional or
solicitous speech reflecting that an individual
finds certain depictions of children lascivious.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(3)(B)(ii),
2256(2)(A)(v).
. . . What exactly constitutes a forbidden
"lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area" and how that differs from an innocuous
photograph of a naked child (e.g. a family
photograph of a child taking a bath, or an
artistic masterpiece portraying a naked child
model) is not concrete. 18 U.S.C. §
2256(2)(A)(v). Generally, courts must
determine this with respect to the actual
depictions themselves. While the pictures
needn't always be "dirty" or even nude
depictions to qualify, screening materials
through the eyes of a neutral fact finder limits
the potential universe of objectionable
images.
In this case, however, the law does not seek to
attach liability to the materials, but to the
ideas and images communicated to the viewer
by those materials. This shifts the focus from
a community standard to the perverted but
privately held belief that materials are
lascivious. Through this lens, virtually all
depictions of children, whom to pedophiles
are highly eroticized sexual objects, are likely
to draw a deviant response. Many pedophiles
collect and are sexually stimulated by non-
pornographic depictions of children such as
commercially produced images of children in
clothing catalogs, television, cinema,
newspapers, and magazines--otherwise
innocent pictures that are not traditionally
seen as child pornography and which non-
pedophiles consider innocuous. Amy Adler,
The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101
Colum. L.Rev. 209, 259-260 (2001). As
illustrated in this case, relatively innocent
candid snapshots of children, such as those
initially exchanged by the defendant Williams
and the undercover agent, are also collected
and used as a medium of exchange. We
cannot, however, outlaw those legal and
mainstream materials and we may not outlaw
the thoughts conjured up by those legal
materials.
Freedom of the mind occupies a highly
protected position in our constitutional
heritage. Even when an individual's ideas
concern immoral thoughts about images of
children, the Supreme Court has steadfastly
maintained the right to think freely. . . . Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253, 122 S.Ct.
at 1403 (finding that the fact that possession
of non-obscene virtual child pornography may
cause sexually immoral thoughts about
children was not enough to justify banning it).
The Court reiterated that the concern with
child pornography is "physiological,
emotional, and mental health" of children,
and thus regulation is permissible only when
targeted at the evils of the production process
itself, and not the effect of the material on its
eventual viewers. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. at 253, 122 S.Ct. at 1403. The
PROTECT Act pandering provision misses
that target and, instead, wrongly punishes
individuals for the non-inciteful expression of
their thoughts and beliefs. Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. at 566, 89 S.Ct. at 1249
(stating that legislators "cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the
desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts"). However repugnant we may find
them, we may not constitutionally suppress a
defendant's beliefs that simulated depictions
of children are real or that innocent depictions
of children are salacious.
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3. The Supreme Court's Decision in Ginzburg
Does Not Support Pandering as an
Independent Offense
The Government's central justification for the
pandering provision, found convincing by the
district court, relies on the Supreme Court's
decision in Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 942, 16 L.Ed.2d 31 (1966),
for the proposition that an individual may be
found criminally liable for promoting material
as appealing to prurient interests even though
the material actually being promoted might
not fall outside the First Amendment's
protection. We believe that reliance is ill-
grounded.
In Ginzburg, erotic publications that were not
"hard core" pornography. and may not have
been obscene per se, became the subjects of
conviction because their prurient qualities
were exploited, or pandered, by the defendant
for commercially sexual purposes. The Court
found that evidence of the manner in which
the publications were advertised and mailed
"was relevant in determining the ultimate
question of obscenity," and that evidence of
such pandering on the basis of salacious
appeal "may support the determination that
the material is obscene even though in other
contexts the material would escape such
condemnation." Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 470,
476, 86 S.Ct. at 947, 950. In Free Speech
Coalition, the Court recognized the limited
scope of the pandering rationale expressed in
Ginzburg: that "in close cases evidence of
pandering may be probative with respect to
the nature of the material in question and thus
satisfy the [obscenity] test." Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258, 122 S.Ct. at 1406
(quoting Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct.
at 942). The Court also suggested that
Ginzburg has no application where, as in the
case of the CPPA, "[t]he statute does not
require that the context be part of an effort at
commercial exploitation." Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258, 122 S.Ct. at 1406.
We disagree with the district court that
Ginzburg supports a prohibition of pandering
as a stand-alone crime without regard to the
legality, or even to the existence, of the
pandered material. First, we note that,
notwithstanding its brief mention by the Court
in Free Speech Coalition, there is some
question as to the continued vitality of the
Ginzburg pandering rationale. Shortly after
Ginzburg was decided, the Supreme Court
held in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346
(1976), that truthful, non-misleading
commercial speech is protected by the First
Amendment, although to a lesser degree than
protected non-commercial speech. The sort of
pandering that caused the publications in
Ginzburg to be found obscene, in other words,
has since gained some First Amendment
protection. In one of two post-Ginzburg cases
in the 1970s, a dissent joined by four justices
states that "Ginzburg cannot survive Virginia
Pharmacy." Splawn v. California, 431 U.S.
595, 603 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 1987, 52 L.Ed.2d 606
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). . . .
Consequently, although Ginzburg has not
been overturned, its precedential value is
questionable.
Even if the Ginzburg pandering rationale
remains viable, the PROTECT Act pandering
provision, as discussed above, is not limited
to the commercial context. In considering the
CPPA pandering provision at issue in Free
Speech Coalition, the Court clearly suggested
that, even if the Ginzburg pandering rationale
remains viable, it would only apply in a the
commercial context. Free Speech Coalirion,
535 U.S. at 258, 122 S.Ct. at 1406 (2002).
The PROTECT Act pandering provision, like
the CPPA pandering provision found
unconstitutional in Free Speech Coalition,
does "not require that the context be part of an
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effort at 'commercial exploitation."' Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258, 122 S.Ct.
at 1406 (2002).
Finally, to the extent that the Ginzburg
pandering rationale remains valid, it lends
little constitutional support to the pandering
provision at issue here. With respect to the
"obscene" virtual or simulated material
described under subsection (i), if the
pandering rationale remains valid, then it
might be the basis for a court to uphold a
conviction under the PROTECT Act for
distributing material of questionable social
value that would not be deemed obscene but
for the defendant's promotion of it suggesting
that it was. But if the rationale holds, then this
would be the case under existing obscenity
law and the pandering provision adds nothing
in that respect. The rationale does not justify a
prosecution under the PROTECT Act that
goes farther than existing obscenity law by
attempting to convict a defendant for
distributing material that is clearly not
obscene, merely because the defendant
pandered it as obscenity.
With respect to "real" child pornography as
described under subsection (ii). the Ginzburg
pandering rationale is of no relevance....
In sum, the Government urges us to read the
PROTECT Act as writing the Ginzburg
pandering rationale into the law. We note that
at least one state law concerning obscene
visual depictions of children has succinctly
done just that. See, e.g., Ala.Code § 13A-12-
195 (2005). But the Government asks us to
stretch that rationale much farther, to support
pandering as an independent crime rather than
only as evidence of the crime of obscenity or
child pornography. We believe such an
interpretation of Ginzburg butts directly
against the holding of Free Speech Coalition
and, accordingly. find that Ginzburg does not
rescue the PROTECT Act pandering
provision from substantial overbreadth.
4. The Protect Act Pandering Provision Is
Not Justified by Legislative Findings
The pandering provision of the PROTECT
Act, for reasons we have discussed, is
inconsistent with Miller and Ferber, as
reaffirmed in Free Speech Coalition, and is
not sustainable under Ginzburg. The
Government, however, seeks to justify its
prohibitions in other ways.
First, noting the state's compelling interest in
protecting children from those who sexually
exploit them, Congress relies on Ferber and
Osborne for the proposition that this interest
extends to stamping out the market for child
pornography. Congressional Findings (501)
at (2)-(3). . . . However, Congress has not
adequately explained why the mere pandering
of otherwise legal material should be
prohibited in the pursuit of this interest.
In the PROTECT Act's Conference Report,
Congress mentions that "even fraudulent
offers to buy or sell unprotected child
pornography help to sustain the illegal market
for this material." H.R.Rep. No. 108-66, Title
V, at 62 (2003). This appears to be a
resurrection of the market-deterrence theory
advanced by the Government., and rejected by
the Court, in Free Speech Coalition. As the
Court recognized, the prohibitions of "real"
child pornography in Ferber and Osborne
were upheld on a production-based rationale.
The Court in Ferber allowed market
deterrence restrictions because they destroyed
the profit motive to exploit real children.
Congress has again failed to articulate
specifically how the pandering and
solicitation of legal images, even if they are
promoted or believed to be otherwise, fuels
the market for illegal images of real children
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engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Next, the Government points to the legislative
findings of the PROTECT Act that articulate
the difficulties in successful prosecution of
child pornography possession cases where
advancements in computer technology allow
images to be so altered as to cast reasonable
doubt on whether they involve real children.
See Findings 501 at (10)-(13). Congress
characterizes the pandering provision as "an
important tool for prosecutors to punish true
child pornographers who for some technical
reason are beyond the reach of the normal
child porn distribution or production statutes."
S.Rep. No. 108-2, Title VIII, at 23
(2003)(remarks of Sen. Patrick Leahy). . . .
Without such prosecutorial tools, it argues,
the child pornography market will flourish,
harming real children. See Findings 501 at
(13).
This argument not only attempts, once again,
to revive the rejected market proliferation
rationale but also disregards the firmly
established principle that "[t]he Government
may not suppress lawful speech as the means
to suppress unlawful speech." Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255, 122 S.Ct. at 1404.
And when the "technical reason" is that the
material being described or exchanged does
not fall within one of the two proscribable
categories-but instead is legal child erotica,
innocent pictures of children arousing only in
the minds of certain viewers, or non-
existent-the Government cannot circumvent
the criminal procedure process. In a non-
commercial setting, in which most child
pornography is discussed and exchanged,
pandering at most either raises actionable
suspicion that illegal materials are possessed
or is evidentiary of the social merit of
questionable materials. The Government must
do its job to determine whether illegal
material is behind the pander.
The Government urges that we consider this
simply an inchoate crime, arguing that only
those with specific intent to traffic in illegal
child pornography will be ensnared and
noting, for example, that offers to buy or sell
illegal drugs can be punished even if no drugs
actually exist. . . Further, the intent element
only applies to one portion of the provision-
promoting material in a manner "that is
intended to cause another to believe" it is
illicit-and, to be a violator, one need not
intend to distribute illegal materials, but only
intend that another believe the materials one
has are lascivious. Also, a defendant may be
liable for promoting, distributing, or soliciting
perfectly legal materials that only he or she
personally believes are lascivious. . . . Finally,
with any inchoate offense the government
must show some substantial movement
toward completing the crime, must prove, in
other words, something beyond mere talk.
Under the PROTECT Act pandering
provision, mere talk is all that is required for
liability and that does not square with
Supreme Court First Amendment
jurisprudence.
In sum, we recognize that Congress has a
compelling interest in protecting children and,
to that end, may regulate in interstate
commerce settings the distribution or
solicitation of the materials described in
subsections (i) (obscene child pornography)
and (ii) ("real" child pornography) of the
PROTECT Act pandering provision.
However, the pandering provision goes much
farther than that. The provision abridges the
freedom to engage in a substantial amount of
lawful speech in relation to its legitimate
sweep, and the reasons the Government offers
in support of such limitations have no
justification in the Supreme Court's First
Amendment precedents. Accordingly, we find
it unconstitutionally overbroad.
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H. Williams's Vagueness Challenge
The Government contends that, since the
written plea agreement references only
Williams's right to appeal his pandering
conviction on grounds of overbreadth, he has
waived his vagueness challenge. We disagree.
We recognize that vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines, although "logically related and
similar," are distinct. Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 358 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75
L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). However, plea bargains,
as we have noted, are like contracts and
should be interpreted in accord with the
parties' intent. United States v. Rubbo, 396
F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir.2005). . . . The
record in this case clearly reflects the parties'
intent to preserve Williams's constitutional
challenges under both overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines. That the written
memorialization of that agreement omitted the
latter of these related grounds is insufficient
to support waiver.
Laws that are insufficiently clear are void for
three reasons: (1) to avoid punishing people
for behavior that they could not have known
was illegal; (2) to avoid subjective
enforcement of the laws based on arbitrary or
discriminatory interpretations by government
officers; and (3) to avoid any chilling effect
on the exercise of sensitive First Amendment
freedoms. Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408
U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33
L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). Thus, to pass
constitutional muster, statutes challenged as
vague must give a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited and provide explicit
standards for those who apply it to avoid
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357, 103 S.Ct. at 1858
(1983); Bama Tomato Co. v. U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture. 112 F.3d 1542 (11th Cir.1997).
Vagueness concerns are more acute when a
law implicates First Amendment rights and a
heightened level of clarity and precision is
demanded of criminal statutes because their
consequences are more severe. Village of
Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498, 499, 102
S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).
In this case, considering a penal statute that
both restricts speech and carries harsh
criminal penalties, it is not at all clear what is
meant by promoting or soliciting material "in
a manner that reflects the belief, or that is
intended to cause another to believe" that
touted or desired material contains illegal
child pornography. This language is so vague
and standardless as to what may not be said
that the public is left with no objective
measure to which behavior can be conformed.
Moreover, the proscription requires a wholly
subjective determination by law enforcement
personnel of what promotional or solicitous
speech "reflects the belief' or is "intended to
cause another to believe" that material is
illegally pornographic. Individual officers are
thus endowed with incredibly broad discretion
to define whether a given utterance or writing
contravenes the law's mandates. See City of
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 119 S.Ct.
1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (holding
unconstitutionally vague an anti-loitering
ordinance, which defined loitering as
remaining in place with "no apparent
purpose," finding that standard "inherently
subjective because its application depends on
whether some purpose is 'apparent' to the
officer on the scene.") . . .
Even more complex is the determination of
what constitutes presentation in a "manner
that is intended to cause another to believe"
that material contains illegal child
pornography. Let us consider, for example, an
email entitled simply "Good pics of kids in
bed." Let us also imagine that the "pics" are
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actually of toddlers in footie pajamas, sound
asleep. Sender One is a proud and computer-
savvy grandparent. Sender Two is a chronic
forwarder of cute photos with racy tongue-in-
cheek subject lines. Sender Three is a
convicted child molester who hopes to trade
for more graphic photos with like-minded
recipients. If what the statute required was a
specific intent to traffic in illegal child
pornography, the identity of the sender and
the actual content of the photos would be
probative. Senders One and Two would be off
the hook while Sender Three may warrant
further investigation.
But again, the pandering provision requires no
inquiry into the actual nature or even
existence of the images and provides no
affirmative defense that the underlying
materials are not, in fact, illegal child
pornography. The offense is complete upon
communication "in a manner that," in the
discretionary view of law enforcement, "is
intended to cause another to believe" that
materials are illegal child pornography. Here,
the "manner" of presentation, as well as the
plainly legal underlying material, are identical
in all three instances. And Sender Two clearly
intended that his recipients believe, however
briefly, that the attached photos were sexually
explicit depictions of minors.
We again recognize that Congress may
regulate the distribution or solicitation of the
illegal materials described in subsections (i)
(obscene child pornography) and (ii) ("real"
child pornography) of the pandering
provision. If that were all the provision did,
we would find no constitutional infirmity on
vagueness grounds. However, the statute is
unnecessarily muddled by the nebulous
"purported material" and "reflects the belief,
or is intended to cause another to believe"
language. Because of this language, the
pandering provision fails to convey the
contours of its restriction with sufficient
clarity to permit law-abiding persons to
conform to its requirements. Because of this
language, the provision is insusceptible of
uniform interpretation and application by
those charged with the responsibility of
enforcing it. Accordingly, we find it
impermissibly vague.
III. WILLIAMS'S Booker CHALLENGE
A. Standard of Review
Where, as here, there is a timely objection, we
review a defendant's Booker claim in order to
determine whether the error was harmless.
United States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289,
1291 (11th Cir.2005). There are two harmless
error standards, one of which applies to
Booker constitutional errors, the other to
Booker statutory errors. Statutory errors are
subject to the less demanding test that is
applicable to non-constitutional errors. A
non-constitutional Booker error is harmless if,
viewing the proceedings in their entirety. a
court determines that the error did not affect
the sentence, or had but very slight effect.
United States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289,
1291 (11th Cir.2005). If one can say with fair
assurance that the sentence was not
substantially swayed by the error, the
sentence is due to be affirmed even though
there was error. United States v. Mathenia,
409 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir.2005).
Because this is a Booker statutory error case
we will apply that standard.
B. No Reversible Booker Error
Williams was assessed (1) a two-level
sentence enhancement for use of a computer
for transmission, receipt or distribution of
child pornography (2) a two-level sentence
enhancement for possession of child
pornography because the pornographic
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material at issue involved minors under age
twelve, and (3) a four-level sentence
enhancement because the material involved
portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct or
other depictions of violence. Because these
enhancements were applied under a
mandatory guidelines scheme, error occurred.
See United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325,
1331 (11th Cir.2005). However, because
Williams admitted to the factual basis for his
sentence, which included the facts underlying
these enhancements, there was no Sixth
Amendment Booker error. See United States
v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th
Cir.2005).
We conclude that, viewing the proceedings in
their entirety, the sentence was not
substantially swayed by the statutory error.
Williams was sentenced above the bottom of
the 57 to 71 month guideline range for the
possession count, and the district court,
exercising its discretion, expressly declined
his request for a lower sentence within that
range. The court also stated that, even if not
bound by the guidelines, it had doubts that the
sentence would be any lower, and it may have
been higher. While the judge declined to issue
an alternative sentence in anticipation of
Blakely's application to the guidelines given
the then-settled state of that issue in this
circuit, he explained his decision thoroughly
enough that we are confident that he would
not lower the sentence in this case on remand.
IV CONCLUSION
In the wake of Free Speech Coalition,
sexually explicit speech regarding children
that is neither obscene nor the product of
sexual abuse of a real minor retains protection
of the First Amendment. We believe the
Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition
leaves Congress ample authority to enact
legislation that allows the Government to
accomplish its legitimate goal of curbing
child abuse without placing an unacceptably
heavy burden on protected speech. Certainly
Congress took many cues from the Court in
drafting the legislation at issue in this case.
Given the unique patterns of deviance
inherent in those who sexually covet children
and the rapidly advancing technology behind
which they hide, we are not unmindful of the
difficulties of striking a balance between
Congress's interest in protecting children
from harm with constitutional guarantees.
However, the infirmities of the PROTECT
Act pandering provision reflect a persistent
disregard of time-honored and
constitutionally mandated principles relating
to the Government's regulation of free speech
and its obligation to provide criminal
defendants due process. Because we find the
PROTECT Act pandering provision, 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B), both substantially
overbroad and vague. and therefore facially
unconstitutional, we reverse Williams's
conviction under that section. However,
because we find no reversible Booker error in
his sentencing for possession of illegal child
pornography, we affirm his sentence of 60-
months imprisonment.
CONVICTION REVERSED
SENTENCE ON COUNT
VACATED; SENTENCE ON
TWO AFFIRMED.
AND
ONE
COUNT
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"Justices Agree to Revisit Child
Pornography Laws"
The New York Times
March 27, 2007
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON, March 26-The Supreme
Court agreed Monday to undertake its latest
effort to define the permissible boundary
between free speech and the government's
prohibition of child pornography.
The justices agreed to hear a government
appeal of a ruling issued last year by the
federal appeals court in Atlanta that
overturned part of a recent federal law
aimed not only at the sexual exploitation of
real children but also at computer-generated
or enhanced images that help sustain the
market for child pornography.
The appeals court, the United States Court
of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, said that
while the statute's goal was one of
"extraordinary importance," its prohibition
against "pandering" child pornography was
too broadly worded and too vague to satisfy
the First Amendment. "Congress may not
burn the house to roast the pig," the court
said.
In appealing to the Supreme Court. Solicitor
General Paul D. Clement said the provision.
a portion of a 2003 law known as the Protect
Act, was "totally consistent with the
Constitution" because it was aimed at a form
of speech that was not entitled to
constitutional protection.
"The court of appeals' misguided
invalidation of the law undermines
Congress's effort to protect children by
eliminating the widespread market in child
pornography," the government's appeal said.
In another part of the brief, however. Mr.
Clement said the government had invoked
the section at issue "only rarely."
Congress passed the law to respond to a
Supreme Court decision the year before that
invalidated the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996. "Protect" is an
acronym for the statute's formal title,
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to
End the Exploitation of Children Today.
The appeals court invalidated a section
known as the "pandering" provision, which
makes it a crime to advertise, promote,
distribute or solicit "any material or
purported material in a manner that reflects
the belief, or that is intended to cause
another to believe, that the material or
purported material contains" either "an
obscene visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct" or
such a visual depiction of an "actual minor."
In other words, the government told the
Supreme Court, the law allows prosecution
of those who "make direct requests to
receive, or offers to provide, what purports
to be illegal material, regardless of whether
the government can prove that such material
is in fact real child pornography or that it
even exists." The minimum sentence is five
years.
The appeals court's decision came in an
appeal brought by a man, Michael Williams,
who was caught in a federal sting operation
soliciting and offering child pornography in
an Internet chat room. Secret Service agents
obtain a warrant and searched his home,
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finding two computer hard drives with
images of minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct.
The appeals court found that the
photographs were "unquestionably" of
"real" children. so that the case did not raise
a question about the definition of "virtual"
child pornography. The problem, the appeals
court held, was with the absence of language
in the law that would limit its application to
commercial transactions.
While commercial promotion of child
pornography would lack constitutional
protection, the appeals court said, "the non-
commercial, non-inciteful promotion of
illegal child pornography, even if repugnant,
is protected speech under the First
Amendment."
Without such a limitation, the court
continued, the law could apply to "any
promoter-be they a braggart, exaggerator,
or outright liar-who claims to have illegal
pornography," and could subject such a
person to up to 20 years in prison, even if
the material was nothing more than "a video
of 'Our Gang,' a dirty handkerchief, or an
empty pocket."
Congress's effort in the 2003 law to define
the crime precisely was a response to the
Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the
earlier law, so broadly written, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the
majority, that it could have turned a modern
production of "Romeo and Juliet" into a
criminal act. Juliet was supposed to be only
13, Justice Kennedy noted, so her portrayal
as a young teenager could well be a "visual
depiction" of a minor, or one who appeared
to be a minor, engaged in sexually explicit
conduct, in violation of the law.
The court will hear the new case, United
States v. Williams, No. 06-694, in its next
term.
Also on Monday, the court declined to
revisit the question of the circumstances
under which courts can award visiting rights
to grandparents over the objection of a
child's parents. It let stand a decision by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that upheld a
visiting order without requiring proof that
denying visits would harm the child. The
case was Fausey v. Hiller, No. 06-863.
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"Court First to Strike Pandering Provision
of Child Porn Law"
The Recorder
April 11, 2006
Alyson M. Palmer
ATLANTA-Congress' quick fix to a child
pornography law struck down in 2002 by the
U.S. Supreme Court failed last week before
the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.
The April 6 decision, the first by a federal
appeals court declaring a particular
provision of the law unconstitutional, may
have minimal practical impact given the
relatively rare use of that provision.
But it is significant to First Amendment
jurisprudence and will no doubt give
prosecutors and legislators headaches.
The provision struck made it a felony-
carrying at least five years of prison time-
to promote, distribute or solicit material in a
way intended to cause others to believe that
the material is legally obscene or depicts a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
A three-judge panel found the provision
against promotion of such material vague
and overbroad because, in essence, it could
criminalize legal speech. The panel's
opinion was written by Senior Judge
Thomas Reavley, visiting from the Fifth
Circuit, and joined by Eleventh Circuit
Judges Rosemary Barkett and Charles
Wilson.
The provision struck by the court-
sometimes called the "pandering"
provision-is part of the federal legislation
known as the Prosecutorial Remedies and
Other Tools to end the Exploitation of
Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003.
Signed by President Bush in 2003, the
legislation was Congress' response to a 2002
U.S. Supreme Court decision that struck
down the prior law. Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
That decision, which split the court 6-3,
struck down as overbroad an aspect of the
prior statute that included within the
definition of child pornography computer-
generated images that appeared to show
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony
Kennedy also found fault with the prior
"pandering" provision to the extent that it
included within its child pornography
definition material promoted in such a way
that it "conveys the impression" that it
shows a minor engaged in sexually explicit
conduct.
Reavley's Eleventh Circuit opinion quoted
fears expressed by Sen. Patrick Leahy,
D-Vt., during the debate over Congress'
attempt to fix the law after it was struck
down by the high court.
Leahy, the ranking Democrat on the Senate
Judiciary Committee, said the proposed
changes "federally criminalize[s] talking
dirty over the Internet or the telephone when
the person never possesses any material at
all."
"In a non-commercial context," wrote
Reaviey, "any promoter-be they a
braggart, exaggerator or outright liar-who
claims to have illegal child pornography
materials is a criminal punishable by up to
twenty years in pison, even if what he or
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she actually has is a video of 'Our Gang,' a
dirty handkerchief or an empty pocket."
The provision is overbroad, the judge added,
also because criminal liability under the
provision could be based on the "perverted
but privately held belief' that certain
materials are "lascivious." Most pedophiles
find "virtually all" depictions of children
erotic, said the court, but "we may not
outlaw the thoughts conjured up by those
legal materials."
Jeffrey Douglas, chair of the board of the
Free Speech Coalition, a trade organization
for adult entertainment businesses that
challenged the old law before the Supreme
Court, said that the Eleventh Circuit's
decision was "inevitable" following the
2002 ruling.
"While everyone abhors the idea of sexually
exploiting children," said Douglas, also a
criminal defense attorney in Santa Monica,
"there is a legal difference between an idea
and an act, and Congress attempted to
criminalize the idea again, and the Supreme
Court and now the Eleventh Circuit has
essentially said you can't do that."
As an example of what the Eleventh
Circuit's decision means, Douglas noted that
the term "Lolita" is highly suggestive of
child molestation, but the novel by that
name may be written without exploiting any
child.
"If I were to offer to distribute Lolita
material there are law enforcement agents
that would line up between here and Atlanta
to prosecute me because of what that phrase
or term conveys," he said. "But you can't do
that."
The case came from a federal prosecution in
Miami. Alicia Valle, special counsel to U.S.
Attorney R. Alexander Acosta, said Friday
that prosecutors would make a
determination whether to seek further
review of the Eleventh Circuit panel's
decision soon but would have no further
comment.
The government's Eleventh Circuit brief
argued that the pandering provision of the
PROTECT Act was significantly different
from the law struck down by the Supreme
Court in 2002 and "does not prohibit a
substantial amount of protected speech in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep."
Ironically, the appellate decision may be of
no practical help to the party who raised the
challenge to the law.
According to the decision, federal
prosecutors in Miami charged Michael
Williams after he traded messages with an
undercover agent posing as a minor in a chat
room. Federal agents seized images of
minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct
from Williams' hard drive, the decision
added.
In addition to receiving a five-year sentence
on his pandering conviction, Williams also
received a five-year sentence-to run at the
same time as the other sentence-for
possession of child pornography. The
appeals court rejected Williams' arguments
that he was improperly sentenced on the
possession count, leaving his five-year
sentence intact.
"It's really a pyrrhic victory at this point,"
said Luis Guerra, a Miami attorney who
represented Williams, adding that he still
was very pleased with the decision on the
pandering provision. Guerra said that his
client was considering whether or not to
seek a rehearing or review by the Supreme
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Court on the sentencing ruling.
Guerra said that the attorneys were not First
Amendment experts but "felt comfortable"
handling the matter because "it was so
obvious to us that this statute was
problematic."
Jennifer Kinsley, a criminal defense attorney
in Cincinnati who handles First Amendment
matters, suggested that few defendants may
be helped directly by Williams' partial
victory.
"[I]t is exceedingly rare that a defendant is
charged with promotion, since the penalties
for possession are so high and the burden of
proof is so low," said Kinsley in an e-mail.
"So I don't really think the case will be that
significant in terms of impacting other
defendants' convictions."
However, Kinsley added that she thought
the decision might call into question the
constitutionality of laws that criminalize an
adult soliciting an undercover police officer
posing as a juvenile for sex.
The case is United States v. Williams, 04-
15128 (11th Cir. April 6, 2006).
Alyson M. Palmer is a reporter with the
Fulton County Daily Report, a Recorder
affiliate based in Atlanta.
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"Struggle Continues to Write Laws that
Protect Children Online"
The New York Journal
May 16, 2006
Stephen V. Treglia
Congress' second attempt to criminalize the
distribution of "virtual child pornography"
over the Internet-the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003
(PROTECT Act)-was recently held
unconstitutional by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in U.S. v.
Williams, _ F3d , 2006 WL 871200 (Fla,
4/6/06).
While not yet having received the public
attention as an earlier decision in this line of
jurisprudence, Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 US 234 (2002), Williams
continues the judiciary's trend of making it
difficult for the legislative branch to find a
solution to the conflict between
constitutionally protected speech and the
legitimate interests of keeping minors safe
from sexual predators.
A review of these legislative attempts and
the federal decisions holding them
unconstitutional will illuminate the
difficulties already encountered by
lawmakers as well as demonstrate the
problems that lie ahead for future attempts
to resolve this difficult conflict.
The Child Pornography Protection Act of
1996 (CPPA) was enacted wvith the intention
of creating, as noted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Ashcroft, criminal sanctions against
"not only pornographic images made using
actual children, but also 'any visual
depiction. including any photograph, film,
video, picture or computer or computer-
generated image or picture' that 'is, or
appears to be, of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct,"' under 18 USC
2256(8)(B).
A second CPPA provision, 18 USC
2256(8)(D), likewise criminalized "the
production or distribution of pornographic
material pandered as child pornography."
The Free Speech Coalition, described in
Ashcroft as "an adult-entertainment trade
association," filed suit in the Northern
District of California seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief out of fear the CPPA
would have an adverse effect on the
industry. Their suit claimed the phrases
"appears to be" and "conveys the
impression" were "overbroad and vague"
and created a "chilling effect" on the
production of First Amendment protected
art.
The majority in Ashcroft initially observed
that these CPPA provisions targeted a
"range of sexually explicit images . . that
appear to depict minors but were produced
by means other than using real children,
such as through the use of youthful-looking
adults or computer-imaging technology."
The majority opinion went on to state that
the broad language of "appears to be" and
"conveys the impression" could be used to
prosecute numerous "mainstream" artistic
endeavors, including movies involving adult
actors merely playing the role of a minor.
Justice Kennedy pointed to the paintings of
Gingerich. the photographs of Raffaelli and
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the films "Traffic," "American Beauty" and
"Romeo and Juliet" as examples of "virtual
depictions" of sexual activity that could
arguably fit within the definition of child
pornography under 18 USC 2256(8)(B).
A careful reading of his opinion, however,
was believed to provide a roadmap of
compliance by those in law enforcement
looking to draft new legislation intended to
withstand future First Amendment scrutiny.
Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that
"freedom of speech has its limits; it does not
embrace certain categories of speech,
including defamation, incitement, obscenity,
and pornography produced with real
children." He remarked that the two CPPA
provisions at issue failed to include the four-
prong obscenity language standard set forth
in Miller v. California, 413 US 15 (1973)
(i.e., "the work, taken as a whole. appeals to
the prurient interest, is patently .offensive in
light of community standards, and lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value").
Hence, it appeared that one easy solution for
Congress would have been to enact a virtual
child pornography statute that included the
obscenity three-prong standard as an
element of the offense. Justice Kennedy's
opinion did, nevertheless, provide a second
possible method of withstanding
constitutional attack in the future.
His opinion analyzed, at some length, how
the Court had previously found a valid
limitation of free speech protection in New
York v. Ferber, 458 US 747 (1982), which
held that a state had a substantial interest in
protecting real children from harm by
criminalizinez the distribution of actual child
pornography. The Court extended this valid
state interest to the mere possession of such
items in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 US 103
(1990).
In contrast, Justice Kennedy stressed in
Ashcroft that while the government
attempted to claim 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(B)'s
prohibition of virtual child pornography
protected against harm to real children, "the
causal link is contingent and indirect."
Instead, he noted the "harm does not
necessarily follow from the speech, but
depends upon some unquantified potential
for subsequent criminal acts." The clear
implication here is that if Congress could
establish a more direct "causal link" or some
"quantifiable potential for subsequent
criminal acts," future legislation might be
held constitutional.
PROTECT Act
In response to Ashcroft, Congress enacted
the PROTECT Act, which attempted to
include the suggested solutions in Justice
Kennedy s opinion.
One would hope that Congress learned the
following lessons from Ashcroft in drafting
new legislation: (1) avoid overbroad
language, (2) adopt the full three-prong
Miller obscenity standard, and (3) adopt
specific legislative findings supporting the
need for criminalizing virtual child
pornography. Williams found the PROTECT
Act failed in successfully meeting any of
these goals.
The defendant in Tilliams was caught in
one of the commonplace undercover sexual
predator stings in which a law enforcement
officer visits Internet chatrooms. In this
case, the defendant, after meeting the
undercover in a "public" chatroom, engaged
the undercover in a private online
communication.
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While still participating in a private chat, the
two initially exchanged non-pornographic
depictions of young girls. Next, the
defendant told the undercover he had "hard
core" images of his own daughter, indicating
he was willing to trade with the undercover
if the latter had similar depictions.
After the undercover sent more non-
pornographic pictures, the defendant
announced in the public chatroom that the
undercover was "a cop" because the
undercover refused to send sexually explicit
depictions of children. The undercover
immediately responded by announcing that
the defendant was really the "cop."
The defendant fell for this trap by posting a
hypertext link in the public chatroom so that
anyone could click on it to access child
pornography. The defendant added to this
link a statement in the chatroom bragging
that he could not be a cop because he was
willing to post such an "uplink" while the
undercover would not do the same.
The defendant was prosecuted for both the
possession and the distribution of child
pornography. A plea arrangement was
worked out so the defendant could admit his
guilt to both the possession and distribution,
but still appeal the PROTECT Act
distribution provisions to the Eleventh
Circuit as being unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague.
The new, promoting child pornography
provisions of the PROTECT Act made it a
crime to distribute the visual depiction of
both an "actual minor" and an "obscene
visual depiction of a minor" engaging in
sexually explicit conduct. So it appeared
Congress did link obscenity to virtual child
pornography.
The problem the circuit found, however, was
that the PROTECT Act's definition of
obscenity used only one of the three prongs
of the Miller standard (the "lacking serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value"
prong).
At one point in Williams, the court seemed
to imply that Congress may regulate
"obscene child pornography," presumably if
the entire Miller definition had been utilized,
but the court found other deficiencies with
the act.
For example, the description of what
constitutes distributing child pornography is
someone who "advertises. promotes,
presents, distributes, or solicits through the
mails, or in interstate or foreign commerce
by any means, including by computer, any
material or purported material in a manner
that reflects the belief, or that is intended to
cause another to believe, that material or
purported material" that fits the definition of
child pornography.
The circuit court found such language
objectionable on multiple grounds. First, the
use of the term "purported material" could
be considered to include someone who
claims he is distributing child pornography
when he is sending legal depictions of
children (such as a non-provocatively posed
nude child).
This, the court found, criminalizes not the
validly objectionable act of the distribution
of the child pornography, but the "speech
promoting and soliciting such material." It
noted that the foundation of protected
speech is the right to openly speak about
objectionable topics.
Also problematic were such "muddled" and
"nebulous" phrases as "purported material"
and -reflects the belief, or is intended to
cause another to believe."
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The Williams decision concluded its analysis
of the PROTECT Act's constitutionality by
remarking that the distribution provisions
"fail to convey the contours of its
restrictions with sufficient clarity to permit
law-abiding persons to conform to its
requirements." Hence, they are
"insusceptible of uniform interpretation and
application by those charged with the
responsibility of enforcing" them and,
therefore, are unconstitutionally vague.
Williams also appears to subtly suggest
there are other weaknesses in the PROTECT
Act, without using them as grounds for
reversal. For example, the legislative
memorandum supporting the act focused
almost exclusively on the technological
advances in modem computer-generated
images creating virtually indistinguishable
depictions of child pornography while
abandoning other supporting grounds listed
in the memorandum.
Likewise, the court mentioned other
potentially vague words and phrases found
elsewhere in the act, some closely mirroring
the CPPA language found objectionable in
Ashcroft, but never specifically ruled on
such language being a basis for reversal.
New York Law
In New York, the Ashcroft and Williams
decisions are basically a non-issue. The
state's child pornography provisions are
worded to require that the "sexual
performance" be done "by a child."
The obvious question then becomes, how
does a prosecutor prove the depicted person
engaged in pornographic acts is, in fact, a
child?
One way to prove the age of a child would
be to call an expert in the approximation of
age based on an examination of
developmental characteristics and other
phvsical traits. But does the law require such
evidence to sustain a conviction?
At least three post-Ashcroft federal decisions
have ruled that juries, on their own, are
capable of distinguishing between real and
virtual images, U.S. v. Kimler, 335 F3d 1132
(10th Cir, 2003); U.S. v. Deaton, 328 F3d
454 (8th Cir, 2003); U.S. v. Hall, 312 F3d
1250 (11th Cir, 2003), cert den., 538 US
954.
The leading New York case on
disseminating indecent material to minors,
People v. Foley, 94 NY2d 668 (2000),
likewise appears to imply support of a jury's
ability to make a similar determination.
Conclusion
Whether it is the Communication Decency
Act of 1996, which was ruled
unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU, 521 US
844 (1997), or the Child Online Protection
Act of 1998, found unconstitutional in
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 US 564 (2002), or
New York's Disseminating Indecent
Material to Minors in the Second Degree,
held unconstitutional in American Library
Association v. Pataki, 969 FSupp 160
(SDNY, 1997), or the CPPA or PROTECT
Act provisions cited in this article,
lawmakers continue to struggle with drafting
legislation designed to protect minors online
consistent with First Amendment
protections.
Whether the fault lies with imprecise
legislative draftsmanship or with the
structural nature of the Internet itself is still
a bit unclear, although a combination of the
two is probably closest to the truth.
Ultimately, the only real solution might be
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to retool the Internet with appropriate
controls, checks and balances imposed from
birth. While that seems a daunting task, the
development of a "second Internet" has been
talked about for the past several years.
Hopefully, the mistakes in governing the
first one will be minimized with the second
because the alternative-a retrofitting of
regulations and supervision of cyberspace as
it exists today-just may be impossible.
Stephen V Treglia is an assistant district
attorney in Nassau County and chief of the
office 's technology crime unit.
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Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki
(06-1322)
Ruling Below: (Holowecki v. Federal Exp. Corp., 440 F.3d 558 (2d Cir. 2006), cert granted
_ S. Ct. , 2007 WL 989595 (U.S.), 75 USLW 3540, 75 USLW 3641, 75 USLW 3644 [2007]).
Respondents filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") against
Federal Express, alleging a pattern of discrimination against older couriers. One of the
respondents filed an "intake questionnaire" with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") and two others filed charges with the EEOC and received right-to-sue
letters in response; the remaining respondents did not file any charges with the EEOC. The
District Court dismissed the suit without reaching the merits, finding that none of the fourteen
plaintiffs had filed timely or valid charges with the EEOC, but the Second Circuit reversed the
dismissal and held in favor of petitioners, allowing eleven of the fourteen original plaintiffs to
piggyback on the single complaint of plaintiff Kennedy.
Questions Presented: Whether the Second Circuit erred in concluding, contrary to the law of
several other circuits and implicating an issue the Supreme Court has examined but not yet
decided, that an "intake questionnaire" submitted to the EEOC may suffice for the charge of
discrimination that must be submitted pursuant to the ADEA, even in the absence of evidence
that the EEOC treated the form as a charge or the employee submitting the questionnaire
reasonably believed it constituted a charge.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION
Petitioner, Appellant
V.
Paul HOLOWECKI, et al.
Respondent, Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Decided March 8, 2006
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
POOLER, Circuit Judge:
Appellants, who are all at least 40 years of
age and are currently or were formerly
employed as couriers for appellee Federal
Express Corporation ("FedEx"). filed an April
30, 2002, complaint on behalf of themselves
and other similarly situated FedEx couriers,
claiming that FedEx had engaged in a pattern
and practice of employment procedures that
discriminate based on age, in violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., the New
York State Human Rights Law ("NYHRL"),
N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq., and the laws
of several other states. The United States
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District Court for the Southern District of
New York (McKenna. J.) dismissed the
claims as time-barred, concluding that each
named plaintiff failed to comply with the
ADEA s time limit requirements under 29
U.S.C. § 626(d).
We disagree with the district court's
dismissals of the plaintiffs' claims.
Specifically. we hold that plaintiff Patricia
Kennedy's Intake Questionnaire and
accompanying verified affidavit, filed with
the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), constituted an EEOC
"charge" that satisfactorily fulfilled the
ADEA's exhaustion requirements even
though the EEOC never notified, or
investigated, the employer. Furthermore, we
conclude that Kennedy's EEOC charge was
sufficient to permit the eleven named
plaintiffs that never filed EEOC charges to
take advantage of the "single filing" or
"piggybacking" rule and thereby satisfy the
ADEA's exhaustion requirements.
Finally, with respect to plaintiffs George
Robertson and Kevin McQuillan, two
individuals who did individually file
administrative charges and received right-to-
sue letters. we conclude that the district court
erred in determining that these plaintiffs did
not file their charges within 300 days after the
alleged unlawful practice occurred, as is
required by 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). We remand!
however, for the district court to decide in the
first instance whether the complaint. fleshed
out by Robertson's affidavit, was sufficient to
withstand a motion dismiss based on the
ADEA's requirement that a claimant who
receives a right-to-sue letter must bring suit in
federal court within 90 days of receipt of the
letter. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e). Accordingly.
wx e reverse in part, vacate in part. and remand
for further proceedings in accordance with
this opinion.
BACKGROUND
This case requires us to consider various time
limits imposed on plaintiffs seeking to sue
their employer under the ADEA. Appellants
(also referred to as "Holowecki plaintiffs"),
residents of several states, filed an April 30,
2002, complaint on behalf of themselves and
other similarly situated FedEx couriers. The
complaint alleged, inter alia, that, through
policies initiated in 1994 and 1995-such as
"Best Practices Pays" ("BPP") and
"Minimum Acceptable Performance
Standards" ("MAPS")-and through a pattern
and practices that continued thereafter, FedEx
had discriminated based on age. The
Holowecki plaintiffs contended that BPP,
MAPS, and related policies were intended to
encourage older workers to leave the
company before they wished to retire and to
mask FedEx's efforts to terminate older
workers based on age discrimination.
According to the complaint, for instance, after
the initial implementation of the BPP and
MAPS, FedEx continued to increase
performance goals and apply these new goals
in a way that discriminated against older
couriers..." Over time, however, [FedEx]
treated the goals as the minimum acceptable
number of stops that older couriers were
required to make to retain their positions. ...
Older couriers, according to the complaint,
were more often "written up" for occasional
failures.... The complaint alleged a series of
additional discriminatory practices....
The district court dismissed the Holowecki
plaintiffs' complaint without reaching the
merits, ruling that all fourteen named
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the ADEA's time
limit requirements, see 29 U.S.C. § 626, and
declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims.
Under 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) ("Section 626(d)"),
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an aggrieved person must file an EEOC
charge at least 60 days prior to initiating an
ADEA suit in federal court. In addition, if the
allegedly discriminatory act occurs in a
"deferral state," a state that has its own age
discrimination law and its own age
discrimination remedial agency, the charge
must be filed within the earlier of 300 days
after the alleged unlawful practice occurred or
thirty days after a complainant receives notice
of the termination of state law proceedings. It
is undisputed that all of the states relevant to
this action are deferral states.
Unlike Title VII, the ADEA does not require
an aggrieved party to receive a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC before filing suit in
federal court. However, in the event that the
EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter to an ADEA
claimant, the claimant must file her federal
suit within 90 days after receipt of the letter.
While the ADEA's time limit requirements
are subject to equitable modification or
estoppel, Dillman v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc.,
784 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir.1986), ADEA time
limits "are not to be disregarded by courts out
of a vague sympathy for particular litigants,"
Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466
U.S. 147, 152, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d
196 (1984).
Three of the named Holowecki plaintiffs filed
charges with the EEOC or an authorized state
agency (collectively referred to as "EEOC")
before bringing suit in federal court and
eleven did not. Plaintiff Kennedy, a resident
of Florida, filed an EEOC Intake
Questionnaire form and accompanying
verified affidavit on December 3, 2001. and
an EEOC charge form on May 30, 2002.
Kennedy did not receive a right-to-sue letter
in conjunction with either of these filings. The
verified affidavit, accompanying the Intake
Questionnaire form, consisted of over four
pages of text and alleged that FedEx had
instituted a number of policies and practices
that discriminated based on age. It stated, for
instance, that "as a result of [the Best Practice
Pays] policy and procedure changes," FedEx
had "fired and/or constructively terminated"
older couriers ' and had otherwise
discriminated against older couriers.
Moreover, it named several practices, such as
FedEx's goals with respect to the number of
stops per hour, that had increasingly gotten
worse since the initiation of the BPP and
MAPS.
The district court determined (1) that
Kennedy's EEOC Intake Questionnaire and
affidavit was not an EEOC "charge" and
therefore did not satisfy Section 626(d)'s
requirement that a claimant file a charge
before bringing suit in federal court, and (2)
that Kennedy's May 30, 2002, EEOC charge
form was untimely because it was not filed 60
days prior to filing the April 30, 2002, ADEA
complaint in federal court. See 29 U.S.C. §
626(d). Appellee does not dispute that
Kennedy's EEOC Intake Questionnaire form
and accompanying affidavit would satisfy the
60 and 300 day time limits set out in 29
U.S.C. § 626(d) if we consider them to be an
EEOC charge. In appellee's view, however,
the EEOC Intake Questionnaire and
accompanying affidavit do not satisfy Section
626(d) because they are not properly
considered to be an EEOC "charge."
Plaintiff Robertson, a resident of Illinois, filed
an EEOC charge on December 1, 2000, and
plaintiff McQuillan, a resident of New York,
filed an EEOC charge on September 11. 1998.
Although there was no question as to whether
these constituted EEOC "charges" or as to
whether these were filed 60 days prior to the
initiation of the April 30, 2002, federal
complaint, the district court found that they
failed to meet the Section 626(d) requirement
that the EEOC charge be filed within 300
days after the occurrence of the allegedly
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discriminatory acts. Appellee argued below
that these two plaintiffs, both of whom
received right-to-sue letters from the EEOC,
failed to satisfy the requirement that they
bring their April 30, 2002, federal suit within
90 days of receipt of the letters. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(e). After McQuillan filed his September
11. 1998, charge, the EEOC issued a right-to-
sue letter on June 11. 1999.
Appellee argues that Robertson's right-to-sue
letter was received on or about April 25,
2001, but Robertson states, "under penalty of
peijury," that it was received shortly after
February 7. 2002, and thus satisfies Section
626(e) because it was received within 90 days
of the April 30, 2002, federal suit. After
Robertson filed his December 1, 2000, charge
with the EEOC, providing a Lake Villa,
Illinois address, the EEOC sent Robertson a
right-to-sue letter, dated April 25, 2001.
According to Robertson's declaration,
submitted to the district court in opposition to
appellee's motion to dismiss, he moved from
Lake Villa in March of 2001 and requested
that the United States Postal Service forward
his mail. The April 25, 2001, right-to-sue
letter, however, somehow did not reach
Robertson. In January or February of 2002,
Robertson contacted the EEOC because he
had not heard anything since the filing of his
charge. In response, on February 7, 2002, the
EEOC sent Robertson the April 25. 2001,
right-to-sue letter.
According to the record, eleven of the
Holowecki named plaintiffs never filed
anything approximating an EEOC charge.
These non-filing plaintiffs claimed that their
suit nonetheless did satisfy ADEA time limit
requirements because of the single filing, or
"piggybacking." rule. According to the
piggybacking rule, "where one plaintiff has
filed a timely EEOC complaint, other non-
filing plaintiffs may join in the action if their
individual claims aris[e] out of similar
discriminatory treatment in the same time
frame." Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d
1094, 1100 (2d Cir.1986). In cases such as
this, when the allegedly discriminatory
activity affects a large group, piggybacking is
not allowed unless the filed charge provides
"some indication that the grievance affects a
group of individuals defined broadly enough
to include those who seek to piggyback on the
claim." Tolliver. 918 F.2d at 1058.
An individual who has previously filed an
EEOC charge cannot piggyback onto
someone else's EEOC charge. See Levy v.
United States Gen. Accounting Office, 175
F.3d 254, 255 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam); see
also Snell, 782 F.2d at 1100. As noted by
other Circuit Courts of Appeals, allowing an
individual who has previously filed a charge
to abandon that charge and piggyback onto
the charges of another individual would too
often frustrate the EEOC's statutorily
mandated efforts to resolve an individual
charge through informal conciliation. See,
e.g., Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 129 F.3d 554, 557-58 (11th
Cir.1997).. .. We agree with this analysis.
The eleven non-filing plaintiffs (also referred
to as "the piggybacking plaintiffs") present
three piggybacking theories on appeal, all of
which the district court rejected. They argue
that they can piggyback onto (1) Kennedy's
December 3. 2001, EEOC Intake
Questionnaire and accompanying affidavit or
(2) Robertson's December 1, 2000, EEOC
charge, both of which, in their view, satisfy
the ADEA's time limit requirements.
Additionally, the piggybacking plaintiffs
contend that they can piggyback onto timely
EEOC charges filed by parties to a separate
Florida lawsuit that was dismissed prior to the
initiation of this claim, Freeman v. Federal
Express Corp., No. 99-2466 (M.D.Fla. Sept.
25, 2000), aff'd, 2002 WL 187185 (11th Cir.
Jan.14, 2002). because the charges filed by
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those individuals put the EEOC and FedEx on
notice about its allegedly nationwide
discriminatory practices. None of the
Freeman plaintiffs are parties to the
Holowecki suit. None of the Holowecki
named plaintiffs were parties to the Florida
lawsuit, although some of them
unsuccessfully tried to join in an amended
Freeman complaint that the Florida district
court dismissed as moot. See Bost v. Federal
Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1236-37 (11th
Cir.2004).
DISCUSSION
We construe the district court's ruling as a
dismissal for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
rather than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1) does not apply
because the ADEA's time limits, which are
subject to equitable modification, are not
jurisdictional in nature. See Dillman, 784 F.2d
at 59....
In reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) ruling, it is
proper for this court to consider the plaintiffs
relevant filings with the EEOC and the
declaration that Robertson submitted to the
district court.....
I. Kennedy's EEOC Intake Questionnaire
and Affidavit
Both Kennedy and the piggybacking plaintiffs
argue that, based on the circumstances of this
case, Kennedy's EEOC Intake Questionnaire
and accompanying affidavit constitute an
EEOC "charge." Accordingly. they contend,
it is timely in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §
626(d) because it is a "charge" that satisfies
both the 60 day and 300 day time limits. The
piggybacking plaintiffs further argue that the
scope of Kennedy's charge is sufficient to
incorporate their age discrimination claims,
thereby permitting them to piggyback. We
agree on both accounts and reverse the district
court's dismissal of these plaintiffs' claims.
A. Meaning of EEOC "Charge"
In order to decide whether Kennedy's EEOC
Intake Questionnaire and accompanying
affidavit constitutes an EEOC charge we first
turn to the meaning of the statutory term
"charge." The ADEA requires the filing of a
timely charge with the EEOC but does not
define the term "charge." See 29 U.S.C. §
626(d). The EEOC has established
interpreting regulations that specify the
requisite information that must appear in a
"charge." See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.3, 1626.6,
1626.8. The required content is minimal. For
instance, a charge "is sufficient" when the
EEOC receives "a . . . writing" (or
information that an EEOC employee reduces
to a writing) from the person making the
charge that names the employer and generally
describes the allegedly discriminatory acts.
See id. § 1626.8(b) (citing id. § 1626.6).
According to the regulations, a charge also
"should contain," but is not required to
contain, other information such as the full
contact information for the employer and the
individual filing the charge, and a "clear and
concise statement of the facts, including
pertinent dates, constituting the alleged
unlawful employment practices." See id. §
1626.8(a)(l)-(5).
Some Circuits have imposed an additional
requirement, the "manifest intent" rule, that is
not explicitly stated in the statute or
interpreting regulations. According to these
courts, for a written submission to the EEOC
to constitute a "charge," it must manifest an
individual's intent to have the agency initiate
its investigatory and conciliatory processes.
An oft-cited proposition of the Third Circuit
is that "[i]n order to constitute a charge that
satisfies the requirement of section 626(d),
notice to the EEOC must be of a kind that
would convince a reasonable person that the
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grievant has manifested an intent to activate
the Act's machinery." Bihler v. Singer Co.,
710 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983); see Wilkerson
v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th
Cir.2001); Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co.,
859 F.2d 534, 542 (7th Cir.1988).
We agree with this proposition and hold that a
writing submitted to the EEOC containing the
information required by EEOC interpreting
regulations is an EEOC "charge" for purposes
of Section 626, only when the writing
demonstrates that an individual seeks to
activate the administrative investigatory and
conciliatory process. We also agree that
"notice to the EEOC must be of a kind that
would convince a reasonable person that the
grievant has manifested an intent to activate
the Act's machinery." Bihier. 710 F.2d at 99.
This interpretation of the meaning of "charge"
recognizes that providing the EEOC with an
opportunity "to eliminate the discriminatory
practice or practices alleged, and to effect
voluntary compliance with the requirements
of [the ADEA] through informal methods of
conciliation, conference, and persuasion," 29
U.S.C. § 626(b). is "an essential element" of
the ADEA's statutory scheme, cf. Francis v.
City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d
Cir.2000). Receiving a charge provides the
EEOC with an opportunity to notify the
prospective defendants and seek conciliation.
See Tolliver. 918 F.2d at 105-: see also
Dezaio v. Port Auth. of N.Y & N.J.. 205 F.3d
62. 65 (2d Cir.2000). Without notice from the
complainant, the EEOC is not provided with
an opportunity to fulfill this statutory purpose.
See Schroeder v. Copley Newspaper. 879 F.2d
266. 269 (7th Cir.1989).
While we fully recognize that administrative
exhaustion is an important aspect of the
ADEA-k. if an individual satisfactorily notifies
the EEOC of her charge. she is not foreclosed
from federal suit merely because the EEOC
fails to follow through with notifying the
employer and attempting to resolve the matter
through "conciliation, conference, and
persuasion." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). To require
this would be to hold individuals accountable
for the failings of the agency. Moreover, we
see no reason to require that the EEOC have
provided misleading information to a
complainant about the status of her charge.
Regardless of what the EEOC communicates
or fails to communicate to a party, a written
filing that complies with the ADEA and
contains the information required by EEOC
interpreting regulations is an EEOC "charge"
as long as it demonstrates a party's intent to
activate the administrative process.
This Court has recognized, in the ADEA
context, that it is not required that the EEOC
has actually taken action before an individual,
who otherwise satisfactorily filed a charge,
can bring suit in federal court. Hodge, 157
F.3d at 167-68. In Hodge, we allowed a
federal ADEA suit to go forward even though
the EEOC had not terminated its
investigation. In that case, the investigation of
the charge had been held up due to the
withdrawal of plaintiff's initial administrative
charge pursuant to an agreement that was later
deemed invalid. Id. We concluded that
plaintiff need not re-file a charge or seek to
reopen the administrative proceedings. Id.
Since the EEOC had the charge for more than
the "60-day period that Congress established
for the EEOC to investigate or attempt
conciliation before the ADEA plaintiff is
allowed to file suit in court." we saw "no
statutory purpose to be served by a refiling or
reopening requirement, the effect of which
would be the imposition of additional delays,
including another 60-day waiting period." Id.
at 168. We cited Bihler, 710 F.2d at 99 n. 7,
for the proposition that "[s]uch a holding
would establish a prerequisite to suit beyond a
prospective plaintiffs control and therefore
would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of
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the Act." Hodge, 157 F.3d at 168. This
reasoning equally applies when an individual
has manifested her intent to activate the
administrative process. A complainant should
not be held accountable if the EEOC fails to
follow through after that complainant has
provided written notice to the EEOC "that
would convince a reasonable person" that she
intends "to activate the Act's machinery,"
Bihler, 710 F.2d at 99.
B. Kennedy's EEOC Questionnaire as EEOC
Charge
Now that we have described the requirements
for an EEOC "charge" we - turn to the
particular circumstances of this case.
Kennedy filed her EEOC Intake
Questionnaire and accompanying affidavit
("questionnaire") with the EEOC on
December 3, 2001, more than 60 days prior to
initiating this suit on April 30, 2002, and
alleged discriminatory acts that occurred
within 300 days of the filing of the
questionnaire. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). The
relevant question on appeal is whether this
otherwise timely filing with the EEOC
constituted a "charge." We conclude that
Kennedy's questionnaire constituted an
EEOC "charge" because (1) its content
satisfied the statutory and regulatory
requirements for what content must be
included in a charge, and (2) the questionnaire
communicated Kennedy's intent to activate
the EEOC's administrative process.
First, Kennedy's questionnaire satisfies the
EEOC's interpreting regulations specifying
the required content that must appear in a
"charge." See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.3, 1626.6,
1626.8(b). By stating that FedEx was
discriminating against her and others because
of their age, Kennedy's questionnaire
certainly alleged that the defendant had
engaged in "actions in violation of the Act,"
as is required by 29 C.F.R. § 1626.3.
Moreover, the questionnaire form and
accompanying four-page verified affidavit,
were a "writing" that named the employer and
generally described the alleged discriminatory
act, as is required by 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.6 and
1626.8(b). The affidavit detailed numerous
instances of alleged discrimination, such as
FedEx's implementation of various aspects of
the "Best Practices Pays" and "Minimum
Acceptable Performance Standards"
programs....
Second, the content of the questionnaire
evidenced Kennedy's intent to activate the
administrative process. The forceful tone and
content of the affidavit should have alerted
the EEOC that the filing was meant to be an
EEOC "charge." For instance, the affidavit
states that, in years past, Kennedy has
"threatened to stand up for [her] rights" but
that "[i]n the past several months" she had
''come to realize that by doing nothing" she
had allowed FedEx to continue its
discriminatory practices against her. As
further indication that Kennedy intended to
activate the administrative process, by
checking the "consent" box on the
questionnaire form, Kennedy consented to the
disclosure of her identity to the employer that
allegedly discriminated against her. This
demonstrates Kennedy's desire to move the
investigatory and conciliatory process
forward. Moreover, the EEOC form, on which
Kennedy submitted her affidavit, itself
indicated that the case was currently "open,"
also suggested that her filing would be
sufficient to initiate the administrative
process. Finally, and perhaps most tellingly,
the affidavit unambiguously states, "[p]lease
force Federal Express to end their age
discrimination plan so we can finish out our
careers absent the unfairness and hostile work
environment created within their application
of Best Practice Pays/High-Velocity Culture
Change." In light of these facts, we conclude
that Kennedy provided written notice to the
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EEOC "that would convince a reasonable
person" that Kennedy intended "to activate
the Act's machinery," see Bihler, 710 F.2d at
99. The EEOC erred by failing to act in
response to Kennedy's manifested intent.
FedEx argues that the fact that Kennedy later
filled out an actual EEOC charge form
indicates that her earlier intention was not to
file a "charge." Some courts have followed
this logic to some extent. See Bost, 372 F.3d
at 1241; Diez v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co., 88 F.3d 672, 677 (8th Cir.1996). There is
nothing in the record, however, that indicates
that Kennedy, by also filing a charge form,
was doing anything more than supplementing
her earlier charge., or acting out of a surfeit of
caution. Therefore, based on the
circumstances of this case, we conclude that
the content of Kennedy's questionnaire
sufficiently demonstrated her intent to
activate the administrative process and her
later filing of an EEOC charge form does not
compel us to find otherwise.
Having established that the questionnaire in
this case was a "charge," we turn to the
piggybacking plaintiffs' theory that they can
use Kennedy's charge to satisfy the ADEA's
time limit requirements because Kennedy's
affidavit identified discriminatory treatment
that is similar to the acts described in the
complaint and alleges that a large group of
workers have experienced similar
discrimination. See Tolliver, 918 F.2d at
1056-58. We agree with this theory.
Like the Holowecki complaint, Kennedy's
questionnaire described the allegedly
discriminatory policies, such as the Best
Practices Pays. Minimum Acceptable
Performance Standards, and other
discriminatory practices, in detail. Kennedy's
questionnaire also provided notice that the
policies were affecting a wide range of FedEx
employees. The affidavit stated, for instance,
that the Best Practice Pays policy "has
systematically targeted myself and others."
[A. 158] Moreover, it stated that
''management has continually picked at me
and other older couriers emotionally and
financially by changing our 'start times"' and
that Kennedy knew she was "not alone"
because "many older couriers" shared her
"doubts and fears." Kennedy concluded by
stating that FedEx must be forced to stop its
discriminatory policies so that "we can finish
out our careers" absent discriminatory
practices.
Because we agree that the piggybacking
plaintiffs can piggyback onto Kennedy's
charge, there is no reason for this court to
address the two other piggybacking theories
presented on appeal. Therefore, we are left
only to deal with the two remaining named
plaintiffs who individually filed
administrative charges with the EEOC.
II. Robertson's EEOC Charge
It is undisputed that Robertson's charge was
filed more than 60 days prior to the initiation
of the Holowecki suit. The district court held,
however, that the Robertson charge was
nonetheless untimely under Section 626(d)
because it was filed more than 300 days after
the implementation of the allegedly
discriminatory policies alleged in the
complaint. Specifically, the district court
found the charge untimely because it was
submitted "over six years after plaintiffs
claim the policies were implemented."
Appellee also challenges the Robertson
charge on an additional timeliness ground not
specifically addressed in the district court's
opinion, arguing that Robertson did not file
suit in federal court within 90 days of his
receipt of a right-to-sue letter. in violation of
Section 626(e). We find that, if we accept the
allegations in the complaint as true,
Robertson's charge was not filed more than
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300 days after the implementation of the
discriminatory policies alleged, and we
therefore vacate the district court's dismissal
of his claim on that basis. However, because
it was not reached below, we remand for the
district court to address whether Robertson's
suit was untimely because it was not filed
within 90 days of receiving the right-to-sue
letter.
Robertson's charge unambiguously included
references to allegedly discriminatory
practices that took place within the 300-day
period and did not even mention any
particular FedEx policies or acts that were
initiated more than 300 days before the filing
of the charge. Instead Robertson's January 2,
2001, charge alleged that FedEx refused to
allow Robertson to take accrued leave in
August 2000, and terminated him on
September 8, 2000, based on age and
disability discrimination. Both of these acts
occurred less than 300 days before Robertson
filed his January 2, 2001, charge. The district
court's reference to alleged discriminatory
acts that occurred outside the 300-day period
is simply a misreading of the allegations in
the complaint. We therefore vacate the district
court's dismissal on the basis that Robertson's
charge was untimely, and remand for the
district court to consider whether Robertson
filed suit within 90 days of receiving the
right-to-sue letter.
III. McQuillan's EEOC Charge
As with Robertson, we disagree with the
district court's determination that McQuillan
failed to file within 300 days after the alleged
unlawful practice occurred. McQuillan's
charge, which was signed on September 11,
1998, challenges his termination from
employment, which occurred on March 31,
1998. There is no doubt that the charge
described acts that allegedly occurred within
the required 300-day period. Because we
vacate the district court's dismissal of
McQuillan's claim on this ground, we remand
for the district court to consider in the first
instance appellee's argument that
McQuillan's suit was not filed within 90 days
of receiving the right-to-sue letter.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court is
REVERSED with respect to all of the named
plaintiffs, except Robertson and McQuillan.
The District Court's dismissal of Robertson's
and McQuillan s claims is VACATED. The
case is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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"FedEx Case Goes to Supreme Court-Justices Will
Hear Discrimination Suit in October"
Associated Press
June 5, 2007
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court said
Monday that it will consider [in Federal
Express Corporation i'. Holowecki] whether
an a,-e discrimination lawsuit against FedEx
Corp. can proceed.
At issue is whether a group of 14 FedEx
employees, led by Patricia Kennedy and
Paul Holowecki, followed proper procedures
in suing FedEx for age discrimination.
The Memphis-based company is arguing
that the suit should be dismissed because
Kennedy did not file a formal charge
alleging age discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission until
after she sued FedEx. The other employees
joined Kennedy's complaint.
Federal law requires plaintiffs to file a
complaint with the EEOC and wait 60 days
before they sue an employer, FedEx says.
The law is intended to give the EEOC the
opportunity to notify the company accused
of discrimination, investigate the charges
and seek to resolve them before a suit is
filed, the company said.
The plaintiffs respond that a form Kennedy
filed with the EEOC in December 2001
included the information necessary to
comply with that law, and that the suit she
and her colleagues filed in April 2002.
should be allowed to proceed.
A district court dismissed the case, but the
U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals, based
in New York City, ruled in March 2006, that
the case should be allowed to proceed. The
court found that the EEOC's failure to
follow through on Kennedy's complaint and
notify FedEx should not preclude the
plaintiffs' right to sue.
The justices won't hear arguments in the
dispute until the Supreme Court's next term.
which begins in October.
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"2nd Circuit Rules Filing of EEOC Questionnaire
Satisfied ADEA Exhaustion Requirement"
Lawyers Weekly USA
March 27, 2006
Lawyers Weekly USA Staff
An employee satisfied the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's
exhaustion requirement by filing an intake
questionnaire with the EEOC, the 2nd
Circuit has ruled [in Federal Express
Corporation v. Holowecki].
The employee, along with 11 other
plaintiffs, brought suit alleging that her
employer engaged in a pattern and practice
of employment procedures that
discriminated on the basis of age. A judge
dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the plaintiffs did not satisfy the ADEA's
time limit requirements.
But the 2nd Circuit reversed, holding that
one employee's EEOC intake questionnaire
and accompanying verified affidavit
"constituted an EEOC 'charge' that
satisfactorily fulfilled the ADEA-s
exhaustion requirements even though the
EEDOC never notified, or investigated, the
employer."
The court stated that "a writing submitted to
the EEOC containing the information
required by EEOC interpreting regulations is
an EEOC 'charge' . . . when the writing
demonstrates that an individual seeks to
activate the administrative investigatory and
conciliatory process."
Furthermore, "if an individual satisfactorily
notifies the EEOC of her charge, she is not
foreclosed from federal suit merely because
the EEOC fails to follow through with
notifying the employer and attempting to
resolve the matter through 'conciliation,
conference, and persuasion."' To impose
such a requirement, the court reasoned,
"would be to hold individuals accountable
for the failings of the agency."
Here, the court said that the other plaintiffs,
who never filed EEOC charges, could "take
advantage of the 'single filing' or
'piggybacking' rule and thereby satisfy the
ADA's exhaustion requirements" because
the affidavit outlined similar discrimination
experienced by a large group of workers.
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Bd. of Educ. of City of N. Y. v. Tom F.
(06-637)
Ruling Below: (Bd. ofEduc. of City of N. Y v. Tom F., 193 F. App'x 26, cert granted 127 S. Ct.
1393, 167 L. Ed. 2d 158, 75 U.S.L.W. 3452, 75 U.S.L.W. 3456 [2007]).
Gilbert F. had attended a private school in New York since Kindergarten that offered special
education services. In 1999, the Board of Education conducted its annual review and determined
that Gilbert was still in need of special education and placed him at a public school program with
a teacher to student ratio of 15:1. Gilbert's father, Tom F., kept him at the private school where
the classroom size was 8:1. In 2000, Tom F. applied to the board for reimbursement of education
expenses. Although local and state administrative bodies determined that Tom F. should be
reimbursed, the school district refused to pay, claiming that the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) precluded the father from reimbursement, because Gilbert had never
attended a public institution. The school district filed suit in the Southern District of New York
to overturn the state's determination that the school district owed reimbursement. The District
Court Judge overturned the decision, holding that the IDEA did bar reimbursement in this
instance. However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, in a summary order, reversed that
determination and remanded the matter for further proceedings in light of its decision in Frank
G. v. Bd. of Educ., which held that the IDEA did not preclude reimbursement when a student had
not previously received special education and related services.
Question Presented: Whether the IDEA permits tuition reimbursement where a child has not
previously received special education from a public agency.
BOARD OF EDUCATION of the CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
of the CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellee,
V.
TOM F. on behalf of GILBERT F., a minor child,
Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Decided August 9, 2006
[Facts: Tom F.'s son, Gilbert, has attended a
private school since Kindergarten. The
school district's Committee on Special
Education (CSE), conducted its annual
review in 1999 and determined that Gilbert
should remain classified as learning
disabled. CSE proposed placement in a
public school special education classroom
with a teacher to student ratio of 15:1. Tom
F. chose to keep his son in the private
school, where the class size was 8:1. Tom
F. then sought reimbursement for the cost of
tuition. An Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO)
ordered the school board to reimburse Tom
F. The school board appealed that
determination to the State Education
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Department State Review Officer (SRO),.
who affirmed the IHO's determination. The
school board filed suit in the Southern
District of New York. The District Judge
held that the IDEA precluded
reimbursement, since Gilbert had never
received special education from a public
school before his placement in a private
institution. Tom F. now appeals that
judgment.]
SUMMARY ORDER
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the judgment of district
court be, and it hereby is, VACATED and
REMANDED for further proceedings in
light of this Court's decision in Frank G. v.
Board of Education of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d
356 (2d Cir. 2006).
FRANK G. and Dianne G., Parents of a Disabled Student, Anthony G.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
N1.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HYDE PARK, Central School District,
Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Decided July 27, 2006
[Excerpt: Some citations omitted.]
KORMAN. District Judge:
DISCUSSION
Congress enacted the IDEA to promote the
education of children with disabilities, "to
ensure that all children with disabilities have
available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education
and related services designed to meet their
unique needs [and] . . . to ensure that the
rights of children with disabilities and
parents of such children are protected." 20
U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1). A free appropriate
public education "must include 'special
education and related services' tailored to
meet the unique needs of a particular child,
and be 'reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits."'
Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist.,
142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998).
The key element of the IDEA is the
development of an IEP for each handicapped
child, which includes "a comprehensive
statement of the educational needs of a
handicapped child and the specially
designed instruction and related services to
be employed to meet those needs." Sch.
Conm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471
U.S. 359, 368, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985). The
IEP is collaboratively developed by the
parents of the child, educators, and other
specialists....
If a state fails in its obligation to provide a
free appropriate public education to a
handicapped child, the parents may enroll
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the child in a private school and seek
retroactive reimbursement for the cost of the
private school from the state. In
determining whether parents are entitled to
reimbursement, the Supreme Court has
established a two pronged test: (1) was the
IEP proposed by the school district
inappropriate; (2) was the private placement
appropriate to the child's needs. See
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370, 105 S. Ct.
1996. Moreover, because the authority to
grant reimbursement is discretionary,
"equitable considerations [relating to the
reasonableness of the action taken by the
parents] are relevant in fashioning relief."
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374, 105 S. Ct.
1996.
Parents seeking reimbursement for a private
placement bear the burden of demonstrating
that the private placement is appropriate,
even if the proposal in the IEP is
inappropriate. Nevertheless, parents are not
barred from reimbursement where a private
school they choose does not meet the IDEA
definition of a free appropriate public
education. . .
Subject to the foregoing exceptions, the
same considerations and criteria that apply
in determining whether the School District's
placement is appropriate should be
considered in determining the
appropriateness of the parents' placement.
Ultimately, the issue turns on whether a
placement-public or private-is
"reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits." Bd. ofEduc. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207, 102 S. Ct. 3034,
73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982). While the IDEA
does not require states to "maximize the
potential of handicapped children," Rowley,
458 U.S. at 213, 102 S. Ct. 3034, it must
provide such children with "meaningful
access" to education, WJalczak, 142 F.3d at
133. With these goals in mind, we have held
that for an IEP to be reasonably calculated to
enable a child to receive an educational
benefit, it must be "likely to produce
progress, not regression." Id. at 130. Courts
must, therefore, "examine the record for any
objective evidence' indicating whether the
child was likely to make progress or regress
under the proposed plan." Id. Thus, "in the
regular classrooms of a public school
system, the achievement of passing marks
and regular advancement from grade to
grade will be one important factor in
determining educational benefit." Rowley,
458 U.S. at 207 n. 28, 102 S. Ct. 3034.
Although it is more difficult to assess the
significance of grades and regular
advancement outside the context of regular
public classrooms, these factors can still be
helpful in determining the appropriateness
of an alternative educational placement.
No one factor is necessarily dispositive in
determining whether parents' unilateral
placement is "reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational
benefits." Rowley., 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.
Ct. 3034. Grades, test scores, and regular
advancement may constitute evidence that a
child is receiving educational benefit, but
courts assessing the propriety of a unilateral
placement consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether that
placement reasonably serves a child's
individual needs. To qualify for
reimbursement under the IDEA, parents
need not show that a private placement
furnishes every special service necessary to
maximize their child's potential. They need
only demonstrate that the placement
provides "educational instruction specially
designed to meet the unique needs of a
handicapped child, supported by such
services as are necessary to permit the child
to benefit from instruction." Rowley, 458
U.S. at 188-89, 102 S. Ct. 3034.
With this as a backdrop, we turn to two of
the principal arguments of the School
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District, namely, that the enrollment of
Anthony at Upton Lake was not appropriate
to his needs and that, because Anthony had
not previously received special education
and related services, his parents are not
entitled to reimbursement even if Upton
Lake provided him with an appropriate
special education. The School District
describes the latter argument as its "absolute
defense."
1. The Appropriateness of the Upton Lake
Placement
[The court found that Anthony's placement
at Upton Lake was appropriate. The court
agreed with the IHO, that Anthony benefited
from the smaller class size at Upton Lake.
Evidence included dramatic improvement on
the Stanford Achievement Test.]
2. The School District's "Absolute Defense"
The School District argues that it has "an
absolute legal defense" to Anthony's
parents' claim for reimbursement, even if
Upton Lake provided him with an
appropriate public education. This defense is
based on one of the 1997 amendments to the
IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii),
which the School District argues,
"established a statutory threshold for parents
to recover tuition reimbursement when
enrolling their child in a private school
without the consent of the school district."
Specifically, it argues that it may deny
reimbursement to the parents of disabled
students who had enrolled them in regular
public or private schools prior to the
emergence of the need for a free appropriate
public education to meet their unique needs.
Only after a learning disabled student
enrolled in an inappropriate special
education program offered by a public
agency would his parents be free unilaterally
to enroll him at an appropriate private
school and seek reimbursement. Because
Anthony never received special education
and related services from a public agency
prior to his enrollment at Upton Lake, the
School District argues, his parents are not
entitled to reimbursement for his tuition
there.
The justification offered for this argument is
the assertedly plain language of 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) which authorizes
reimbursement to the parents of a disabled
child, "who previously received special
education and related services under the
authority of a public agency" and who
enrolled the child in a private elementary or
secondary school without the consent or
referral of the private agency, "if the court
or hearing officer finds that the agency had
not made a free appropriate public education
available to the child in a timely manner
prior to enrollment." 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Because the authority
granted by this subsection applies to the
reimbursement of parents of disabled
children, "who previously received special
education and related services under the
authority of a public agency," the School
District argues that it should be read as
implicitly excluding reimbursement to
parents who enrolled their child in a public
or private school before the need for a free
appropriate special education manifested
itself. "The clear implication of the plain
language, however, is that where a child has
not previously received special education
from a public agency, there is no authority
to reimburse the tuition expense arising from
a parent's unilateral placement of the child
in private school." Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F.,
2005 WL 22866, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4,
2005). We disagree.
As in all statutory interpretation cases, we
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begin with the language of the statute. Our
first task "is to determine whether the
language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning with regard to the
particular dispute in the case." Barnhart v.
Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450,
122 S. Ct. 941, 151 L. Ed. 2d 908 (2002).
Our inquiry ends, if the language of the
statute is unambiguous and "the statutory
scheme is coherent and consistent," unless
the case comes within the category of cases
in which the result reached by applying the
plain language is sufficiently absurd to
override its unambiguous terms. Id. at 450,
459, 122 S. Ct. 941. If, however, the terms
of a statute are ambiguous, "we resort to the
canons of statutory construction to help
resolve the ambiguity." Gottlieb v. Carnival
Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 337 (2d Cir. 2006).
Moreover, while the Supreme Court has said
that it "rarely" invokes the need to avoid an
absurd result to override the plain language
of a statute, Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 459, 122
S. Ct. 941, we have long held that where a
statute is ambiguous, it "should be
interpreted in a way that avoids absurd
results." See, e.g., United States v. Dauray,
215 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2000).
Whether a statute is plain or ambiguous "is
determined by reference to the language
itself, the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of
the statute as a whole." Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S. Ct. 843,
136 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1997). We have applied
a similar approach in determining whether a
provision of a contract is ambiguous.
Specifically, we have held that "[1]anguage
is ambiguous when it is capable of more
than one meaning when viewed objectively
by a reasonably intelligent person who has
examined the context of the entire integrated
agreement." O'Neil v. Retirement Plan for
Salaried Employees of RKO, Inc., 37 F.3d
55. 59 (2d Cir. 1994).
The plain language of 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not say that tuition
reimbursement is only available to parents
whose child had previously received special
education and related services from a public
agency, nor does it say that tuition
reimbursement is not available to parents
whose child had not previously received
special education and related services.
Indeed, the School District's need to rely on
an inference to be drawn from the plain
language, rather than the language itself,
suggests a degree of ambiguity that would
not necessarily be present if §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) was the only section of
the IDEA that spoke to the issue of the
remedy that a district court may award.
This section, however, is not the only
section or even the principal section of the
IDEA that speaks to this issue.
Another section of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(C), authorizes a district court
hearing a challenge to the failure of a local
education agency to provide a free
appropriate public education to "grant such
relief as [it] determines is appropriate." In
Burlington, the Supreme Court held that the
identically worded predecessor of this
section, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1984),
authorized the equitable remedy of tuition
reimbursement to parents who had enrolled
their disabled child in a private school while
they successfully litigated the issue of the
inappropriateness of his public placement.
Then-Justice Rehnquist explained the
reasoning of the decision as follows:
The statute directs the court to
"grant such relief as [it]
determines is appropriate." The
ordinary meaning of these words
confers broad discretion on the
court. The type of relief is not
further specified, except that it
must be "appropriate." Absent
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other reference, the only possible
interpretation is that the relief is to
be "appropriate" in light of the
purpose of the Act. As already
noted, this is principally to provide
handicapped children with "a free
appropriate public education
which emphasizes special
education and related services
designed to meet their unique
needs." The Act contemplates
that such education will be
provided where possible in regular
public schools, with the child
participating as much as possible
in the same activities as non-
handicapped children, but the Act
also provides for placement in
private schools at public expense
where this is not possible. In a
case where a court determines that
a private placement desired by the
parents was proper under the Act
and that an IEP calling for
placement in a public school was
inappropriate, it seems clear
beyond cavil that "appropriate"
relief would include a prospective
injunction directing the school
officials to develop and implement
at public expense an IEP placing
the child in a private school.
Prospective relief alone is not a sufficient
remedy because the process of obtaining the
relief "is ponderous" and a "final judicial
decision on the merits of an IEP will in most
instances come a year or more after the
school term covered by that IEP has
passed." Id. at 370. 105 S. Ct. 1996. Under
these circumstances. "it would be an empty
victory to have a court tell [parents who.
placed their child in a private school] several
years later that they were right," yet deny
them reimbursement for the placement. Id.
"If that were the case," Justice Rehnquist
concluded, "the child's right to a free
appropriate public education, the parents'
right to participate fully in developing a
proper IEP, and all of the procedural
safeguards would be less than complete.
Because Congress undoubtedly did not
intend this result, we are confident that by
empowering the court to grant 'appropriate'
relief Congress meant to include retroactive
reimbursement as an available remedy in a
proper case." Id.
The language of § 1415(e)(2), upon which
Burlington relied, was unchanged by the
1997 revision of the IDEA and continues to
provide that the court "shall grant such relief
as the court determines is appropriate." 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). The re-
enactment of § 1415(e)(2). without change,
is significant because it can be presumed
that Congress intended to adopt the
construction given to it by the Supreme
Court and made that construction part of the
enactment. Whether 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). upon which the School
District relies, was intended to eliminate the
power of a district court to grant the relief to
which Anthony's parents would otherwise
be entitled, involves a question to which the
IDEA does not provide an unambiguous
answer. Indeed, the assertedly "clear
implication of the plain language" of §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), Tom F., 2005 WL
22866, at *3, is inconsistent with the clear
implication of§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(i), which in
relevant part provides that the obligation of
a state to offer a free appropriate education
"does not require a local educational agency
to pay for the cost of education . . of a child
with a disability at a private school or
facility if that agency made a free
appropriate public education available to the
child and the parents elected to place the
child in such private school or facility."
The implication of this subsection is that
reimbursement is available where, as here,
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the agency failed to make a free public
education available to the child.
Under these circumstances, we think it is
hardly clear from the fact that §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) provides for parental
reimbursement in one circumstance, that it
excludes reimbursement in other
circumstances. Our conclusion is supported
by the cases in which a part y relies on the
Latin maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, " that the express statutory mention
of certain things impliedly excludes others
not mentioned. The School District may
not invoke this maxim here, because it
"applies only when the statute identifies a
series of two or more terms or things that
should be understood to go hand in hand,
thus raising the inference that a similar
unlisted term was deliberately excluded."
United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d
83, 98 (2d Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, even
where the maxim is otherwise applicable,
the Supreme Court has not treated as
conclusive the inference that Congress
intended to exclude that which it did not
explicitly include. Instead, it has treated the
maxim "as but an aid to construction." Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 n. 8, 64 S. Ct. 120,
88 L. Ed. 88 (1943). Indeed, only recently
the Supreme Court held that "[w]e do not
read the enumeration of one case to exclude
another unless it is fair to suppose that
Congress considered the unnamed
possibility and meant to say no to it."
Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.. 537 U.S.
149, 168, 123 S. Ct. 748, 154 L. Ed. 2d 653
(2003).
Where, as here, the terms of a statute are
ambiguous, we turn to the "traditional
canons of statutory construction to resolve
the ambiguity." United States v. Peterson,
394 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2005). "Although
the canons of statutory interpretation
provide a court with numerous avenues for
supplementing and narrowing the possible
meaning of ambiguous text," Nat'l. Res.
Def Council v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98
(2d Cir. 2001), several rules are particularly
helpful in interpreting the statutory
provision at issue in this case. Where the
terms of a statute are ambiguous, we "focus
upon the 'broader context' and 'primary
purpose' of the statute." Can. Life Assurance
Co. v. Converium Ruckversicherung
(Deutschland) AG, 335 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir.
2003). Ultimately, as Justice Jackson
observed, "courts will construe the details of
an act in conformity with its dominating
general purpose, will read text in the light of
context and will interpret the text so far as
the meaning of the words fairly permits so
as to carry out in particular cases the
generally expressed legislative policy."
Joiner, 320 U.S. at 350-51, 64 S. Ct. 120.
A second and related rule of statutory
construction is that the meaning of an
ambiguous statutory provision is "clarified
by the remainder of the statutory scheme ...
[when] only one of the permissible
meanings produces a substantive effect that
is compatible with the rest of the law."
United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball
Co., 532 U.S. 200, 217-18, 121 S. Ct. 1433,
149 L. Ed. 2d 401 (2001). The rule is
particularly applicable here, because the
issue involves an ambiguity created by the
tension between different sections of the
IDEA rather than the interpretation of an
ambiguous word or phrase.
Applying these rules in the present case, we
again observe that the express purpose of the
IDEA is to ensure that a free appropriate
public education is "available to all children
with disabilities." Indeed, the IDEA is the
legislative centerpiece of "an ambitious
federal effort to promote the education of
handicapped children." Voluntown, 226
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F.3d at 62. Its central purpose is to "ensure
that all children with disabilities have
available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education
and related services designed to meet their
unique needs and prepare them for further
education, employment, and independent
living" and "to ensure that the rights of
children with disabilities and parents of such
children are protected." 20 U.S.C. §
1400(d)(1)(A)-(B). The IDEA also provides
that a state's eligibility for IDEA funding is
that it make available "free appropriate
public education . . . to all children with
disabilities." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).
One of the primary ways in which the IDEA
seeks to ensure that children with disabilities
receive a free appropriate education is by
conferring broad discretion on the district
court to grant relief it deems appropriate to
parents of disabled children who opt for a
unilateral private placement in cases where
the parents' placement is. determined to be
proper and the proposed IEP is determined
to be inadequate. While the manner in which
the authority is exercised may be guided by
the various subsections of § 1412(a)(10).
which mainly codified existing law in
significant respect, Voluntown, 226 F.3d at
69 n. 9, nothing in the legislative history (to
be discussed shortly) suggests that Congress
sought to alter prior law in a manner that
would constrain the power of a district court
judge to award reimbursement for a private
placement where a free appropriate public
education had not been provided under the
circumstances here.
The Supreme Court has also instructed us
that, because "[t]he [IDEA] was intended to
give handicapped children both an
appropriate education and a free one; it
should not be interpreted to defeat one or the
other of those objectives." Burlington, 471
U.S. at 372, 105 S. Ct. 1996. The
construction of the § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) that
the School District urges upon us would
defeat both purposes of the IDEA. The
construction we adopt is the only one that
"produces a substantive effett that is
compatible with the rest of the law."
Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. at
217-18, 121 S. Ct. 1433.
[The court looked at the final rule: to
construe an ambiguous statute so as to avoid
absurd results. The court determined that
parents who plan to reject the proposed IEP
and subsequently give such notice to the
agency, should not be forced to first enroll
their children in the proposed placement
only to pull them back out, in order to
receive reimbursement. If the proposed
placement was indeed inappropriate, the
child's health would be jeopardized.]
[The court noted that its interpretation of the
statute was consistent with that of the
Department of Education's Office of Special
Education & Rehabilitative Services, who
had written in a letter their belief that actual
receipt of special education from a public
agency is not a prerequisite for
reimbursement.]
Contrary to the School District's argument,
the legislative history does not alter our
conclusion. . . . One of the changes to the
IDEA is the addition of 20 U.S.C. § 1412,
the purpose of which is explained as
follows:
Section 612 [20 U.S.C. § 1412] also
specifies that parents rffay be reimbursed for
the cost of a private educational placement
under certain conditions (i.e., when a due
process hearing officer or judge determines
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that a public agency had not made a free
appropriate public education available to the
child, in a timely manner, prior to the
parents enrolling the child in that placement
without the public agency's consent).
Previously, the child must have had received
special education and related services under
the authority of a public agency.
At best, this language is an awkward
paraphrase of the ambiguous statutory
language which refers to "the parents of a
child with a disability, who previously
received special education and related
services under the authority of a public
agency." Again, the statutory language
does not expressly exclude reimbursement
where special education and related services
have not been previously provided, it only
provides a basis for the argument that
Congress implicitly excluded reimbursement
in these circumstances. The district judge
in Tom F., however, read the language in the
House Report to require explicitly that the
child "must" have "[p]reviously . . .
received" such services as a condition to the
receipt of reimbursement of his parents.
2005 WL 22866, at *3. We cannot agree.
A natural reading of the word "previously,"
in the context of a report detailing changes
to the IDEA, would suggest a reference to
the IDEA's previous requirements. Thus,
the first sentence of the paragraph
unequivocally provides reimbursement for a
private placement "when a due process
hearing officer or judge determines that a
public agency has not made a free
appropriate public education available to the
child, in a timely manner, prior to the
parents enrolling the child in that placement
without the public agency's consent." The
second sentence explains that "[p]reviously,
the child must have received special
education and related services under the
authority of a public agency." (emphasis
added). To paraphrase the words of the
Supreme Court in an analogous context,
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330, 117 S.
Ct. 2059, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997), "[a]
thoughtful Member of the Congress"
reading this explanation for a change in
prior law would have very likely concluded
(1) that "previously," meaning prior to the
proposed amendment to the IDEA, parents
could receive reimbursement for a private
placement only if the child received special
education and related services under the
authority of a public agency and (2) that the
change afforded by the proposed
amendment would permit funding even
where the disabled child had not previously
received such special education and related
services. This is just the opposite of what
the School District and Tom F. argue is the
clearly expressed intent of Congress.
The House Report gives no indication that
Congress intended to amend the IDEA's
rules regarding tuition reimbursement.
Indeed, the House Report makes no
reference to prior law on the issue and
expresses no intent to limit the discretion
that Burlington vested in district courts to
award reimbursement pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(B). Nor does it explain the
reason why it attached the condition at issue
here to private placement reimbursement.
Indeed, the House Report is as significant
for what it does not say as for what it does
say.
[The court declined to pay any deference to
the confusing legislative history, although it
declined to accept Justice Scalia's argument
that such history should never be used.]
* * *
This brings us to the last leg of the School
District's argument-its reliance on
Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d
185
150 (1st Cir. 2004). Greenland held only
that parents of a learning disabled child, who
unilaterally placed their child in a private
school without notice to the local
educational agency of their child's need for
special education and without offering the
agency an opportunity to prepare an IEP that
is appropriate to the child's needs, were not
eligible for tuition reimbursement. Id. at
159-60.. .. We do not regard Greenland as
dispositive.
Greenland's discussion of 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) arose from its perceived
need to deal with the subsection
immediately preceding it. Again, this
subsection, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i), says that a
local education agency is not required to pay
for the cost of education, including special
education and related services, "if that
agency made a free public education
available to the child and the parents elected
to place the child in such private school or
facility." This language troubled the
Greenland Court, because it implied that
parents are entitled to reimbursement if a
free appropriate public education was not
provided "where, as here [in Greenland], the
local education agency was never informed
while the child was in public school that the
child might require special education
services." 358 F.3d at 159. This "seeming
ambiguity," according to Greenland,
"disappears when considered in light of the
section's affirmative requirement that 'the
parents of a child with a disability, who
previously received special education and
related services under the authority of a
public agency' can receive reimbursement
for their unilateral placement of the child in
private school only 'if [a] court or hearing
officer finds that the agency had not made a
free appropriate public education available
to the child in a timely manner prior to that
enrollment."' Id. Greenland continued as
follows:
These threshold requirements are
key to this case: tuition
reimbursement is only available
for children who have previously
received "special education and
related services" while in the
public school system (or perhaps
those who at least timely
requested such services while the
child is in public school). There is
no dispute that neither Katie's
parents nor anyone else requested
an evaluation for Katie while she
was at Greenland. There is also
no dispute that she was removed
from Greenland for reasons having
nothing to do with any issue about
whether Katie was receiving [a
free appropriate public education].
The Greenland Court then went on to deny
the parents' claim for reimbursement
because of their failure to alert the School
District of Katie's need for special education
and related services while she was in public
school. We agree completely with the result
reached in Greenland. Indeed, we reached
the same result in Voluntown, without
reference to § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
Our problem with the analysis in Greenland
is that it assumes that the ambiguous
language of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is clear by
adding the word "only" to the language of
the subsection. Indeed, not a single word of
the language we have emphasized in the
foregoing quote appears in the language of
the subsection. This includes the suggestion
that a child in public school need not have
previously received "special education and
related services;" the child need only have
made a request for it while in a public
school. Simply stated, without discussion
or analysis, Greenland resolved the issue of
the ambiguity of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) by
simply amending the language itself.
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Moreover, it did so in a way, perhaps
inadvertently, that implicitly suggested an
arbitrary distinction between children
enrolled in a regular public school and
children enrolled in a regular private school.
Perhaps even more troubling is that none of
this discussion was necessary, because the
subdivision immediately following §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) makes "clear Congress's
intent that before parents place their child in
private school, they must at least give notice
to the school that special education is at
issue." Greenland, 358 F.3d at 160
(emphasis in original). Indeed, the latter
subsection expressly states that "[t]he cost of
reimbursement described in clause (ii) may
be reduced or denied," if the prescribed
notice is not given, 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(1 0)(C)(iii)(I), or "upon a judicial
finding of unreasonableness with respect to
actions taken by the parents," 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(1 0)(C)(iii)(III).
Separate and apart from subsection
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), we have held that it is
inequitable to penmit reimbursement under
the circumstances in Greenland. As we have
observed: "[C]ourts have held uniformly
that reimbursement is barred where parents
unilaterally arrange for private educational
services without ever notifying the school
board of their dissatisfaction with their
child's IEP." M.C, 226 F.3d at 68. Indeed,
in Carmel, where the district judge followed
the analysis of Greenland as it related to §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), she also denied
reimbursement on the alternative ground
that "the parents are not equitably entitled to
tuition reimbursement." Id. at 407.
Unlike the parents of the child in Greenland,
who provided "no notice at all to the school
system before Katie's removal from
Greenland that there was any issue about
whether Katie was in need of special
education," 358 F.3d at 160, in the instant
case, Anthony's parents provided the School
District with ample notice that he was in
need of special education and the School
District evaluated his needs in 2000, when
he was classified as learning disabled, and
again in 2001 at the request of his parents.
When the School District provided Anthony
with an IEP that Anthony's parents believed
was inappropriate, Anthony's parents gave
timely notice of their dissatisfaction to the
School District. Before his enrollment in
Upton Lake, the School District had every
opportunity to evaluate Anthony in the
regular private school that he was attending
and determine whether "a free appropriate
public education can be provided in the
public schools." Id. After forcing a hearing
before an IHO, it conceded that it had failed
to provide the free appropriate public
education required by the IDEA. Section
1415(i)(2)(B), as construed by the Supreme
Court in Burlington, provides an ample basis
for the award of reimbursement to
Anthony's parents. Section
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not prohibit it.
We have considered carefully the other
arguments raised by the School District and
conclude that they are without merit.
Accordingly. the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
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"'Unilateral' Placements Face Review"
Education Week
March 7, 2007
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to step
into one of the most contentious and costly
areas of special education law by accepting
[New York City Bd. of Ed. v. Tom F.,] a
case involving a parent's efforts to seek
public reimbursement for a private school
placement of his child.
The justices in their next term will take up a
case in which the New York City school
system is balking at reimbursing a parent for
private school tuition when his child never
spent any time in the city's public schools.
In its appeal, the 1.1 million-student New
York district contends that it offered an
appropriate placement for Gilbert Freston,
now 17, but that the boy's father, Thomas E.
Freston, never planned to accept it. The
father says that the district failed to meet his
son's needs.
The Supreme Court held in a 1985 case,
Burlington School Committee v.
Massachusetts Department of Education,
that under the federal Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, parents who
"unilaterally" remove their children from
public schools and enroll them in private
schools are entitled to public reimbursement
when courts later determine that the school
district's placement was inappropriate and
that the private school placement was
appropriate.
Although no reliable statistics are readily
available, such reimbursements are routinely
ordered by lower federal courts under the
proper circumstances, and school districts
say they are a significant expense.
Michael Best, the general counsel of the
New York City district, said that the school
system paid tuition for 2.240 unilateral
placements during the 2005-06 school year.
He estimates that half those cases involved
students who had never attended New York
City public schools. The average tuition cost
for unilateral placements that year was
$29,000, bringing the district's total outlay
to about $6.5 million for that school year.
Mr. Best said that the city is willing to pay
for private school tuition when it cannot
provide an appropriate placement for a
child. But that's just not true in the case
accepted by the high court, he maintained.
And the argument that students have to
suffer in public school placements "is a
complete red herring," he said.
"That assumes that if a kid has to go to
public school to get special education, it's
somehow going to be bad," he said. "That's
completely wrong."
Public School First?
Mr. Freston, the parent in New York Cit
Board of Education i. Tom F. (Case No.
06-637), is a co-founder of the cable channel
MTV and a former Viacom Inc. executive
who reportedly received a severance
package of $85 million when he was ousted
as the president and chief executive officer
of the media company last year.
Neal Rosenberg, Mr. Freston's lawyer. said
that the special education case is not about
money. Mr. Freston sought an
individualized education program for his son
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from the New York City district because he
wanted the boy to receive transportation
services and because of the principles
involved, he said. His son was entitled to an
education provided by the city, Mr.
Rosenberg said.
"I have never found a parent who was
grateful that they had a handicapped child so
that they could get the district to subsidize
the education of that child," Mr. Rosenberg
said. The district's arguments that prior
enrollment in public school should be a
prerequisite to reimbursement are saying, in
effect, that parents "have to make a guinea
pig of their child," he said.
Mr. Freston enrolled Gilbert in the Stephen
Gaynor School in New York City, a private
school for children with special needs, in the
fall of 1995, when the boy was 6. In 1997
and 1998, the New York City district
established an individualized education plan
for Gilbert, which the school district
acknowledged was inadequate, Mr.
Rosenberg said. The district reimbursed Mr.
Freston approximately $36,000 for those
two years. Mr. Freston donated the money
received from the public school system
district to the private school, his lawyer said.
In 1999, the district offered a different
placement for Gilbert. Despite never having
visited the public school suggested for his
son, or any of the other public schools
suggested for him in the past, the district's
brief says, Mr. Freston again sought
reimbursement, this time for about $18,000
for the 1999-2000 school year.
Mr. Best said that the district, in making an
effort to re-evaluate some tuition-
reimbursement cases, zeroed in on this case
because Gilbert Freston had never attended
public school.
But in April 2001, a state special education
hearing officer determined that the district
had not met its burden of proving that its
recommended placement was appropriate
for the student. On appeal, a state review
officer upheld the hearing officer's decision.
The school system prevailed, however,
when it took the case to U.S. District Court
in Manhattan. In a July 2005 decision, U.S.
District Judge George B. Daniels wrote that
the text of the IDEA suggests "that where a
child has not previously received special
education from a public agency, there is no
authority to reimburse the tuition expenses
arising from the parent's unilateral
placement of the child in private school."
The father appealed and last year, a three-
judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 2nd Circuit, in New York City,
overruled the district court, applying the
reasoning of a recent decision the 2nd
Circuit court had made in a similar case,
Frank G. v. Board of Education of Hyde
Park Central School District.
In that case, a different 2nd Circuit panel
said the argument that parents first have to
enroll their child in a public school places
them "in the untenable position of
acquiescing to an inappropriate placement in
order to seek reimbursement from the public
agency that devised the inappropriate
placement."
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, the New
York City district argues that the 2nd Circuit
court's ruling conflicts with a 1997
amendment to the IDEA. The district
believes the amendment made clear that the
statute does not require a district to
reimburse parents when the district offers an
appropriate placement but the parents
voluntarily place the child in
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a private school.
'A New Issue'
Allan G. Osborne Jr., a former president of
the Education Law Association and the
author of several books and papers on
special education law, said he was surprised
that the Supreme Court chose now to take up
a case involving tuition reimbursement
when the student had not attended public
school first.
"It's an issue that I think has not been fully
litigated by the lower courts," said Mr.
Osborne, who is also the principal of Snug
Harbor Community School, a public
elementary school in Quincy, Mass.
"This is a new issue because it involves
some of the newer amendments to the
IDEA," he said, referring to provisions in
the 1997 reauthorization of the law.
"It's a situation that probably occurs fairly
rarely, that you would have a child that has
never come to public school," Mr. Osborne
said. "But in some of your bigger city
districts, it could come up more often."
He added, "Even if it doesn't come up
much, when it does come up its
important, because it's a lot of money."
very
very
Julie Wright Halbert, the legislative counsel
of the Council of the Great City Schools,
said the outcome of the case is important to
the members of her group.
"There's no question that the cost and
burden is significant," she said.
The case adds to a list of three major IDEA
cases the high court has accepted over the
past two years. Just last week, the justices
heard arguments on whether nonlawyer
parents can represent their children in
federal court in special education cases.
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"Private Schooling for the Disabled,
and the Fight Over Who Pays"
New York Times
March 21, 2007
Joseph Berger
Paying for private school is no hardship for
Tom Freston, the former chief executive of
Viacom, the company that runs MTV and
Comedy Central. He left with a golden
parachute worth $85 million.
But he says New York City should
reimburse him for educating his son in a
private school for children with learning
disabilities, where the tuition is $37,900 a
year. In 1997, his son, then 8, was found to
be lagging in reading, though not in math.
The city offered the child a coveted spot in
the Lower Laboratory School for Gifted
Education, a competitive school on the
Upper East Side that also has classes for
students with moderate disabilities. He
would have been placed in a classroom with
15 students, and given speech and language
therapy.
Mr. Freston, though, wanted a class of only
eight students for his son, in a smaller
setting. Without trying Lab, he put his child
in the Stephen Gaynor School on the Upper
West Side, where students, in Gaynor's
language, display "learning differences."
While the city is required by federal law to
pay for private programs for disabled
children when it cannot provide appropriate
programs. city officials said the Lab
program was suitable for Mr. Freston's son
and wanted him to try it. After two years of
reimbursing the Frestons for a large part of
the private school tuition, the city stopped.
The result has been a seesawing lawsuit that
the United States Supreme Court recently
took for review. The question: Do school
districts have to pay for private school for
disabled children if the families refuse to try
out public programs?
School systems around the country are
closely watching the case. Almost seven
million students nationwide receive special-
education services, with 71,000 educated in
private schools at public expense, according
to the United States Department of
Education. Usually school districts agree to
pay for these services after conceding they
cannot provide suitable ones.
In New York City, for example, 147,000 of
the 1.1 million public school children
receive special-education services; 7,445 of
them, most severely handicapped, attend
private schools at taxpayer expense because
the city agrees that it cannot properly
instruct them, said Lindsey Hair, a
spokeswoman for the city education
department.
City officials say that is not the case with
Mr. Freston's son, or with other children
whose families reject the public school
system outright. In 2005-6, 2,240 families
sued the city for tuition reimbursement for
private schools they attended. Half those
children never sampled a public school, said
Michael Best, the education department's
counsel, and the taxpayer tab is well over
$30 million.
"What we're talking about is parents who
have never worked with the school system
to find appropriate placement," Mr. Best
said. "They're making a unilateral decision
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to place kids in private school. We shouldn't
have to pay for it if we can supply the
appropriate services."
Mr. Freston's lawyer, Neal H. Rosenberg,
said the city effectively acknowledged it
could not provide proper services by paying
tuition at Gaynor for two years. Mr. Freston
himself declined to be interviewed for this
column. But in a statement, he said his
lawsuit was about principle, not money.
"While I was fortunate to have the means to
provide such an opportunity for my child,
many families are not able to do so," he
said. His goal, he added, is to make sure that
all families of disabled children "have
access to an appropriate special educational
program." He has used the roughly $50,000
in reimbursements he has received to
finance tutoring for lagging first graders at
Public School 84 on the Upper West Side.
The Freston case is another in the history of
the nation's 32-year-old special-education
law that raises uncomfortable questions. The
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
passed under a different name in 1975,
protects disabled children in ways
mainstream children are not, because
historically children with disabilities were ill
served. But today it can end up financing
top-of-the-line programs for disabled
students while students in overcrowded or
poorly taught mainstream classrooms do not
have recourse to private schools.
The Council of the Great City Schools, a
coalition of 66 urban systems, has supported
the city in the case with a friend-of-the-court
brief. Julie Wright Halbert, legislative
counsel for the group, said some parents
might ask a city's specialists to evaluate
their children while planning all along to
send them to private schools. banking on a
district's being too burdened to contest the
reimbursements. "Many wealthy, well-
educated people are gaming the system in
New York City and around the country." she
said.
Some champions of special education
programs argue that it is unfair to force
children to enroll in public programs just to
prove the programs are weak. Matthew
Lenaghan, deputy director of Advocates for
Children, points out that finding strong
instruction promptly is essential. "If a child
has autism, does that student have to try a
program he knows is inadequate?" he said.
Similarly, Scott Gaynor, head of the Gaynor
school, said "the goal here is to catch a child
before they fail."
Voucher advocates are closely watching the
case because they feel taxpayers should
allow all children, whether handicapped or
not, to choose private schooling for
themselves and recover the public money
that would otherwise have been spent on
them. "The first obligation should be to the
needs of children, not to the need of any
public school system." said Jay P. Greene,
professor of education reform at the
University of Arkansas.
In some ways, the case has been outrun by
realities. Mr. Freston's son is now 17 and
has long since rejoined mainstream classes,
a success for which Mr. Freston credits
private schooling. But it is not clear how his
son would have fared at the Lab School.
The case also has a paradox at its heart.
Current thinking-and the special-education
law itself-urges that disabled children be
placed in the "least restrictive
environment"-preferably in mainstream
classes. But Mr. Freston fought to keep his
child in an environment where he would be
surrounded only by children with
disabilities.
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"Court Rejects Limit on Payment of Tuition
for Disabled Students"
New York Law Journal
August 2, 2006
Tom Perrotta
A Federal appeals court has rejected an
interpretation of the Individuals with
Disabilities Act that would have placed
restrictions on parents who sought private
school tuition reimbursement for the special
education needs of their children.
The decision will be published Monday.
The ruling from the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit came in Frank G. v.
Bd. ofEduc. ofHyde Park, 04-CV-498 1.
While the unanimous ruling affirmed a
lower court's decision in the case, it
simultaneously rejected the conclusion of
another trial court in Bd. of Educ. v. Toni
F.. 2005 WL 22866.
In Tom F., Southern District Judge George
B. Daniels ruled that 1997 amendments to
the disabilities act clearly stated that when
"a child has not previously received special
education from a public agency, there is no
authority to reimburse the tuition expense
arising from a parent's unilateral placement
of the child in private school."
The Second Circuit last week disagreed with
that ruling, saying the plain language of the
amendments did not say that reimbursement
was only available to parents whose children
had previously received special education
from a public agency. Such a reading, the
court said, would produce "absurd" results.
Judge Edward R. Konman, the chief judge of
the Eastern District, sitting by designation,
said this view of the statute would "place the
parents of children with disabilities in the
untenable position of acquiescing to an
inappropriate placement in order to preserve
their right to seek reimbursement from the
public agency that devised the inappropriate
placement."
He added: "We decline to interpret 20
U.S.C. 2 §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to require
parents to jeopardize their child's health and
education in this manner in order to qualify
for the right to seek tuition reimbursement."
In Frank G., Frank and Diane G., the parents
of Anthony G., a learning disabled child,
fought to obtain $3,600 in tuition
reimbursement and more than $45,000 in
attorney's fees from the Hyde Park Central
School District in Dutchess County.
Anthony G. was born in May 1991 to a
crack-addicted mother. Frank and Diane G.
later adopted him. Since the age of 3,
Anthony has been diagnosed with Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. By the time
he reached the fourth grade at his private
school in Newburgh, the Committee on
Special Education for the Hyde Park school
district had classified him as learning
disabled under the disabilities act.
Both school district personnel and an
independent doctor evaluated Anthony in
summer 2001. The doctor concluded that
Anthony should receive individual attention
in a small class, perhaps with 12 students.
The school district, however, developed an
independent education plan for Anthony that
would have placed him in a regular-size
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class of 26 to 30 students at a public school
and provided him with additional services.
Diane G. requested a hearing from the school
district. and asked it to provide these services
at Anthony's private school. She stressed that
the class size was too large. The hearing did
not take place until November and December
of that year, and Anthony's parents decided to
enroll him in a new private school
beforehand.
The school district argued that this placement
was inappropriate, but Southern District
Judge Charles L. Brieant eventually reversed
the decision of a hearing officer and ruled in
favor of the parents. He awarded the tuition
reimbursement and about $35,000 in legal
fees, though he expressed concern about the
sum of the fees compared to the tuition.
No Ambiguity
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the school
district argued that Anthony's parents were
not entitled to reimbursement or fees because
of the holding in Tom F.. which it described
as an "absolute defense." The Second Circuit
disagreed and affirmed Judge Brieant.
The statute in question, 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), authorizes reimbursement
to the parents of a disabled child "who
previously received special education and
related services under the authority of a public
agency- and who enrolled the child in a
private school, "if the court or hearing officer
finds that the agency had not made a free
appropriate public education available to the
child in a timely manner prior to enrollment."
Judge Korman said the school district was
relying on ambiguity in the statute for its
position, and noted that other sections of the
statute, and its legislative history, lead the
court to a different conclusion about when
reimbursement was appropriate.
"The plain language of 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not say that tuition
reimbursement is only available to parents
whose child had previously received special
education and related services from a public
agency, nor does it say that tuition
reimbursement is not available to parents
whose child had not previously received
special education and related services," the
judge wrote. "Indeed, the School District's
need to rely on an inference to be drawn from
the plain language, rather than the language
itself, suggests a degree of ambiguity that
would not necessarily be present if §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) was the only section of the
IDEA that spoke to the issue of the remedy
that a district court may award."
Judges Rosemary S. Pooler and
Sotomayor concurred on the ruling.
Sonia
Mark I. Reisman represented Frank and Diane
G. James P. Drohan of Donoghue, Thomas,
Auslander & Drohan represented the school
district.
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"Special-Ed Ruling Benefits City"
The New York Sun
January 7, 2005
Julia Levy
The city could save millions of dollars under
a new ruling, which found that special-
education students who never try public
school are ineligible for reimbursement for
private-school expenses.
The decision by Judge George Daniels of
federal District Court in Manhattan found
that the family of a boy identified as Gilbert
F. didn't have the right to be reimbursed for
tuition because Gilbert had never attended
public school. He began attending a private
special-education program in kindergarten at
the Stephen Gaynor School on the Upper
West Side.
Judge Daniels's ruling overturned a 2000
decision by the city's impartial hearing
officer and another decision by the state
Education Department's state review officer.
It could send shockwaves through the
growing community of parents who have
never sent their children to public school but
petition the city each year to pay for all or
part of the youngsters' tuition at private
school.
In the last school year, the city Department
of Education spent more than $12 million
reimbursing the families of about 1.000
special-education students who had never
attended public school despite the
department's recommendations. The number
of families applying for reimbursement has
more than tripled since the 1997-98 school
year.
Yesterday, department officials said they
were pleased with the decision. "We believe
this is a sound decision and are pleased that
the court agreed with our view," the
department's general counsel, Michael Best,
said.
The lawyer who represented Gilbert and his
father, Neal H. Rosenberg, called the
decision "very bad."
"I don't understand why the board is
applauding itself here," Mr. Rosenberg said
last night in a telephone interview. "It's
almost like they are thrilled that a judge says
they're not obligated to provide services that
they themselves recommend."
He said his client and the city agreed that
Gilbert needed special-education services.
The question was whether the special
services would be provided by the public-
school system or by a private school. The
city paid part of Gilbert's tuition for the first
two years of his schooling. In the third year
the city refused to settle with the family,
which led to a hearing and then more than
four years of litigation.
Mr. Rosenberg said if Judge Daniels's
decision is upheld, some special-education
students who try the public schools might be
successful, but others will fail.
"It is asking a lot of parents to make a
guinea pig of their child," he said. "The risk
society runs here is that the year will be so
unsuccessful as to require two years or three
years to make up for the bad year."
Other lawyers who represent special
education students whose families sue for
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reimbursement had similar opinions.
"It's going to be a disaster for parents who
don't want to put their children in peril and
in harm," one attorney, Regina Skyer, said.
She said parents shouldn't have to put their
children into public schools and watch them
fail before being able to put them into
private schools.
Another lawyer, Phyllis Saxe, who entered
the field after her experience convincing the
city to pay for the private education of a
daughter with cerebral palsy. said she is
"devastated" by the decision.
"I feel extremely bad for the special
education children," she said. "It's a terrible
emotional blow to hear that not only is your
child disabled but that there is no recourse."
She said if parents start trying out public-
school programs and then pulling out their
children to place them in private schools,
"you're going to have a lot of children who
are going to be disturbed in addition to being
disabled."
The executive director of Advocates for
Children, Jill Chaifetz, said most of her
clients are poor and can't afford private
lawyers, and thus will not be affected by the
ruling. But she said in many cases there
aren't appropriate placements for special-
education students in public schools.
"The real issue here is to get more
appropriate programs for kids with
disabilities in the school system so they
don't need to make use of the private
schools," she said.
The chairwoman of the City Council's
Committee on Education, Eva Moskowitz,
said although she doesn't think parents
should be granted a "free pass" for private
school if the public schools can meet their
child's needs, there's a shortage of good
special-education programs in the public
system.
"This ruling will result in students being
forced to try a public-school program even if
the public-school system offers no
appropriate program," the Manhattan
Democrat said.
Mr. Rosenberg said he would advise the
boy's father, identified as Tom F., to appeal.
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"Ex-MTV Big Takes on Schools"
Daily News (New York)
February 27, 2007
Erin Einhorn
Multimillionaire businessman Tom Freston-
the man who founded MTV-was last night
revealed to be the driving force behind a
Supreme Court battle to help city schoolkids
with special needs.
Freston, who can afford to send his son to any
school in the world, is pushing his case
because of principle, his lawyer said.
Freston landed at the center of [Bd. of Ed. of
the City School District of the City of New
York v. Tom F.,] the controversial case over
whether taxpayers should cover private tuition
at a special school for his son, who has
learning disabilities. The court yesterday
agreed to hear the "Tom F" case, which could
affect thousands of kids around the country
who have special needs that their parents say
cannot be addressed by their local public
schools.
The Daily News has identified "Tom F" as
Freston, who helped found the MTV
Networks in 1981 and went on to take over
Viacom. He was fired last September and was
paid as much as $84.8 million in severance.
Freston, who lives in an upper East Side
mansion once owned by Andy Warhol, could
easily have paid his son's tuition at the
Stephen Gaynor School, a private academy on
the upper West Side for kids with learning
disabilities, but he pursued the case on moral
grounds, his lawyer said.
"He felt his son's rights were being
violated-rights guaranteed to him under
federal law," said lawyer Neal Rosenberg.
"For him it was a moral issue. It wasn't a
financial issue."
Freston's son, now 17, received three years of
tuition reimbursement from the city under a
federal law requiring school districts to pay
for kids they can't educate. In 1999, the city
obj ected.
The teenager never attended a public school;
city lawyers argued that federal law
guarantees tuition only to children who had
"previously received special education and
related services" from the public schools.
School officials said his son's needs could
have been met at the highly respected Lower
Lab public school in Manhattan.
Freston won appeals to city and state
administrative judges. The city appealed to
the federal courts.
"There are millions and millions of dollars at
stake here for school districts," said Education
Department lawyer Michael Best. "If parents
can force us to pay for private school
placement when we're perfectly capable of
providing that child with a place in the public
schools, then it's a needless waste of money
that should be going to public schools."
Best said 2,240 parents requested an average
of $29,000 in tuition during the last school
year. Of those cases, Best estimated that
roughly half could be affected by the Ton F
case.
Many families have legitimate claims, Best
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said, but "sometimes parents do try to take
advantage of the system."
Rosenberg said Freston has not sought
reimbursement since 1999, when he began
appealing his case, and that Freston
contributed the $50,000 he received for three
years of Gaynor tuition to a special fund at the
school.
Head of School Scott Gaynor confirmed
Freston contributed $100,000 about five years
ago for a free tutoring program for public-
school kids in the school's W. 90th St.
neighborhood. Special education advocates
say many of the families getting tuition are
poor or middle class, and some worry that
Freston's wealth could harm the cause.
"This case has dangerous implications for my
clients," said lawyer Regina Skyer, who
represents disabled children. If parents have
to send their kids to a public school before
they can seek tuition, "it'll force parents into
feeling they'll have to put their child in
harm's way."
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LaRue v. DeWolff Boberg & Associates
(06-856)
Ruling Below: (LaRue v. DeWolff Boberg & Associates, 450 F.3d 570 (4th Cir. 2006), cert
granted, 127 S.Ct. 2971, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333, 75 U.S.L.W. 3673, 75 U.S.L.W. 3677 [2007]).
DeWolff, Boberg, & Associates administers an ERISA-regulated 401(k) retirement savings plan
for its current and former employees. LaRue, a participant in the plan since 1993, states that he
directed the administrators, who are also fiduciaries, to make certain changes to the investment
strategy for his plan. LaRue argues that neglecting to make the requested changes amounts to a
breach of fiduciary duty. Having not made those changes, it caused a loss of over $150,000 in
interest revenue for his retirement plan. LaRue filed suit for the losses or similar relief under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
Questions Presented: Whether §502(a)(2) of ERISA permits a participant to bring an action to
recover losses attributable to his account in a "defined contribution plan" that were caused by
fiduciary breach; and whether §502(a)(3) permits a participant to bring an action for monetary
"make-whole" relief to compensate for losses directly caused by fiduciary breach (known in pre-
merger courts of equity as "surcharge")?
James LaRUE,
Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
DeWOLFF, BOBERG, & ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
Decided June 19, 2006
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiff in this case alleges that
defendant fiduciaries breached their duty to
him by failing to implement the investment
strategy he had selected for his employee
retirement account. Relying on two separate
provisions of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 29
U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2) and 1132(a)(3) (2000),
he seeks recovery of the amount by which
his account would have appreciated had
defendants followed his instructions. The
district court concluded that his complaint
did not request a form of relief available
under ERISA, and it therefore granted
defendants' motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
We affirm. Section 1132(a)(2) provides
remedies only for entire plans, not for
individuals. And while § 1132(a)(3) does in
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some cases furnish individualized remedies,
the Supreme Court's decisions in Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, . . . compel
the conclusion that it does not supply one
here. Plaintiff has alleged no unjust
enrichment, unlawful possession, or self-
dealing on the part of defendants, and the
remedy he seeks falls outside the scope of
the "equitable relief' that § 1132(a)(3)
authorizes.
II.
[The court states that Congress intended to
uniformly regulate employee benefit plans.
One of the principal sections of ERISA was
to preempt state law causes of action and
provide only specified remedies. See §
1132(a).]
Section 1132(a) stops short of providing
ERISA complainants with a full arsenal of
relief. ERISA is "an enormously complex
and detailed statute that resolve[s]
innumerable disputes between powerful
competing interests-not all in favor of
potential plaintiffs." Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262, 113 S.Ct. 2063.
124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993). Its civil
enforcement provision in particular attempts
to settle "a tension between the primary
ERISA goal of benefiting employees and the
subsidiary goal of containing pension costs."
Id. at 262-63. 113 S.Ct. 2063. Congress has
consequently made various "policy choices"
resulting in "the inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others." Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41. 54,
107 S.Ct. 1549. 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987).
Interpretation of § 1132(a) is therefore no
easy task. As the Supreme Court's ERISA
decisions have repeatedly cautioned, "vague
notions of a statute's 'basic purpose' are ...
inadequate to overcome the words of its text
regarding the specific issue under
consideration." Great-West Life & Annuity
Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204. . . .
Section 1132(a) represents an "interlocking,
interrelated, and interdependent remedial
scheme" that "provide[s] strong evidence
that Congress did not intend to authorize
other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly." Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 ....
With these constraints in mind, we consider
whether the statute's text provides the
particular relief at issue here.
III.
Plaintiff first suggests that remuneration of
his plan account finds express authorization
in the text of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). That
subsection allows for a civil action "by a
participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for
appropriate relief under section 1109 of this
title." Section 1109, in turn, provides that
[a]ny person who is a fiduciary with respect
to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties
imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter
shall be personally liable to make good to
such plan any losses to the plan resulting
from each such breach, and to restore to
such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets
of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be
subject to such other equitable or remedial
relief as the court may deem appropriate. ...
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
Plaintiffs argument regarding the
applicability of § 1132(a)(2) is made for the
first time on appeal. Even if the argument
were not therefore waived, see, e.g., Jones v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (In re Wallace & Gale
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Co.), 385 F.3d 820, 835 (4th Cir.2004), he
could not succeed on the merits. Recovery
under this subsection must "inure[ ] to the
benefit of the plan as a whole," not to
particular persons with rights under the plan.
Russell, 473 U.S. at 140. . . ." A fair
contextual reading of the statute makes it
abundantly clear that its draftsmen were
primarily concerned with the possible
misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that
would protect the entire plan, rather than
with the rights of an individual beneficiary."
Russell, 473 U.S. at 142, 105....
It is difficult to characterize the remedy
plaintiff seeks as anything other than
personal. He desires recovery to be paid into
his plan account, an instrument that exists
specifically for his benefit. The measure of
that recovery is a loss suffered by him alone.
And that loss itself allegedly arose as the
result of defendants' failure to follow
plaintiffs own particular instructions,
thereby breaching a duty owed solely to
him.
We are therefore skeptical that plaintiffs
individual remedial interest can serve as a
legitimate proxy for the plan in its entirety,
as § 1132(a)(2) requires. To be sure, the
recovery plaintiff seeks could be seen as
accruing to the plan in the narrow sense that
it would be paid into plaintiffs personal
plan account, which is part of the plan. But
such a view finds no license in the statutory
text, and threatens to undermine the careful
limitations Congress has placed on the scope
of ERISA relief.
This case is much different from a §
1132(a)(2) action in which an individual
plaintiff sues on behalf of the plan itself or
on behalf of a class of similarly situated
participants... In such a case, the "remedy
will undoubtedly benefit [the plaintiff] and
other participants in the [p]lan," but "it does
not solely benefit the individual
participants." Smith, 184 F.3d at 363
(emphasis added). . . . Here, by contrast,
plaintiff seeks to particularize the recovery
to himself. Section 1132(a)(2) is not -a
proper avenue for him to obtain such relief.
IV.
We thus turn to plaintiff's second theory of
relief, which relies on a different ERISA
remedial provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
That section authorizes a civil action by a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to
enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations
or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan.
Plaintiff contends that the "make whole"
relief he seeks constitutes one of the forms
of "other appropriate equitable relief' that
the provision authorizes.
A.
In construing the scope of § 1132(a)(3). the
Supreme Court has stressed that the term
"equitable" is one of limitation. In Mertens
v. Hewitt Associates, the Court held that the
phrase "equitable relief' refers only to
"those categories of relief that were t)pically
available in equity" in the days of the
divided bench. 508 U.S. at 256, 113 S.Ct.
2063. . . . The Court reasoned that other
sections of ERISA expressly refer to
"equitable or remedial relief," 29 U.S.C. §
1109(a), and "legal or equitable relief," e.g.,
id. § 1132(g)(2)(E), thereby demonstrating
that "equitable relief' connotes only a subset
of the full palliative spectrum. See Mertens,
508 U.S. at 258, 113 S.Ct. 2063. The Court
refused to "read the statute to render the
modifier superfluous," id., a construction
201
that would undermine Congress's exclusive
remedial scheme by opening a back door
through which uninvited remedies might
enter, id. at 257, 113 S.Ct. 2063.
The particular definition of "equitable" that
the Court has adopted finds support in a
well-known principle of statutory
construction. "The maxim noscitur a sociis,
that a word is known by the company it
keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often
wisely applied where a word is capable of
many meanings in order to avoid the giving
of unintended breadth to the Acts of
Congress." Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d
859 (1961). Section 1132(a)(3) expressly
mentions the right to "enjoin" certain acts or
practices " or . .. to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief' (emphasis added). The
understanding of what "equitable" means in
this context is necessarily informed by its
association with injunctive relief, the
quintessential exemplar. of a remedy that
equity alone would typically provide.
Determining the applicability of §
1132(a)(3) therefore requires a court to
examine whether the form of relief a
plaintiff seeks is, like an injunction,
historically one that a court of equity rather
than a court of law would have granted. See
Sereboff 126 S.Ct. at 1874. The Supreme
Court has, in addition to injunctions, listed
mandamus and restitution as examples of
traditional equitable remedies. See Mertens,
508 U.S. at 256, 113 S.Ct. 2063. Subsequent
decisions of both the Supreme Court and
this court have been wary of expanding the
list beyond these archetypes and their
closely related kin. See, e.g.. Varity Corp. v.
Howe, 516 U.S. 489....
B.
Mertens and its progeny compel the
conclusion that the remedy plaintiff desires
falls outside the scope of§ 1132(a)(3). As in
Mertens, although he "often dance[s] around
the word," what plaintiff "in fact seek[s] is
nothing other than compensatory damages-
monetary relief for all losses ... sustained as
a result of the alleged breach of fiduciary
duties." 508 U.S. at 255, 113 S.Ct. 2063.
"Money damages are, of course, the classic
form of legal relief," id., and have therefore
remained conspicuously absent from the list
of traditional equitable remedies available
under § 1132(a)(3), id. at 256.
While that list does include "restitution," id.,
this form of recovery is not so broad as to
include the compensatory relief that plaintiff
seeks. As the Supreme Court explained in
Great- West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson, "not all relief falling under the
rubric of restitution is available in equity."
534 U.S. at 212, 122 S.Ct. 708. In particular,
"for restitution to lie in equity," as opposed
to at law, "the action generally must seek
not to impose personal liability on the
defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff
particular funds or property in the
defendant's possession." Id. at 214, 122
S.Ct. 708....
The Supreme Court's most recent §
1132(a)(3) decisions demonstrate how the
absence of unjust possession is fatal to an
equitable restitution claim. In Knudson, the
Court denied a restitutionary remedy under §
1132(a)(3) where "'the funds to which
petitioners claimed an entitlement' were not
in Knudson's possession, but had instead
been placed in a 'Special Needs Trust' under
California law." Sereboff 126 S.Ct. at 1874
(quoting Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207, 214, 122
S.Ct. 708) (internal alterations omitted).
More recently in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic
Medical Services, Inc., the Court allowed a
claim for equitable restitution to proceed
where "Mid Atlantic sought specifically
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identifiable funds that were within the
possession and control of the Sereboffs." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court in Sereboff reaffirmed the possession
requirement it had announced in Knudson,
but found that the "impediment to
characterizing the relief in Knudson as
equitable [was] not present" in the
Sereboffs' case. Id.
The impediment is, however, present in this
case, and it precludes plaintiff flom
recovering under an equitable restitution
theory. Plaintiff does not allege that funds
owed to him are in defendants' possession,
but instead that these funds never
materialized at all. He therefore gauges his
recovery not by the value of defendants'
nonexistent gain, but by the value of his own
loss-a measure that is traditionally legal.
not equitable. . . . Thus, at core, he seeks "to
obtain a judgment imposing a merely
personal liability upon the defendant[s] to
pay a sum of money." Knudson, 534 U.S. at
213, 122 S.Ct. 708 (internal quotation marks
omitted). As Knudson explained, historically
"[s]uch claims were viewed essentially as
actions at law," and they are therefore
unavailable under § 1 132(a)(3). Id.
C.
Plaintiff attempts to avoid this conclusion by
arguing that his requested "make whole"
relief represents something entirely different
from the types of remedies that we or the
Supreme Court have heretofore considered
in the context of § 1132(a)(3). In particular,
he emphasizes that this case involves a
situation where a participant or beneficiary
is suing a fiduciary for a breach of fiduciary
duty. In his view, the scope of "equitable"
remedies available in such a case is broader
than when a fiduciary sues a beneficiary (as
was the case in Knudson and Sereboff ) or
when a beneficiary sues a non-fiduciary (as
was the case in Mertens ). Unlike either of
those scenarios, the argument goes, this case
can be analogized to a common law breach-
of-trust action by a beneficiary seeking to
recover lost trust profits, a remedy that trust
treatises have labeled "equitable." See
Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 197,
205(c) (1959)....
The governing precedent, however, does not
point as plaintiff suggests. In fact, Mertens
squarely "rejected the claim that the special
equity-court powers applicable to trusts
define the reach of [§ 1 132(a)(3)]."
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 219, 122 S.Ct. 708;
see Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256-57, 113 S.Ct.
2063. While the generally exclusive
jurisdiction of equity courts over breach-of-
trust suits renders all remedies in such cases
"equitable" in the sense that a court of
equity has power to grant them, "equitable"
in the context of § 11 32(a)(3) has a narrower
meaning. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256, 113
S.Ct. 2063. Under Mertens, "the relevant
question is . . . whether a given type of relief
was available in equity courts as a general
rule," Rego v. Westvaco Coip., 319 F.3d
140, 145 (4th Cir.2003)(emphasis added),
rather than merely in the context of "the
particular case at issue," Mertens, 508 U.S.
at 256, 113 S.Ct. 2063. "Equitable relief'
therefore does not encompass the "many
situations-not limited to those involving
enforcement of a trust-in which an equity
court could," by virtue of its jurisdiction
over the claim at issue, "grant legal remedies
which would otherwise be beyond the scope
of its authority." Id.
That plaintiff can analogize this suit to a
common law breach of trust action therefore
proves of no avail in characterizing the relief
he seeks as equitable. Plaintiff admits that he
lacks support for the notion that "make
whole" relief was available in equity outside
the context of trusts. It is therefore
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impossible for us to conclude that such relief
"was available in equity courts as a general
rule," Rego, 319 F.3d at 145.
The Sixth Circuit has reached a similar
conclusion in a case presenting facts nearly
identical to those before us here. In Helfrich
v. PNC Bank, Kentucky, Inc., 267 F.3d 477
(6th Cir.2001), a beneficiary of an employee
401(k) plan sued a plan fiduciary for failing
to comply with written directions to roll
over his assets into a specific set of mutual
funds. Id. at 479-80. The plaintiff asserted
an entitlement to the difference between the
"amount he would have earned" had the
fiduciary followed his instructions and "the
amount he in fact earned" as a result of the
fiduciary's alleged breach of duty. Id. at
480. The court concluded that his requested
remedy was unavailable under § 1132(a)(3).
Id. at 481-83. It found that the plaintiff could
not style his relief as "restitution" when he
was measuring recovery by his own losses
rather than the defendant's gains, id. at 482-
83, and it rejected a strict congruence
between § 1132(a)(3) and the common law
of trusts, id. at 482 (citing Mertens, 508 U.S.
at 256, 113 S.Ct. 2063). It therefore
dismissed the suit because "ERISA does not
permit plan beneficiaries to claim money
damages from plan fiduciaries." Id. at 482.
As Helfrich shows, the fact that a plaintiff
happens to be a participant or beneficiary
suing a fiduciary is entirely beside the point
in the § 1132(a)(3) inquiry; the status of the
parties does not determine the nature of the
relief. Many other circuits, both before and
after Knudson, have likewise rejected the
notion that whether a particular form of
relief is "equitable" depends on the identity
of the parties. See Pereira v. Farace, 413
F.3d 330, 340 (2d Cir.2005). . . . The
teachings of Mertens and Knudson obligate
us to agree, and plaintiffs contrary
argument therefore fails to cast doubt upon
our conclusion that the compensatory relief
he seeks is legal, not equitable.
V
Though Congress may one day take the
remedial step plaintiff desires. it has not yet
done so. It is not difficult to imagine why. In
crafting ERISA, Congress sought a careful
balance between the goals of "ensuring fair
and prompt enforcement of rights under a
plan" on the one hand and "encourag[ing]
... the creation of such plans" on the other.
Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 215, 124 S.Ct.
2488 (internal quotation marks omitted). It
would certainly be reasonable for Congress
to have concluded that imposing personal
financial liability on fiduciaries under
circumstances such as this-where there
was no unjust enrichment, unlawful
possession, or self-dealing-would seriously
deter plan formation and the service of
qualified individuals and institutions as
fiduciaries. Compare, e.g., Mertens, 508
U.S. at 262-63, 113 S.Ct. 2063 (discussing
negative effects of expansive ERISA
liability).
Congress's decision to omit such liability
hardly leaves a plan participant or
beneficiary in plaintiffs position without
recourse. He could, for example, seek an
injunction compelling compliance with his
investment instructions, see 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(3), or. under appropriate
circumstances, bring suit on the plan's
behalf to remove the fiduciary. see 29
U.S.C. § 1109(a). In Congress's view. such
alternative remedies are sufficient to keep
fiduciaries from breaches of fiduciary duty
that result in no benefit whatsoever to
themselves. We possess no authority "to
adjust the balance . . that the text adopted
by Congress has struck." Mertens, 508 U.S.
at 263. 113 S.Ct. 2063. Accordingly. we
AFFIRM the judgment.
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"401(k) Case Could Boost Plan
Fiduciaries' Liability"
Business Insurance
June 25, 2007
Sally Roberts
WASHINGTON-Employers with defined
contribution plans may face more fiduciary
liability depending on how the Supreme
Court interprets sections of federal pension
law [in LaRue v. DeWolff Boberg, &
Assoc.]....
At issue is whether the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act allows an
individual participant in a defined
contribution plan to sue fiduciaries to
recover individual plan account losses
caused by an alleged fiduciary breach. ...
The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Richmond, Va., which upheld a lower court
decision in the LaRue case, ruled that while
ERISA provides that a lawsuit may be
brought by a participant against a fiduciary
who is liable to make good any losses to the
plan due to a fiduciary breach, the remedy is
only for entire plans, not for individual
accounts.
Additionally, the appeals court noted, in
drafting ERISA, Congress sought to balance
the protection of participants' rights with the
encouragement of plan formation.
By making fiduciaries liable where there
was no "unjust enrichment" to the fiduciary
would seriously discourage plan formation
and the service of qualified individuals and
institutions as fiduciaries, the appeals court
said.
In this case. James LaRue, who has
participated in Dewolff, Boberg &
Associates' 401(k) plan since 1993, alleges
his retirement account is short $150.000
because the management firm, which
administers the plan, failed to carry out his
directions to make certain investment
changes to his account in 2001 and 2002. He
sued the firm in 2004.
In an amicus curiae brief encouraging the
Supreme Court to review the 4th Circuit
ruling, U.S. Solicitor General Paul D.
Clement noted that every other courts of
appeals that has addressed the issue have all
held that ERISA authorizes suits by
participants in such instances not
withstanding that the recovery will
ultimately be allocated to the plan accounts
of a limited number of participants....
"This could have a sweeping impact on
employers" and other fiduciaries, said
Martha N. Steinman, a partner in the
executive compensation and ERISA practice
of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae
L.L.P. in New York. "Fiduciaries have just
been adding increasingly higher levels of
risk in terms of potential liability in recent
years, which makes a lot of people reluctant
to be fiduciaries," she said. "A reversal in
this case will have a significant impact on
that." . . .
But if the Supreme Court rules in favor of
plan participants, fiduciaries will be held
liable if they are not being "scrupulous and
really detailed oriented" in making sure the
plan is directing investment decisions
exactly the way the participant wants, Mr.
Rosenberg said, noting that he believes the
Supreme Court will overturn the 4th Circuit.
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"Invitation Brief in No. 06-856,
LaRue v. DeWolff Boberg & Associates"
SCOTUS Blog
May 22, 2007
Amy Howe
Another invitation brief is in. and it looks
like the Court may have another case for its
2007 line-up: the United States
recommended that cert. be granted in No.
06-856, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg &
Associates....
LaRue presents two questions: (1) whether,
pursuant to Section 502(a)(2) of ERISA, a
participant in a defined contribution pension
plan may sue to recover losses to the plan
caused by a breach of fiduciary duty, even
when those losses affected only the
participant's individual account; and (2)
whether an action by a plan participant
against a fiduciary to recover losses caused
by a breach of duty seeks "equitable relief'
for purposes of ERISA Section 502(a)(3).
In the view of the U.S., the Fourth Circuit in
LaRue erred in answering both of the two
questions presented in the negative. With
regard to the first question, the government
explains that ERISA Section 502(a)(2), read
in conjunction with Section 409, authorizes
a plan participant to bring a suit to recover
for the plan "losses to the plan" resulting
from a breach of fiduciary duty. The fact
that petitioner James LaRue seeks to recover
funds (approximately $150,000) that he
allegedly lost when respondent failed to
make certain investments that he had
directed does not, the U.S. contends, take his
suit outside the purview of Section 502(a),
as any recovery by LaRue will ultimately
benefit the plan as a whole by "directly
increas[ing] the overall amount of assets
held by the plan." Certiorari is further
warranted, the U.S. explains, both because
the Fourth Circuit's holding conflicts with
those of the four other courts of appeals that
have addressed the question, and because
the question presented is one of substantial
importance.
With regard to the second question, the
United States argues that a suit such as
LaRue's seeks "equitable relief' because
"both [his] claim, breach of fiduciary duty,
and the relief he seeks, surcharge of the
trustee for the losses resulting from the
breach, were typically-indeed,
exclusively-equitable in the days of the
divided bench." Here, the United States
notes, certiorari is warranted because
although the Fourth Circuit's erroneous
holding comports with those of five other
circuits, the Seventh Circuit has reached the
opposite conclusion.
In closing, the United States notes that
ERISA was enacted to address "misuse and
mismanagement of plan assets by plan
administrators," as well as "to protect . . .
the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans . . . by establishing standards
of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
fiduciaries of [those] plans, and by
providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts." As such, the United States
concludes, certiorari should be granted "to
clarify that ERISA provides monetary
remedies to recompense plans and
participants who have been harmed by
fiduciary breaches."
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"Dismissal of Granted ERISA Case Urged"
SCOTUS Blog
July 25, 2007
Lyle Denniston
Attorneys for a nationwide management
consulting firm involved in a case the
Supreme Court is scheduled to hear at its
next Term have urged the Justices to dismiss
the case as moot. In a motion filed on
Monday, counsel for DeWolff, Boberg &
Associates Inc. said that the individual who
took the case to the Supreme Court has
withdrawn all of his funds from his pension
plan account, leaving him "with no legally
cognizable interest in the outcome of the
case." The motion, re-filed with redactions
to protect privacy interests, can be found
here. The individual involved has a right to
respond.
The case is LaRue v. DeWolff Boberg &
Associates, et aL (docket 06-856). The
Court agreed on June 18 to hear the case
after seeking the views of the U.S. Solicitor
General, who urged the Court to hear and
decide both issues raised by James LaRue, a
Texan who worked for DeWolff Boberg
until 2001.
Thomas P. Gies, a Washington attorney for
DeWolff Boberg, told the Court that, in
assembling materials for a merits brief in the
case, his office "discovered that on July 22,
2006, while the case was still pending before
the Fourth Circuit," LaRue withdraw all of
his funds from his account.
In LaRue's petition, filed last Nov. 6, he
raised two issues: whether the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act allows a
pension plan participant to sue a plan
manager or administrator to recover losses
that the worker suffered in a personal
pension account because of actions by the
plan operator, and whether ERISA allows
monetary relief, in the form of a court-
ordered payback, as a remedy for alleged
wrongs by a plan operator.
The Fourth Circuit Court ruled on June 19
last year that LaRue could not assert a claim
under ERISA because recovery must benefit
the plan as a whole, not a particular plan
participant.
Solicitor General Paul D. Clement, in urging
the Court to decide the two questions, said
they were "important and recurring" issues
regarding civil enforcement of ERISA.
DeWolff Boberg's dismissal motion,
however, noted that neither of the two legal
claims involves a live controversy, because
of LaRue's withdrawal from the plan. The
ERISA provision at issue in the first
question raised allows a lawsuit by "a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary," the
motion said. There is no legal basis, the
motion contended, for allowing a former
participant in a defined contribution plan to
bring a lawsuit under that section to recover
damages measured by lost profits. The
Supreme Court, it noted, has not addressed
the issue.
The provision at issue in the second legal
claim, according to the motion, also makes
that issue moot. The claim LaRue made
under that section, it noted, was that he was
only seeking to have the plan reflect what
would have been his interest in it. Now that
he is a former plan participant, the motion
contended, he has no legally cognizable
interest in a recovery by the plan.
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The Supreme Court, it added, "has
recognized that when a petitioner voluntarily
changes his status . . . while litigation is
pending, that change may render the matter
moot by eliminating the petitioner's legally
cognizable interest in his claim."
Although recommending that the case be
dismissed, the motion did suggest that the
Court "may wish to consider" deciding now
another question that LaRue did not raise in
his petition-that is, whether a worker who
is no longer a participant in an ERISA plan
has a right to sue for damages measured by
lost value in his plan. That is an issue on
which the lower courts are divided, the
motion said.
Submitted along with the motion to dismiss
was a sworn declaration by a vice president
of DeWolff Boberg, Morgan Buffington,
saying that he had learned just this month
that LaRue had withdrawn all of his funds
and ceased to be a plan participant in July
2006. A statement about his account for the
third quarter of 2006, Buffington said,
showed a zero balance and a withdrawal of
$119,009.13.
At the time of his withdrawal of the funds in
July 2006, the declaration said, LaRue "was
no longer employed [by the firm] and
received no other income" from it, so he
"could not make any additional
contributions to the plan following his
decision to close out his account."
Forms included with the motion indicated
that LaRue has an address in Southlake,
Texas.
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Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Management Company
(06-1221)
Ruling Below: (Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2006), cert
granted, 127 S.Ct. 2937, 75 USLW 3661, 75 USLW 3657, 75 USLW 3499).
Plaintiff Ellen Mendelsohn sued her former employer, Sprint/United Management Company,
after the company terminated her employment in 2002 as part of an ongoing company-wide
reduction in force (RIF). Mendelsohn alleged that Sprint unlawfully discriminated against her in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. After a
trial on the merits, a jury returned a verdict for Sprint. Mendelsohn appealed the verdict, arguing
that the district court erred in excluding the "me, too" testimony of other former employees who
alleged similar discrimination, which she believed demonstrated the pervasive presence of age
discrimination at Sprint.
Questions Presented: Whether a district court may properly exclude "me, too" evidence from
non-parties, alleging discrimination at the hands of persons who did not play a role in the
plaintiffs adverse employment situation, in employment discrimination cases.
Ellen MENDELSOHN,
Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit
Decided, November 1, 2006
[Excerpt: Footnotes and citations omitted.]
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Ellen Mendelsohn sued her former
employer Defendant Sprint/United
Management Company (Sprint). alleging
Sprint unlawfully discriminated against her
on the basis of age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
Mendelsohn alleged she was selected for
termination on account of her age during a
company-wide reduction in force (RIF).
After a trial on the merits, a jury returned a
verdict for Sprint. At issue in this appeal is
whether the district court erred in excluding
testimonial evidence from former Sprint
employees who alleged similar
discrimination during the same RIF. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Because the evidentiary exclusion deprived
Mendelsohn of a full opportunity to present
her case to the jury, we conclude the district
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court abused its discretion in excluding the
evidence. We reverse and remand for a new
trial.
I.
[The Court recounts the background and
factual history of the case. Mendelsohn
worked for Sprint from 1989 until
November 2002. At the time, Mendelsohn
was fifty-one years old and the oldest
manager in her unit. Mendelsohn brought
her claim under the ADEA. As evidence of
Sprint's alleged discriminatory animus
toward older employees, Mendelsohn sought
to introduce evidence that Sprint terminated
five other employees over the age of forty as
part of the same RIF. Prior to trial, Sprint
filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude,
among other things, any evidence of Sprint's
alleged discriminatory treatment of other
employees. Relying exclusively on
Aramburu v. The Boeing Co.. 112 F.3d
1398, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997). Sprint argued
any reference to alleged discrimination by
any supervisor other than Paul Reddick,
Mendelsohn's supervisor, was irrelevant to
the issue in this case. The district court
granted the motion in part. and limited
Mendelsohn's evidence to "Sprint
employees who are similarly situated to
her." To prove the employees were
"similarly situated," the district court
required Mendelsohn to show Reddick
supervised the employees and Sprint
terminated them in close temporal proximity
to Mendelsohn's termination. Because
Reddick did not supervise any of the other
employees Mendelsohn sought to place on
the stand, the district court excluded their
testimony at trial. Following the court's in
limine ruling, Mendelsohn submitted in
writing a proper offer of proof. Following an
eight-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for
Sprint finding Sprint did not discriminate
against Mendelsohn on the basis of age.
Mendelsohn then filed a motion for a new
trial renewing her objections to the district
court's in limine ruling. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
50(b). The district court denied the motion,
and Mendelsohn timely appealed.]
II.
Mendelsohn argues the district court
committed reversible error by requiring her
to show she and the other employees shared
a supervisor as a precondition for
admissibility of their testimony. According
to Mendelsohn, the testimony of other
employees in the protected age group who
were subject to substantially similar RIF
terminations was relevant and admissible as
reflecting on Sprint's discriminatory intent
in selecting Mendelsohn to the RIF. Sprint,
on the other hand, maintains any evidence of
its treatment toward other employees is not
relevant to the determination of this action
because the evidence does not make it more
likely that Sprint discriminated against
Mendelsohn.
We review the district court's ruling to
exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.
See Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc.. 429
F.3d 986, 1000 (10th Cir. 2005). . . .
Applying these standards, we agree with
Mendelsohn that the evidence she sought to
introduce is relevant to Sprint's
discriminatory animus toward older
workers, and the exclusion of such evidence
unfairly inhibited Mendelsohn from
presenting her case to the jury. See, e.g.,
Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d
1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 1998) (identifying as a
theory of pretext in RIF cases evidence of an
employer's general policy of using a RIF to
terminate older employees in favor of
younger employees).
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A.
To prevail on a discriminatory discharge
claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff bears the
burden of proving age was the motivating
factor for the employer's decision to
terminate her. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143,
120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000).
As part of her proof, the plaintiff must
persuade the jury that the employer's
proffered reason for its conduct is unworthy
of belief. See Pippin v. Burlington
Resources Oil And Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186,
1193 (10th Cir. 2006). Because direct
testimony as to the employer's mental
processes seldom exists, see Reeves, 530
U.S. at 141, evidence of the employer's
general discriminatory propensities may be
relevant and admissible to prove
discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-805, 93
S. Ct. 1817. 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) ("Other
evidence that may be relevant to any
showing of pretext includes . . . [the
employer's] general policy and practice with
respect to minority employment."); see also
United States Postal Seri. Bd. of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-14 n. 2, 103 S.
Ct. 1478, 75 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1983).
We have previously recognized the
testimony of employees, other than the
plaintiff, concerning how the employer
treated them as relevant to the employer s
discriminatory intent. See Spulak v. K Mart
Coip., 894 F.2d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir.
1990). For example, in Greene v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554 (10th Cir. 1996),
and Bingman v. Natkin & Company, 937
F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1991), we recognized
evidence the employer had terminated other
older employees was relevant as evidence of
a pattern of dismissal based on age.
Similarly, in Coletti v. Cubb Pressure
Control, 165 F.3d 767. 776 (10th Cir. 1999),
we found testimony of other employees
regarding how defendant treated them
relevant to the defendant's discriminatory
intent where "testimony establishes a pattern
of retaliatory behavior or tends to discredit
the employer's assertion of legitimate
motive."
Sprint would have us extend the "same
supervisor" rule announced in Aramburu to
this case. In Aramburu, we held in the
context of a discriminatory discipline action
that plaintiffs seeking to present testimony
of other employees who were treated more
favorably for violating the same work rule
(or another of comparable seriousness) as
evidence of discriminatory intent, must
show they shared the same supervisor with
the proffered witnesses. As we have
observed elsewhere: "The 'same supervisor'
test has been found to be relevant in cases
involving allegations of discriminatory
disciplinary actions." Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Horizon/CMS
Healthcare, 220 F.3d 1184, 1198 n. 10 (10th
Cir. 2000). In discussing Aramburu, we
explained comparison of a supervisor's
disciplinary action with other disciplinary
action of the same supervisor is relevant to
show the bias of the supervisor. For
example:
If X fires A, an Hispanic, for particular
misconduct, but gives only a warning to B, a
non-Hispanic, for identical misconduct, one
might infer that something beyond the
misconduct (such as a bias by X against
Hispanics) motivated the disciplinary action.
But if it was Y, not X, who decided not to
impose a harsher sanction against B, one
cannot infer that X's decision to fire A must
have been motivated by something other
than A's misconduct. X may simply have a
less tolerant view toward misconduct than Y
does. Cf. Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1233
("Different supervisors will inevitably react
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differently to employee insubordination.").
Rivera v. City and County of Denver, 365
F.3d 912. 922 (10th Cir. 2004). This case,
on the other hand, is not about individual
conduct but about a company-wide policy of
which all Sprint's supervisors were
allegedly aware. Accordingly, we decline to
extend the "same supervisor" rule beyond
the context of disciplinary cases.
Since deciding Aramburu, we have only
applied the "same supervisor" rule in the
context of alleged discriminatory discipline.
See, e.g., MacKenzie v. City and County of
Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1277 (10th Cir.
2005); Rivera, 365 F.3d at 922; Kendrick v.
Penske Transp. Services, Inc., 220 F.3d
1220, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000). For example,
in Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of
Regents for Langston University, 245 F.3d
1172 (10th Cir. 2001), a gender
discrimination case, we declined to extend
the application of the "same supervisor" rule
beyond its original context.
Aramburu has no application where, as here,
plaintiff claims to be a victim of a company-
wide discriminatory RIF. Applying
Aramburu's "same supervisor" rule in the
context of an alleged discriminatory
company-wide RIF would, in many
circumstances, make it significantly
difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff to
prove a case of discrimination based on
circumstantial evidence. Conceivably, a
plaintiff might be the only employee
selected for a RIF supervised by a particular
supervisor. Meanwhile, scores of other
employees within the protected group also
selected for the RIF might work for different
supervisors. In such cases, the constraints of
Aramburu would preclude a plaintiff from
introducing testimony from those other
employees. Applying Aramburu to cases of
discrimination based on an alleged
company-wide discriminatory RIF would
create an unwarranted disparity between
those cases where the plaintiff is fortunate
enough to have other RIF'd employees in
the protected class working for her
supervisor, and those cases where the
plaintiff is not so fortunate. We do not think
such disparity should exist.
B.
The testimony of the other employees
concerning Sprint's alleged discriminatory
treatment and similar RIF terminations is
"logically or reasonably" tied to the decision
to terminate Mendelsohn. Spulak, 894 F.2d
at 1156 n. 2 (upholding a district court's
decision to allow former employees in the
protected age group to testify about the
circumstances surrounding their
employment departure). In this case, the
other employees' testimony is logically tied
to Sprint's alleged motive in selecting
Mendelsohn to the RIF. Although
Mendelsohn and the other employees
worked under different supervisors, Sprint
terminated all of them within a year as part
of an ongoing company-wide RIF. All the
employees were in the protected age group,
and their selection to the RIF was based on
similar criteria. Accordingly, testimony
concerning the other employees'
circumstances was relevant to Sprint's
discriminatory intent.
According to the dissent, the evidence
Mendelsohn proffered need not be admitted
because it is "devoid of independent
evidence showing that Sprint had company-
wide discriminatory policies." Dissent at 4.
The dissent, however, does not explain what
this independent evidence might be. In
Gossett. we noted that evidence regarding
the discriminatory application of an
enterprise-wide policy by other supervisors
was admissible when the plaintiff has "other
evidence of that policy[.]" 245 F.3d at 1177.
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Thus, we required a plaintiff to proffer
evidence, other than her own testimony,
concerning the alleged application of said
policy. In Gossett, the plaintiff satisfied this
requirement by introducing an affidavit from
a former student and professor concerning
the application of the policy. Id. at 1177,
1179 n. 2.
Similarly, Mendelsohn in this case proffered
independent evidence in the form of
testimony from other Sprint employees who
were similarly terminated during the RIF.
The dissent mistakenly reads Gossett to
require independent evidence apart from that
evidence which Mendelsohn has proffered.
Reading Gossett in such a manner may place
an insurmountable evidentiary burden upon
a claimant entitled to prove her case of age
discrimination by circumstantial evidence.
See Merrick v. Northern Natural Gas Co.,
Div. of Enron Corp., 911 F.2d 426, 429
(10th Cir. 1990)(noting the ADEA does not
require an employee to produce direct
evidence of discriminatory intent; rather the
employee only need show the employer's
proffered justification is unworthy of belief).
We respectfully disagree with the dissent's
interpretation of Gossett.
Moreover, the dissent claims "the district
court did not apply a narrow interpretation
of admissibility to the evidence of company-
wide discrimination," because the district
court admitted into evidence exhibits 3 and
4. Dissent at 2. Those exhibits are a
compilation of documents Sprint used
during the RIF process that includes
spreadsheets containing, among other data,
the names and age of Sprint employees who
were being considered for termination. In
addition, the court permitted Jo Renda,
Director of Human Resources, to testify
concerning the use of these documents
during the RIF process. With the exception
of Mendelsohn, however, none of the
employees identified in the spreadsheets
testified at trial. The dissent fails to
recognize the limited purpose for which the
district court admitted this evidence as well
as the distinct characteristic of the evidence
the district court excluded in its ruling on the
motion in limine.
Of particular relevance to the case was
whether Sprint followed its own procedures
when it selected Mendelsohn for the RIF. In
fact, the district court denied Sprint's motion
for summary judgment on this very issue.
The district court made quite clear that
exhibits 3 and 4 as well as Renda's
testimony was allowed to come in for the
purpose of determining Sprint's compliance
with its procedures:
[T]he reason I overruled your
motion for summary judgment
was because there was, I thought,
sufficient evidence in the record
that Sprint didn't follow its own
procedures. I think that makes the
whole process, you know, fair
game. what was the procedure and
was it followed? And if this
spreadsheet was used as part of the
implementation of the RIF and it
has ages on it, then I think that it's
fair game for the jury.
It was never my intention to
preclude Plaintiff from putting on
evidence about the RIF, how it
worked, whether Sprint followed
its own RIF procedures, et. cetera.
Aplt's Supp. Appx. at 88, 92-93. In response
to Sprint's concerns regarding the improper
use of this evidence the district court
reiterated that its in limine ruling was aimed
at excluding "other employees . . from
213
coming in and saying, I was RIF'd, it was
because of my age" and that the ruling
applied to this evidence. Id. at 93-94. The
court made clear Mendelsohn's use of this
evidence would have to conform to the in
limine ruling. See id. at 55-56. Therefore,
these exhibits were not offered for the
purpose of showing pretext under the theory
Sprint had a policy of favoring younger
employees. Instead, the district court
admitted this evidence under a different
theory of pretext by showing Sprint did not
follow its own RIF criteria. In addition, Jo
Renda was able to use this evidence to find
examples of older employees whom Sprint
had retained, even though they were not
supervised by Reddick. Thus, the district
court's in limine ruling disadvantaged
Mendelsohn further because Sprint was
allowed to portray itself as retaining older
employees, aside from Mendelsohn, even
though these employees were not all
supervised by Reddick.
... The nature of the evidence Mendelsohn
proffered is vastly different from the
evidence the jury considered-merely
names and dates of birth. Evidence of an
employer's alleged prior discriminatory
conduct toward other employees in the
protected class has long been admissible to
show an employer's state of mind or attitude
toward members of the protected class. See,
e.g.. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at
804; Aikens, 460 U.S. at 713-14 n. 2; Estes
v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc.. 856 F.2d 1097.
1102-03 (8th Cir. 1988); Hunter v. Allis-
Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d
1417, 1423-24 (7th Cir. 1986). These other
employees should have been allowed to take
the stand and testify subject, of course, to
any district court ruling regarding the proper
use and limitations of such testimony.
Generally, a court's evidentiary ruling is
entitled to deference. See Shugart v. Central
Rural Elec. Co-op., 110 F.3d 1501, 1508
(10th Cir. 1997). But the court's discretion
over evidentiary matters should not unfairly
prevent a plaintiff a full opportunity to
present her case. See Gossett, 245 F.3d at
1178. Blanket pretrial evidentiary
exclusions, in particular, "can be especially
damaging in employment cases, in which
plaintiffs must face the difficult task of
persuading the fact-finder to disbelieve an
employer's account of its own motives."
Hawkins v. Hennepin Technical Center, 900
F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1990)(citation omitted).
The evidence which Mendelsohn seeks to
present, "is certainly not conclusive
evidence of age discrimination itself, but it
is surely the kind of fact which could cause
a reasonable trier of fact to raise an
eyebrow, and proceed to assess the
employer's explanation" for its motive in
terminating Mendelsohn. Greene, 98 F.3d at
561. Age as a motivation for Sprint's
selection of Mendelsohn to the RIF becomes
more probable when the fact-finder is
allowed to consider evidence of (1) an
atmosphere of age discrimination, and (2)
Sprint's selection of other older employees
to the RIF.
C.
Finally, Sprint argues the testimony should
be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403. Rule
403 allows a district court to exclude
relevant evidence when concerns over unfair
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time
substantially outweigh the probative value
of the evidence. Sprint argues that allowing
the evidence would prejudice Sprint because
it would result in Sprint having to defend
multiple claims of discrimination. To be
sure, the district court retains its power to
limit cumulative and marginally relevant
testimony. But otherwise, we disagree.
Excluding otherwise admissible evidence
under Rule 403 "is an extraordinary remedy
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[that] should be used sparingly." United
States v. Roberts, 88 F.3d 872, 880 (10th
Cir. 1996). "In performing the 403
balancing, the court should give the
evidence its maximum reasonable probative
force and its minimum reasonable
prejudicial value." Deters v. Equifax Credit
Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th
Cir. 2000)(internal quotations omitted).
Little doubt exists that the admission of
evidence about other alleged episodes of
discrimination would inconvenience Sprint.
But the fact Sprint would have to rebut this
testimony is not in itself enough to outweigh
the probative value of Mendelsohn's
proffered evidence. See Bingman, 937 F.2d
at 557. Based on the record before us, we
cannot say the evidence is unduly
prejudicial. 5
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above
the district court's order denying
Mendelsohn's motion for a new trial is
reversed. We remand to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I do not
believe the district court abused its
discretion in its evidentiary rulings
excluding testimony. At the outset, I agree
that the district court's ruling is difficult to
decipher, especially looking solely at the
minute order. In the context of the trial,
however, I think the court's ruling is clear
enough-the proffered testimony from other
employees failed to satisfy the relevancy and
prejudice requirements of Rule 403.
Moreover, I believe the majority makes a
mistake in holding that testimony from other
employees not similarly situated is
admissible even where the plaintiff has
made no independent showing of a
company-wide policy of discrimination.
A.
A brief review of the evidence the court
admitted will place its ruling in perspective.
First, despite its pre-trial ruling regarding
the witness testimony, the court admitted
Exhibits 3 and 4, voluminous documents
from Sprint's "succession planning" file,
including notes on employees slated for
termination pursuant to the company-wide
RIF. Both exhibits show that Sprint kept
information on the gender, ethnicity and age
of employees alongside other information
on their performance and perceived
"4potential." .
Second, the court also allowed testimony
regarding the RIF dismissal of Marc Elster,
one of Reddick's peers who was 51 at the
time of his termination....
This evidence shows that the district court
did not apply a narrow interpretation of
admissibility to the evidence of company-
wide discrimination proffered by
Mendelsohn....
Finally, in addition to admitting actual
evidence of pretext, the district court
rejected a jury instruction proffered by
Sprint, which would have instructed jurors
to consider only evidence about employees
similarly situated to Mendelsohn. The court
explained that evidence outside of Reddick's
chain of command had been allowed to
come in as relevant to the question of
pretext.. ..
In sum, it appears to me that the plaintiff had
an adequate opportunity to introduce
relevant evidence of Sprint's corporate
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policies and practices surrounding the RIF
and argue that the RIF was itself a pretext
for age discrimination. I am further
convinced of this after studying the
proposed testimony of the five witnesses
proffered by Mendelsohn and excluded by
the district court. Their proposed testimony
seems a mixture of hearsay and speculation
that would be marginally admissible in any
event. I cannot say that the court erred in
excluding such testimony under the
standards of Rule 403.
I readily admit that the court would not have
erred in admitting the evidence. see, e.g.,
Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150,
1156 (10th Cir. 1990), but I am equally
confident that the court did not abuse its
discretion in choosing to exclude it.
B.
The larger problem with the majority's
position is it suggests that anecdotal
evidence from employees throughout a large
organization will be per se admissible when
offered in the context of alleged
discrimination in a RIF. This appeal
illustrates the hazard of such an approach for
several reasons.
The first reason is the lack of any statistical
or other direct evidence that supports an
inference of enterprise-wide discrimination.
Given the size of Sprint, the fact that
Mendelsohn found five former employees
who believed they were victims of age
discrimination is not meaningful until a
specific evidentiary foundation has been
laid. The proffer of evidence here is devoid
of independent evidence showing that Sprint
had company-wide discriminatory policies.
Even taking as true Mendelsohn's assertion
that these witnesses would provide credible
evidence that managers other than Reddick
were motivated by discriminatory animus,
this does not in and of itself support the
conclusion that Reddick was so motivated.
Nor does it establish that the RIF's
"subjective criteria" was a pretext for age
discrimination. While Sprint may well have
had policies designed to discriminate against
older employees, without more, the
excluded testimony does nothing to establish
that fact, nor does it directly support an
inference that Mendelsohn's termination
was wrongfully motivated. See Carpenter v.
Boeing Co. 456 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2006)
(discussing use of statistical evidence to
support claim of disparate treatment). The
evidence must tend to show that the
company had a policy to discriminate, not
merely a policy applied in a discriminatory
manner by an individual supervisor or
supervisors.
The second and more important hazard of
the majority's approach is the narrow
reading it gives to Aramburu. The so-called
".same supervisor" rule articulated in that
case recognizes that where an employee has
putatively been fired for the violation of a
workplace rule, an inference of
discrimination is more likely where the same
supervisor disciplines similarly situated
employees differently. Aramburu v. The
Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398. 1403 (10th Cir.
1997).
But it is equally plausible that an employer
could have a company-wide policy of using
disciplinary actions as a pretext for unlawful
discrimination. In such a case, I suspect we
would modify the applicable relevancy
standard in order to account for and allow
evidence of a company-wide policy.
I would do the same in the RIF context and
apply the Aramburu rule in cases like this
one unless "independent evidence of
specific enterprise-wide policy" has been
developed. Rivera v. City and County of
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Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 922 (10th Cir. 2004).
Since Mendelsohn did not establish a
foundation that the proffered evidence
would support such a finding, and since she
otherwise had the opportunity to present
evidence to the jury of other older
employees subject to the RIF, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the additional witness testimony.
The second and more important hazard of
the majority's approach is the narrow
reading it gives to Aramburu. The so-called
"same supervisor" rule articulated in that
case recognizes that where an employee has
putatively been fired for the violation of a
workplace rule, an inference of
discrimination is more likely where the same
supervisor disciplines similarly situated
employees differently. Aramburu v. The
Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1403 (10th Cir.
1997).
But it is equally plausible that an employer
could have a company-wide policy of using
disciplinary actions as a pretext for unlawful
discrimination. In such a case, I suspect we
would modify the applicable relevancy
standard in order to account for and allow
evidence of a company-wide policy.
I would do the same in the RIF context and
apply the Aramburu rule in cases like this
one unless "independent evidence of
specific enterprise-wide policy" has been
developed. Rivera v. City and County of
Denver, 365 F.3d 912. 922 (10th Cir. 2004).
Since Mendelsohn did not establish a
foundation that the proffered evidence
would support such a finding, and since she
otherwise had the opportunity to present
evidence to the jury of other older
employees subject to the RIF, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the additional witness testimony.
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"Workplace Bias Evidence Draws
Supreme Court Scrutiny"
Bloomberg
June 11, 2007
Greg Stohr
The U.S. Supreme Court will use an age-
bias lawsuit against Sprint Nextel Corp. to
consider limiting the ability of workers to
present evidence of discrimination against
other employees at trial.
The justices today agreed to hear arguments
from Sprint, the nation's third-largest
mobile-phone service provider, in its bid to
end an age-bias lawsuit by Ellen
Mendelsohn, who lost her job as a manager
during layoffs in 2002. Sprint wants the
court to reinstate a jury verdict in the
company's favor.
The court will consider the admissibility of
what Sprint calls "me, too" evidence-
testimony by other alleged victims of
discrimination. In ruling against Sprint, a
federal appeals court said five of
Mendelsohn's former coworkers should
have been allowed to testify in the case.
"For the trial to be fair, district judges must
retain the discretion to declare that such
proof, whatever its marginal probative
value, is unfairly prejudicial," Sprint argued
in court papers, filed in Washington.
AT&T Inc., Honeywell International Inc.
and Lockheed Martin Corp. joined Sprint in
urging the high court to take up the case,
saying the issue is a recurring one in
employment-discrimination lawsuits.
In siding with Mendelsohn and ordering a
new trial, the Denver-based 10th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals said the testimony
was relevant because the other workers lost
their jobs as part of the same layoff. Like
Mendelsohn, all five worked for Sprint in
Kansas City, Kansas, though they didn't
report to her supervisor.
"The 10th Circuit, like other courts of
appeals, addresses on a case-by-case basis
the relevance of anecdotal evidence of other
discrimination," argued Mendelsohn, who
was 51 when she was fired.
Sprint is based in Reston, Virginia.
The justices will hear arguments during their
2007-08 term, which starts in October.
The case is Sprint/United Management v.
Mendelsohn, 06-1221.
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"Job Bias and "Me, Too" Evidence"
SCOTUS Blog
June 11, 2007
Lyle Denniston
Workers who believe they lost a job or a
workplace opportunity because of their age
must offer proof that their age was the
motivating factor for what happened to
them. Since there is seldom direct evidence
of the employer's mindset, lawyers for
workers in such cases try to prove a general
propensity in the management of the
company to favor younger workers. On
Monday, the Supreme Court said it will
consider, at its next Term, whether a worker
claiming discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act can
bring other workers into the case to testify
that they, too, were victims of age bias on
the job-so-called "me, too" evidence. The
other workers would not have been in the
case as actual parties, but were available to
tell their stories to help prove the claim.
(The new case does not involve a claim of a
pattern or practice of discrimination based
on age, but only a single worker's claim.)
The case[, Sprint/United Manageient i.
Mendelsohn,] involves Ellen Mendelson,
who worked for a company in Kansas City,
Mo.. named Sprint/United Management Co.
(a subsidiary of Sprint Nextel Corp.) She
was on the payroll there from 1989 to
November 2002. working in business
development activities.
In the fall of 2002, the Sprint unit, hit by the
recession that generally spread through the
telecom industry, decided to downsize its
payroll. Other Sprint units elsewhere were
also involved in the cutback, with the release
of some 15,000 workers.
Mendelson, at the time, was 51 years old.
She was laid off-one of 18 persons in her
group who lost their jobs in the downsizing.
Sprint later claimed that her performance
had been weak, and that is why she was
included in the group that got laid off. She
claimed age bias was the controlling factor,
charging company-wide discrimination
against older workers. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
rejected her challenge, finding no evidence
of an ADEA violation. She thus was free to
sue, and did so.
She asserted in her lawsuit that the bias
against her was typical for the Sprint unit.
Her lawyers then began assembling proof
for the trial.
Mendelson's counsel sought to call five
other ex-employees of Sprint, all within the
40-and-over age range-the range protected
by ADEA from discrimination. They, too,
were ready to testify that they also were
victims of discrimination, as was
Mendelson. Sprint lawyers objected, arguing
that they were not in the same situation as
Mendelson, because none of them had
worked for the supervisor who made the
decision to lay off Mendelson. The District
Court ruled that only workers laid off by the
same supervisor could be called to testify on
Mendelson's claim, so it barred the
prospective witnesses on her side. The case
went to a jury, and it ruled in favor of Sprint,
finding no discrimination against
Mendelson.
The case then moved to the Tenth Circuit,
which ruled in a 2-1 decision last Nov. 1 that
a District Court trying an ADEA case must
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admit any testimony of other workers who
claimed to suffer the same sort of bias
against them-even if they had worked for a
different supervisor, or in a different work
unit for the same employer. While the
Circuit Court said that, in the past, it had
limited testimony in a job bias case to that of
other workers who had the same supervisor,
it stressed that the prior case involved only a
claim of discriminatory disciplinary actions,
and it had never applied that restriction in
any other workplace context.
If "me, too" evidence were excluded when
different supervisors were involved, the
Circuit Court said, that would make it
significantly more difficult in many
circumstances to prove discrimination based
on circumstantial evidence. Conceivably, an
individual worker might be the only
employee chosen for a reduction in force by
a particular supervisor, but scores of other
workers within the 40 and older group might
have been treated the same way by other
supervisors.
Sprint/United's petition for review raises
this question: "whether a district court must
admit 'me, too' evidence-testimony by
nonparties, alleging discrimination at the
hands of persons who played no role in the
adverse employment decision challenged by
the plaintiff." It contends that the Tenth
Circuit ruling conflicts with decisions in
other circuits-four holding that such
evidence is wholly irrelevant, and five
excluding it under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The issue, the appeal said, is a
recurring question of proof in workplace
discrimination cases.
The appeal is supported by he Equal
Employment Advisory Council and the
Society for Human Resource Management.
They contended that admission of "me, too"
evidence will prolong litigation in
workplace cases, and will unfairly prejudice
management as it seeks to defend itself,
since management would be forced to justify
every other employment decision it had
made against any worker who is allowed to
come in and testify.
The case will be briefed over the summer,
and will be heard sometime in the fall or
early winter.
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